333. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State0

1673. Paris for USRO. For Finletter. Embassy pass Dean Brown. Embassy Lisbon has ably elucidated the problem of our relation to Port. and her colonies. This is whether we should identify ourselves with Portugal as a European military power or with the more numerous but less closely associated populations of Asia and Africa with which perhaps our more liberal instincts also lie.

The question is undoubtedly simplified by the fact that it is not the armed might of England, Germany, France or Belgium that is involved but the exiguous military power of Portugal. We might also note that India is a rather more formidable military power than Portugal and in [Page 913] World War I, World War II and even in Korea supplied us with many, many more fighting soldiers or supporting personnel. But the choice obviously is not to be made as between two Embassies and I contently submit it to the administration without further comment or cable changes.

Purely for purposes of clarification, however, I would make a few brief points.

1.
While it is true that there are elections coming here, Nehru is in negligible need of an issue for winning them. I should not like this to be construed, in the slightest measure, as a criticism of Lisbon in light of difficulties in judging elections from there.
2.
Nehru, as Lisbon rightly suggests, is unquestionably concerned politically with his position in the Afro-Asian countries. However, the acuteness of his political judgment in this regard, immoral as it may seem, may well have its lessons. Similarly his indifference to Portugal’s opinion.
3.
The tactics of the Indians on Goa are not commendable. But again I would urge that moral indignation, however admirable, may in such matters subtract for clarity of thought. The obvious Indian manufacture of sentiment should not cause us to embrace Portuguese colonial aspirations unless that is the wise thing to do.
4.
Embassy Lisbon’s conclusion that order has now been restored to Portugal’s overseas empire naturally evokes interest. The question inevitably arises as to whether this is a firm judgment on its durability. Nor does it entirely resolve the question of its popularity or merit in the eyes of the world.
5.
I am a little puzzled by the reference to our deposing Salazar. This had not occurred to me. My suggestion was only that we be cautious in our association with aging and enfeebled strongmen to whom one day there will have to be an alternative. I had rather assumed that our Embassy had given much thought to the problem of succession, always so difficult in this form of government.
6.
The objection to my reference to a few acres of asphalt is exceedingly well taken. It was much too colorful. I was concerned only to defend the Defense Department from the supposition that it would bend American policy over two continents to the perpetuation of a single base on a narrowing ocean.
7.
Perhaps I might ask our able Embassy in Lisbon reflect further on one final point mentioned in my earlier telegram. Would not their present position on liberation have kept President Roosevelt from taking his position against any of the colonial powers or President Kennedy from proposing independence for Algeria?
Galbraith
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12–1161. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN, Lisbon, London, and Paris.