Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

411. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Steering Group To Implement the Nassau Decisions (Kitchen) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, January 4, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Principle Substantive Issues Emerging from Nassau Follow-Up

1. In this memorandum I set forth what appear to be the substantive differences in points of view which are emerging from the work of the Steering Committee and various Sub-Groups which have been organized to provide the detailed follow-up on Nassau.

2. I start from the predominant State Department point of view held by EUR and S/P. This point of view argues that US national interests are deeply involved in the development of an Atlantic Community in which, hopefully, over a period of time political, economic and military interdependence will become an accepted characteristic. This view holds that events are moving rapidly in that direction. The European Economic Community is perhaps the major immediate stake which hangs in the balance, uncertain as to accomplishment, but with a high probability of its success. This would signify an immense step toward the development of a united Europe economically, which would be one of the prerequisites for interdependent Atlantic Community. However, this point of view also maintains that on military matters, and particularly on nuclear matters, the stakes are at least as high and the issue at least as delicate a balance. Thus, it is the view that our nuclear policy must be focused on our long-range objectives which should be the development of integrated Europeans manufacture, control and use of nuclear weapons. This point of view maintains that such a development can only come about if US policy refuses to support national nuclear ambitions and capitalizes upon the high costs and highly complicated processes of nuclear technology which make it so difficult for powers other than the Soviet Union and the US to develop and maintain independent nuclear capabilities. It believes that we can, and must, use the period of time available to wean Europeans away from the notion of developing nuclear capability, except under a concept of multilateralism in which all who wish to do so may participate in a nuclear force (European if preferred, but hopefully with US participation) but only on a complete integrated basis. In this manner, through mixed manning and other techniques, no one nation could ever withdraw and reserve for itself a national nuclear capability. In the case of Britain it believes that acceptance of the multilateral concept is not far off, viewing the present Conservative Government position as a temporary political expedient. France it accepts as a more difficult problem which will take a longer period of time to resolve but it believes France too, especially under a successor government, will be forced to accept the inevitable course of European multilateralism as the only right course. Finally, Germany represents a key element. This point of view holds that support for any national nuclear force inevitably gives rise to the specter of a similarly re-armed Germany which cannot forever be expected to accept an inferior nuclear position. This, it argues, would be disastrous in the present European political context and would, at this stage in the evolution of German democratic and social life, adversely affect the interests of all of the Free World members.

3. The second point of view is that of Defense as expressed by Secretary McNamara. This point of view appears to place primary emphasis upon the effective utilization of Free World resources for building up its defenses. It argues that resources have and will continue to be grossly mal-used so long as the US refuses to assist its principle Allies with its advanced technology and hardware, while those Allies for their part are equally insistent on developing their own independent capabilities. It believes that this mal-use of resources will adversely affect not only Allied nuclear capabilities, but far more importantly, the ability of our Allies to contribute to Alliance conventional military strength. On the surface this view appears not to comprehend fully the importance of the political movement toward European integration and the Atlantic Community. However, Defense staff has denied this and offer a different interpretation of Mr. McNamara’s views. This argument maintains that we must realistically face up to the fact that the only avenue toward achieving cooperation with our Allies is by our demonstrated willingness to cooperate through our own actions. It hopes that in this way an atmosphere can be developed which will permit the US to have a greater influence than it would otherwise have over the ultimate direction of the Alliance policy. Consistent with the foregoing, the Defense view is that we should proceed with assistance for the development of the British national nuclear capabilities promised at Nassau with all reasonable speed and at minimum cost to the British (two judgments exactly contrary to the prevailing State point of view). It argues that an exactly similar position should be taken toward the French in the belief that this will prove a sufficient inducement to the French to cooperate on nuclear and other matters far more fully than has heretofore been the case (a point of view strongly rejected by the prevailing State judgment). With regard to the Germans (and subsequently the Italians) it would offer them a bilateral participation with the US in a nuclear force at an early opportunity in order to meet the German political problem as well as to gain a maximum German military contribution to the nuclear and conventional forces. And finally, it would continue to support the multilateral force concept for all others in NATO who might be interested, in the hope that over the long run, perhaps the very long run, this would be the accepted avenue for Alliance participation in nuclear affairs.

