6. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Preliminary Discussion for Dr. Hallstein’s Meeting with the President

PARTICIPANTS

  • Dr. Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community
  • Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
  • Mr. Richard D. Vine, Office of European Regional Affairs

Mr. Ball had invited President Hallstein to come in informally to discuss what Hallstein might usefully talk about with the President.

Mr. Ball said that the British appeared anxious to go ahead toward a solution with the Common Market. EFTA seemed to be the all important problem now and the UK seems to insist upon a simultaneous arrangement for the neutrals. We thought that this would be difficult and would probably jeopardize the success of any talks. It would cause us a real problem since it was essentially a six-seven merger. On agriculture, the British seemed to have made substantial progress and now appeared to be ready to work for a solution in the framework of a common agricultural policy after entering the Common Market. It is not a condition of membership. The Commonwealth problem seems to be soluble if transitional measures can be found.

President Hallstein inquired whether we had seen Mr. Macmillan’s comments of two days ago, in which he replied to a question in the House from Wyatt in the sense that there was no thought of the UK’s joining the Rome Treaty as it is although it might be prepared to “associate with membership” based on the three conditions of EFTA, Commonwealth and agriculture.

Mr. Ball said that he expected some move before the House rises.

Mr. Ball also stressed that we did not wish to play the role of honest broker. Dr. Hallstein said that this was just as well since he did not particularly like the atmosphere in Paris these days.

In regard to the UK in the Common Market, Dr. Hallstein said that his first concern was the change in voting power. The British will be entering with clients whom they can rely on. On the other hand, even if this [Page 14] brought about a change, the British would be welcomed if the final results or objectives of the Rome Treaty would remain the same.

He was also concerned that the traditions of the British civil servant working in the Commission would lead to its evolution into a compromise-making machine by making it more an administrative or consultative mechanism.

Dr. Hallstein was inclined to wait for majority rule so that the British could not veto any of the major trends now in process. He cited the example of the evolution of the Council of Europe. The British stopped this. It could have been a confederation, looser than the EEC, but still very good. In the Consultative Assembly, for example, one sees the British parliamentarians always in line with the Government. In the EEC countries, on the other hand, strength on behalf of Community institutions could always be counted on in the Parliament. This was one of the reasons why he was not worried about de Gaulle, for in France the Parliament undoubtedly still retained an influence. It would be just the opposite in the UK where Parliament remained hostile to the European concept.

Hallstein wished to stress that he meant none of this in any moralizing sense. It is just in the British tradition. The British have not accepted European unity as an ideal; they have accepted it as a fact. For them the idea means the reversal of 400 years of policy toward the Continent and they must have time to digest and adjust to these new concepts. There is no great hurry.

Another factor, said Hallstein, is Europe’s 11 years of experience with the integration process which the British have missed. His inclination was to add conditions, not to take them away, in order to take account of the British state of mind which had not kept up with the European evolution on this problem. To do otherwise, would amount to retrogression.

He welcomed the way we have laid out our position with the British. He thought that firmness and clarity was the only position we could continue to take.

Dr. Hallstein believed that the old policy of national states in Europe no longer has legitimacy. Psychologically the people of Continental Europe are prepared to accept European unification. They have learned the real lesson of the disaster of two world wars. The British on the other hand, are not yet so prepared. Forward progress must be maintained, and Hallstein would not wish to see a lower common denominator achieved by bringing in new states before they are psychologically prepared.

Mr. Ball stated that he thought it would be helpful if President Hallstein could tell the President this when he saw him, that it would be [Page 15] a great contribution if the British came in in the right spirit, but there was no great hurry.

There followed a brief discussion of the recent history of British antagonism to the Six in Europe and efforts on the one hand to stay out of Europe, while on the other to slow down Europe’s own efforts to unite. Hallstein thought there were two clear aspects of importance. The first was a French tendency represented by Debre to use a British move to back out of the integration structure to bolster their own preference for a looser union. The other, was the British view, represented by Macmillan, that the EEC is only a trade agreement and that once the French are convinced of this the rest will fall in line. Both these views represent great dangers to further progress and must be combatted.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.800/5–1361, Official Use Only. Drafted by Vine on May 19 and approved in B on May 22. During his visit to Washington, Hallstein discussed the relationship between the EEC and the Organization of African States on August 16 with President Kennedy and the relationship between the EEC and the OECD with the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors the same day. Memoranda of their conversations are ibid., 375.800/5–1661. A memorandum of Hallstein’s conversation with Secretary of Agriculture Freeman is printed as Document 7.