Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

22. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, March 23, 1962, 2 a.m.

Secto 91. Eyes only for the President and Acting Secretary. No Other Distribution. Separate telegram will give details my conversation with Gromyko alone today.¹ Two points seem clear. First, Gromyko shows no inclination to break off talks and register an impasse. Despite several firm and possibly provocative statements by me with respect to nature of possible crisis, he did not respond with belligerence or threats. Second, there seems to be no movement in Soviet position toward Western vital interests. He made it perfectly clear that minor variations in access proposals he had submitted were organically dependent upon removal Western forces from West Berlin.

At reception following our conversation Gromyko indicated some interest in “modus vivendi” paper I had handed to him.² He commented that certain subjects such as status of West Berlin had been omitted. I told him that we could discuss such questions. We agreed our respective colleagues might have preliminary discussion at technical level of his two recent papers and our paper before our next conversation. (This being arranged.)

There is no doubt that Gromyko understands conditions under which, from our point of view, they could sign peace treaty with GDR without precipitating crisis. He again stated clearly, however, that they are not interested in a peace treaty as pure formality but one which would either be based upon a prior agreement with West or one which would carry with it full implications of GDR sovereignty with respect to access and other questions.

I am aware that you hoped that conversations with Gromyko would clarify whether we are moving toward a crisis or toward a possible agreement. Nothing has been said at Geneva which indicates that we are moving toward an agreement. Whether this means we are moving toward a crisis is still obscure. Fact that Gromyko seems interested in continuation talks is at least relevant. Suggest intelligence community be specially alerted for other evidence of Soviet intentions.³

As to what happens next after this round of talks, judgment should be deferred pending Gromyko’s response to “modus vivendi” approach. Will report further in next day or so.

Unless there is some significant movement in their position in next two days, I plan to leave Geneva Monday afternoon.⁴ In my final talk with Gromyko I would not register impasse but would merely say that I would report in full to you on our conversations.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–2262. Secret; Niact. Received on March 22 at 11:18 p.m. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Rusk and concurred in by Bohlen, Thompson, and Kohler. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 193, Chron)
1. See Document 19.
2. Document 20.
3. At 5:37 p.m. on March 23 the Department of State cabled Secretary Rusk at Geneva that the intelligence community was reviewing Soviet intentions on Berlin, but the evidence available did not appear to indicate a Soviet intention to precipitate a crisis, although air and ground access to the city would continue to be harassed. (Tosec 128; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–2362)
4. March 26.