143. Notes on Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group1
Kohler, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Gilpatric, Nitze, Lemnitzer, Murrow, Cabell, Acheson, Taylor, Bob Kennedy
Sec Def explained paper.2
P[resident] asked how divs would be employed. 2-1 each Corps; 2-another Corps; 2-mobile reserve.
I made clear our inc. strength will not enable us to reopen access to Berlin.
P asked Acheson—what would you rec.
A would support program’s rec. Looks like Sov accel. schedule prob as result of refugee prob. We must accelerate. Other purposes—restore morale of European allies to stand up to prospective military [Page 396] action. If allies go to pieces—we are taking lead. If allies collapse and won’t follow us—only way of stopping a disaster is for us to show Eur. what happens when you are weak. Would rec. 4 permanent divs to US Army—phase out reserves—res. have to go home. We should be creating a permanent larger force. All this to be better prepared for future similar crises. Lead our allies out of weakness. Be prepared for action. Not have onus of failure. Picking up pieces if we have a war. Rec to date does not add divs.
P discussed land, sea & air ops.
Nitze air access may be first blocked total. Described possible action—Schonfeld. Discussed escalation. Discussed ground target attacks.
P what then?
Rusk take it to the UN. Purpose of inc str of ground forces: stronger def w or w/o nuc; be prepared for enemy if he attacked in strength. When no W Ger can get to Berlin—we have lost.
Kohler if our air access stopped, we would stop Soviet civil air traffic; 80% goes in Eur. Most to Germany. They want to break link of civilian traffic between WG and West Berlin.
P we don’t seem to be able to impress K.
A we must respond with force.
Nitze explained part I naval blockade table; part II acts of war. Allies think they can win over USSR.
P with conventional?
Sec Def yes.
P what would Sov do? go in Iran?
Cabell prob not.
Rusk trouble will break out in other areas.
A was asked why he thinks K won’t want to neg—aren’t we done?
A because he thinks he can get what he wants without neg.
P won’t our troops (air & ground) upset gold flow?
Gil[patric] dep etc.—No.
Rusk asked if the supplies will permit approx 30 days.
Sec Def Yes—as long as they can fight with.
A will our allies fight over Berlin?
Sec Def No—unless we push them hard now.
A I agree. When will they drop by the wayside?
Rusk they have revitalized interests in Berlin. They want to see what neg produce. Believe in the last analysis they will fight.
[Page 397]P read Finletter msg—concern over too much mil action & too little pol.3
(Note. Apparently K has told Sulzberger he doesn’t want negotiations.)4
P How do we get it over to our allies to do something?
Rusk K proposals have not made any headway in Europe. Germans provide a tough problem.
Bundy Sukarno visit—we ought.5
Murrow little reaction to our dec to resume testing.6 We should put forth neg proposal.
A we are worrying about much needlessly. Allies will try almost anything to avoid doing anything. We must not appear too eager to negotiate.
Rusk hope Sec Def will be prepared to move up his schedule.
Sec Def rec approval of 3 items on page 1; 2 & 3 could be together.7
P when do we need to decide to move more than 1 div.
Sec Def later.
P we must insist allies do something more before we send more.
Sec Def our purpose is to insure that K knows we will use nuc.
B Kennedy we should get all this written down step-by-step.
Sec Def 1 2 & 3 informs K of our det.
I emphasized not being able to retake Berlin.
A if we had no troops in E & if we would not use nuc he would do as he pleases. We must est cred. of our det to use nuc. There are not enough div in Eur to retake B. We must show K & others we are not going to sacrifice 5 or more divs without use of nuc. We will be more ready to use nuc with more divs. If we don’t, we go from meg [reg?] to nuc war.
[Page 398]Nitze with 30 divs you can man the whole line.
Directive to Sec Def
Get down on paper how an additional 10 divs would do. Also naval. Pres is sending a paper to Sec Def.
P 2 & 3 approved. Item 1 is deferred.
A it is spelled out in my 28 June paper.8
Rusk we have launched a large effort of our own & exhorted allies to a lot—can we get half hearted now.
A this is only chance of making nuc war unnecessary.
Bundy could be the reverse.
- Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29. Top Secret. The source text is Lemnitzer’s handwritten notes.↩
- Reference is to a memorandum from McNamara to the President, September 7, which laid out a schedule of U.S. actions through the end of 1961, summarized the NATO buildup in conventional forces, and described the status of four-power military contingency planning. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Germany)↩
- See Document 134.↩
- Regarding Sulzberger’s interview with Khrushchev, see Document 146.↩
- Presidents Sukarno of Indonesia and Keita of Mali visited Washington September 12-13 to urge talks between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce tension. A memorandum of their conversation with the President on September 12 is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9-1261. For text of their message to the President, see Department of State Bulletin, October 2, 1961, p. 543; for text of the President’s September 14 reply, in which he attributed the Berlin crisis to the Soviet Union, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 602-604.↩
- For text of the President’s September 5 statement ordering a resumption of underground nuclear testing, see ibid., pp. 589-590.↩
- Point 1 of McNamara’s September 7 memorandum directed the call-up of four National Guard divisions; point 2 suspended the movement of dependents to Western Europe; and point 3 ordered the movement of 37,000 army personnel to Europe. On September 12, in NSAM No. 93, Bundy informed McNamara that the President had approved points 2 and 3. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs)↩
- Document 49.↩