326. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 0

998. Re Embtel 990.1 I have just delivered Secretary’s letter to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira.2 He read it calmly without any visible emotion but he became more and more depressed as we talked.

His reaction was as expected. He said he failed to see logic of US position and proceeded to expound familiar views on motivation of ASAF and Soviet Bloc attacking Portugal and attempting to fragmentize Africa. He understood that US reasons for voting for resolution3 entirely different from those of Soviet but world would be impressed by fact we vote with Soviet Bloc. This particularly true of African countries arrayed against Portugal, all of which would see in SC resolution a “green light” to step-up terroristic attacks. Portugal will stand its ground, he said, and result will be “a blood bath”. At a time, he said, when Western World is beset with so many crises, it is ill-advised of US to antagonize a friend (Portugal) and undermine an alliance (NATO), in an effort to curry favor with countries whose reliability is at least questionable.

I expanded on reasons for our attitude, assuring him US was not aiming at objection of Portugal from Africa. We are interested in seeing Portugal grant the peoples of overseas territories greater voice in their own affairs and we felt Portugal could avoid disaster in those territories only by taking measures to accomplish this end quietly. I thought this would not be too difficult in view of fact he had already told me government was prepared to institute far-reaching reforms. I said that this was a most critical moment in Portuguese history and that extraordinary measures were required to meet situation.

Nogueira agreed that far-reaching reforms were necessary but said that these could not be introduced overnight. He said if ASAF resolution passed in present form it would be impossible for Portugal to cooperate with GA committee. In keeping with its previous stand, Portugal Government would ignore such resolution.

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On parting Nogueira said he feared that US vote for present ASAF resolution would provoke another wave of anti-Americanism in Portugal.4

Elbrick
  1. Source: Department of State Central Files, 753.022/6–861. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN.
  2. Telegram 990, June 8, reported that Elbrick had an appointment with Nogueira at 5:30 p.m. (Ibid.)
  3. Dated June 7, it was a reply to a letter from Nogueira of June 2 (telegram 966 from Lisbon, June 2; ibid., 110.11–RU/6–261), which urged the Foreign Minister to consider reforms for Portugal’s African colonies. (Ibid., 753.022/6–761)
  4. For text of the draft resolution on Angola, June 6, see U.N. doc. S/4828.
  5. On March 27 Elbrick had telephoned McBride and reported that a demonstration was going on in front of the chancery. Elbrick commented that U.S.-Portuguese relations had reached a low point, and in his opinion the U.S. position was “so unenviable” that nobody could say anything that would be influential or that would even be listened to. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 611.53/3–2761) Later that day the Embassy reported that the crowd of 15,000 to 20,000 people had demonstrated in front of the chancery for more than an hour, breaking some windows, before being dispersed. (Telegram 677 from Lisbon; ibid.)