435. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State0

1164. For Secretary and Under Secretary. From Ambassador. Reference: Department telegrams 1080 and 1081;1 Embassy telegram 1157.2 I saw Prime Minister at his residence evening May 12 immediately after his return to Ottawa.

I opened by saying I had delayed my departure by reason my grave and growing concern over our talk on May 4.I said I had not reported to the President his stated intent to reveal in present campaign his possession of confidential document of the President presenting advice of member his personal staff. I said I had only reported to the Department his belief Pearson intended capitalize in campaign on private conversation with the President on Nobel Prize occasion which I said had been informal twenty-minute chat in advance of formal dinner. Then I said I had independently obtained copy Walt Rostow’s memo which I found unexceptionable and concerning four subjects which had been frequently discussed and regarding which I had thought PM’s personal attitude favorable. Verb “push” I said corresponded to British “press” or Canadian phrase “seek to persuade”.

PM did not interrupt as I went on to say that I had not reported his threat to use existence or contents memo because consequences of his so doing would be catastrophic. PM interjected “they would so be in Canada”. I said I was not talking of Canada but of reaction in the US. I said if he did this the result in the US would be of incalculable harm with public opinion, in the government and in his personal relations and that consequently I had delayed my departure to urge once more that he abandon any such thought.

Mr. Diefenbaker having heard me out said that he had given matter further consideration and in light of what I had said to him on May 4 he had no present intention of using or in any way referring to memo in question. He said if he changed his mind he would personally telephone me in Washington before doing so but he was now decided to discard any such thought. He then said only three other men know of memo, cabinet members Green, Fleming and Churchill. (All are cool steady men.)

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I replied that I was relieved for the sake of both countries at this decision. He went off at this point on an emotional sidetrack on the US “trying to push” Canada around but calmed down when I asked what in his talks with the President or any other dialogue gave any grounds for suspecting such an intent.

Then the PM described his prairie campaign tour with gusto (it apparently went well) and bemoaned time on hustings and travel still ahead. He came back to Pearson White House visit and said he expected latter to emphasize it heavily though he admitted that he had not yet done so. Winding up, he reiterated his decision not to inject “push” issue. He did refer to article in Toronto Telegram (which Embassy will secure) entitled “Ouch” and based he said on Scripps-Howard pieces critical of his government and expressing view administration desired to see conservatives in Canada defeated.

Notwithstanding fact PM nervous and in my judgment on verge of exhaustion, I believe storm has passed and that chances are now minimal that he will embark on all-out anti-American line using reference memo in process. At end conversation we both lowered our voices and with complimentary close he bade me warm good night.

I have of course kept Armstrong fully informed this entire episode so he can carry on as well as I could should need for further interchange arise.

Merchant
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.42/5–1362. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only; No Distribution.
  2. Document 434 and footnote 2 thereto.
  3. Telegram 1157, May 11, reported that Merchant planned to see Diefenbaker on May 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.42/5–1162)