66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0

1773. Paris pass USRO. Brussels also for Busec. In course meeting requested with Asst Secy Tyler January 31, German Minister von Lilienfeld expressed concern over fact that interpretation of Franco-German Treaty prevailing in US, arising from coincidence in timing de Gaulle press conference and treaty signing, seems to be that treaty foreshadows basic change in FRG policy vis-à-vis US. Minister stated this completely out of question; even if were contemplated by FedGovt (which not case), German people would not accept this. In view heightened concern German leaders following Brussels collapse, Minister said much thought being given to ways in which can be made clear again and again that signature Franco-German Treaty does not denote FRG endorsement de Gaulle policies, especially with respect UK-EEC accession and implementation Nassau Agreement.

In Tyler response, emphasis placed on our determination to press forward main lines our basic policy elaborated over period of years and concerted within Atlantic Alliance. We will in particular not be deflected from policy based on concept of Nassau, namely indivisibility of threat and of means required to meet threat. Tyler further emphasized need to avoid creating impression in US public and Congressional mind that Europe has turned its back on US or that FedRep has opted for alternative to close relations with US. Resulting disenchantment would make it difficult to pursue policy based on Atlantic concepts shared by FRG and US.

According to Minister, as result increasing awareness US attitude on part of German public, press, cabinet and parliament (particularly after Brussels), feeling is growing that FedGovt will be obliged make clear statement to effect 1) FedRep not turning back on US, and 2) Franco-German Treaty does not signify German identification with de Gaulle policies on EEC and Nassau. In response Tyler question re what Germans might have in mind this connection, Minister noted press statements along these lines already issued had not been strong enough. Minister said thought being given to “unusual gesture” such as Carstens’ visit to Washington, in return Under Secretary Ball’s recent visit Bonn, during which Carstens could explain German position “with certain amount of authority.”

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Tyler expressed view present moment grave and noted that conjunction in which recent events had taken place has given rise to type of speculation about future of Atlantic Alliance which could have farreaching consequences in US. He emphasized in particular enormous responsibility FedRep bears in post-Brussels shock period to make its position clear.

Memcon follows.1

FYI. Re Lilienfeld suggestion of Carstens’ visit to Washington, Dept has subsequently informed German Embassy here it would welcome such a visit and feels it might prove very useful. End FYI.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol 4 Fr-WGer. Secret. Drafted by Stalder (GER) and approved by Tyler. Also sent to London, Brussels, and Paris.
  2. A copy of the 4-page memorandum of conversation is ibid., 611.62A/1–3163.