Office of the Historian
  1. Home
  2. Historical Documents
  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963
  4. Document 21

21. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State0

Bonn, March 22, 1962, 6 p.m.

2285. Geneva for Sec Del. USAREUR for Gen Clarke. I regard Vopo shooting US Military Liaison vehicle1 as an extremely serious development following as it does the wounding under similar circumstances of a member of the British Armed Forces2 and believe that serious counter-measures should be taken against Soviet Military Mission in West Germany. [Page 72] I recognize that any measures we may take may produce comparable steps by Russians against our Mission in Potsdam thus severely restricting their normal intelligence activity. Nevertheless I recommend that Gen Clarke’s protest to Marshal Konev be followed immediately by serious counter-measures against Sov Military Missions in West Germany including restriction of Sov Missions to their compounds until a satisfactory reply has been received from the Sov authorities.3

Although I understand British have not instituted any counter-measures I have not discussed this with British and French Embs in Bonn except to protest to Sov authorities.

Dowling
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0021/3–2262. Secret; Priority. Received at 3:17 p.m. Also sent to Geneva and USAREUR and repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.↩
  2. On March 20 and 21 a U.S. Military Liaison Mission vehicle was detained and shot at by Vopos in the Gotha area. A summary of the incident was transmitted in telegram 1795 from Berlin, March 22. (Ibid., 762.0221/3–2262)↩
  3. On March 10 the driver of a British Military Mission vehicle had been wounded by Vopos, and Soviet officials’ cooperation had been deemed “inadequate” in helping the victim. (Telegram 1764 from Berlin, March 17; ibid., 762.0221/3–1762)↩
  4. On March 22 General Clarke sent a letter of protest about the incident with the USMLM vehicle to Marshal Koniev, and on the following day outlined specific measures he would take if no reply were received by March 27 or if the reply were unsatisfactory. (Telegram 2300 from Bonn, March 24; ibid., 762.0221/3–2462) Clarke reported on March 27 that the Soviet reply, received that day, was unacceptable. (SX 2552 from Heidelberg; ibid., 762.0221/3–2262) Two days later the Chief of Staff, USAREUR, informed the Soviet MLM at Frankfurt that its personnel were restricted to the Mission except for official duties and that U.S. escorts would accompany any Soviet traffic. (SX 2601 from Heidelberg, March 29; ibid., 762.0221/3–2962)↩