4. Lastly, there is a point of view which emerges from the White House staff and which presumably is to a considerable extent a reflection of the President’s thinking. As we understand it, this point of view holds that Nassau in effect recognizes that there are two paths toward our ultimate objective of European nuclear integration: one multinational, the other multilateral. It argues that it is unrealistic to ignore the fact that our policy in the area of military integration has not achieved success and that we were, and to some extent still are, at odds with our two principal Allies. It accepts the prevailing State argument that multilateralism in nuclear matters must be our ultimate objective but it rejects the State point of view (and in this regard is much closer to the Defense point of view) that this is an objective which can be accomplished at a single point in time and without intermediate stages, or policy plateaus. This point of view reflects the assumption that, like it or not, the sense of national sovereignty remains the determining political force in militarily potent European countries. It places credence in the expression of views by Macmillan at Nassau and DeGaulle everywhere and always as to the importance of the history, culture, tradition, etc., of their two nations and of their unwillingness to sacrifice these features at this point in history to a loyalty to a yet non-existent higher political entity. This point of view would suggest, along with Defense, that we should be prepared to assist in the development of the British national force expeditiously and as inexpensively as possible. It would also offer the French an interpretation of “similar terms” which would bring that nation into an equivalent position with the British during the time span envisioned in the Nassau Agreements, i.e., about 1970. However, unlike the Defense position, it would not accept financial efficiency as a prime determinent in formulating US policy and more importantly, like the State point of view, it would urge the maximum rapid development of the multilateral force concept. This latter it believes important if the Germans are to have “some place to go,” although they may not fully share the State concern about the Defense proposal for a bilateral US-German nuclear cooperation. But it would not give a primary position to the multilateral force over the multinational force concept, but rather an equal status over the next several years.

5. It is apparent that these conflicting points of view are complicated, each with some merit and in toto presenting difficult dilemmas. My own point of view is closest to that which I have attributed to the White House staff. I think that the major weakness in the prevailing State point of view is that it has not taken sufficient account of the importance, be it rational or irrational, of the present force of European nationalism and only dim prospect of a supra-national political authority. I fully share what I believe continues to be a basic tenet of US nuclear policy, namely that multilateralism for Europe and interdependence with the US is the long term objective and the only sane course. But, I doubt that realization of this objective can be forecast in the next several years. Prior to Nassau we could have, as a considered policy, continued our unbending course and played for benefits which time might have delivered to us. Now we have offered the French a formula for ending the special US-UK relationship, and have stated our desire initially to strengthen NATO via multinational nuclear forces and to move from these toward multilateralism. As at least an interim measure, we may have to develop and nurture a feeling within the European Community that the US is not arrogating to itself a judgment as to how outmoded is national sovereignty as a concept for others to live under. The US is not prepared to surrender its sovereign right to control and direct its own national nuclear force, and yet presently it seems to expect this of other nations having histories and cultures pre-dating our own. The requirement therefore is for a policy which carries us through this period of transition from nationalism to multilateralism. It is difficult to see a clear course between the two which does not dilute and to that extent endanger our ultimate goal, but this I believe we must accept.

My conclusion, therefore, is that the time imperative is such that we should move forward with the British and the French to develop their national capabilities, seeking a firm commitment for their ultimate support of a multilateral force (and without such a commitment from the French, I do not see how we can proceed with them). This will leave us with the problem of the Germans, principally, but of the Italians, the Belgians and others, as well. For them every effort must be made to accelerate the multilateral force. To do this, however, it may be necessary for us to consider whether certain interim arrangements short of the ideal multilateral force might not be acceptable. For example, we have heretofore insisted on mixed crews, represented by no less than three nationalities, with no one predominating. If it would facilitate the technical development of a force, as it might, I am not at all sure that we cannot live with one predominant nationality on a new crew so long as there is some other national participation and so long as the targeting and command structure is multinational. Admittedly, this would involve acceptance of a greater risk that national forces might be withdrawn but it may be an acceptable risk when weighed in the light of realistic probabilities. (Since we argue in support of the multilateral concept, that in time our Allies will come to the realization that small independent forces have no future in the nuclear world, this realization should not be inhibited if the multilateral force is made up of predominately national components. And, if this realization occurs will not the probability of withdrawal be negligible?)

Finally, I think it is vitally important that our policy not be dictated by false notions about maximizing financial efficiencies in defense matters and of radically improving the US balance of payments position through sales of equipment to our Allies, however otherwise desirable both these objectives may be. Especially on this point Mr. McNamara, I believe, tends to greatly underestimate the importance which our European Allies will attach to the economic and technological benefits of national production of nuclear systems, both weapons and propulsion, for reasons exactly like those he does recognize as relating to their force structure preference. While, of course, some sizable purchases will be made from the US, the amount of foreign exchange available to France and especially Britain is likely to be more limited than Mr. McNamara assumes. Moreover, the purchases are likely to be directed toward improving technology and developing independent productive capacity rather than toward purchasing finished US hardware.

6. Finally, while I believe that we should move forward, and in fact are moving forward, with reasonable speed, the problems which face us are of immense complexity and importance and it would be endangering our best judgments and penalizing ourselves to push the process faster than we are capable of giving it discriminating handling. If only one single agreement were presently possible between State, Defense and the White House, I would hope it would be on this point of a consistent and measured pace, but one which presses to the point where judgments are hurried and ill-taken.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D110, CF 2217. Secret. Drafted by Weiss and Kitchen. The source text bears a notation that Ball saw it.