72. Editorial Note
On February 9 Ambassador Bruce completed his report to the President. The 10-page report consisted of sections on U.S. objectives, obstacles that recent events had posed to the attainment of these objectives, U.S. strategies to overcome the obstacles, and some specific steps that should be taken to carry out U.S. strategies. Bruce proposed two objectives: (1) to deny Europe to Communist control and (2) to mobilize U.S. and European resources to serve the free world. After examining the question of European unity, Bruce concluded that it was still in the U.S. interest and went even further to state that European integration was an imperative of modern history. The prospect of a close connection between Europe and the United States was equally important.
Having reached these conclusions Bruce wrote that de Gaulle had created three obstacles to these objectives: (1) excluding the United Kingdom from the Common Market, (2) blocking the Common Market as a road to European political unity, and (3) presenting intra-European and Atlantic relationships contrary to U.S. interests and conceptions. To overcome these obstacles Bruce stated that the United States must make more clear its willingness to treat a united Europe as an equal partner and break the present European dependence and U.S. predominance in the relationship. The two critical areas available to do this were the multilateral mixed manned force and political consultations with the Europeans.
With regard to specific actions, Bruce suggested that for Germany the President should write Adenauer stressing U.S. willingness to maintain forces in Germany, a strong endorsement of the multilateral force, and a reiteration of U.S. support for bringing the United Kingdom fully into Europe. On the negative side Bruce stated that the United States should make no attempt to prevent ratification of the Franco-German treaty. With regard to the United Kingdom Bruce stressed the need for close but unobtrusive consultations, without doing anything publicly to reinforce the appearance of special ties. The British should also be encouraged to exploit whatever opportunities existed for closer ties with the continent and in particular to make adjustments in their economy to bring it into closer conformity with developments in the Common Market.
Bruce concluded his report with a short paragraph on France, stating that no immediate action was necessary. He believed:
“Our tactic with France must be to provide a counter attraction, not aimed at France, but at the legitimate ambitions of Europe. The opportunity for France to join in these efforts must always remain open. In the meantime, we should have well-informed contingency plans against a de Gaulle assault on NATO, our trade negotiations, or our balance of payments.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265)