84. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Geneva0
Tosec 36. Eyes only for the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. Re Secto 25.1 The following comments have been prepared by senior officers of the Department, including Bohlen:
In view of shortage of time and necessity of it reaching you before your next meeting with Gromyko, it has not had White House clearance, therefore represents only Department view.
Gromyko’s comments in your two meetings do not add any factual material or any new arguments which would be of assistance in making a new evaluation of Soviet intentions. General tenor of the conversation seems to us to stick squarely on previous positions but is presented in a somewhat more definitive way in regard to the signature of a separate peace treaty. It is likewise noticed that Gromyko read from a paper which would indicate that he was operating under instructions from highest authority, but it is also noted that he tended to back away at end of first conversation on the threat aspect of his remarks. It is also significant that he put no time limit or date in regard to the signature of a peace treaty and was even more evasive when pressed as to exactly what would be its consequences other than implication of his remark that arrangements would have to be made with GDR and not with Soviet Union.
Despite generally tougher line, it is no more possible now than it was earlier to make any accurate prediction as to course of Soviet future [Page 239] action and we are still inclined to believe that Soviets have not definitely made up their mind on this aspect.
The threat of Soviet action and the constant repetition about the necessity of removal of Western troops would seem to be in line with recent indications from Moscow of Soviet position. It is possible that this line is dictated by a desire to probe in depth the Western position and when satisfied that there is no give to use this as a justification for an eventual separate peace treaty.
Another conceivable but less likely motivation is that a strong negative Western attitude might be utilized by the Soviets as an argument against those elements within the communist bloc (in particular East Germans) or even within the Soviet Government who have been pressing for a radical solution of Berlin question. A strong Western attitude would demonstrate that any radical solution carries with it a great risk of war. We are unable to carry the analysis any farther.
It is of course conceivable that Gromyko may show some more flexibility in your next meeting with him, which we understand is at noon, Geneva time, tomorrow. We have noted that Gromyko has referred to the removal of Western forces as the “crucial point” of discussion. You might care at the next session if he sticks to this point to say that you had already given all the arguments as to why this was quite inconceivable for Western acceptance and in general shorten the conversation if there seems to be no Soviet give and tell Gromyko you would report his attitude to the President on your return and suggest that he should do the same with Khrushchev.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–2362. Secret; Niact. Drafted and initialed by Bohlen, cleared by Hilsman and Davis, and approved and initialed by Ball.↩
- Document 83.↩
- On July 23 Davis had sent Bohlen a similar evaluation adding that Rusk might press Gromyko on what would happen to access controls if the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with East Germany. Rusk might also try to explore designating the Western troops in Berlin something other than NATO forces. (Memorandum from Davis; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–2362) On July 24 the Department of State sent Bundy a 2-page INR assessment of the first two talks with Gromyko, which stated that the talks confirmed the U.S. expectation “of a Soviet effort at this time to increase pressure on the West over Berlin.” (Ibid., 762.00/7–2462)↩