Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal ⁰

Washington, March 4, 1961, 4:55 p.m.

471. For Ambassador Elbrick and Barbour from Secretary. Elbrick should seek soonest feasible interview with Salazar in order make following presentation. (I plan parallel approach to Fernandes here when you inform me you have appointment with Salazar.) Barbour should inform UK Government at high level of US démarche to Portuguese indicating we would welcome similar British approach. NATO discussion of this problem as recommended by Embassy Lisbon may at appropriate stage also be most useful. These are lines which Elbrick should use in discussion with Salazar:

1) We are deeply concerned over deteriorating position Portugal in United Nations and in Africa, and over growing difficulties in UN in connection with its overseas provinces. Accordingly we wish talk frankly and in friendly spirit with Portugal as ally with view to improving mutual understanding our position and, we would hope, influencing Portugal to undertake major adjustments in her policies which as presently constituted seem to us headed for very serious trouble.

2) Most immediate problem is Liberian move place Angola question on Secretary Council agenda. In view our traditional position on inscription of items we shall vote in favor inscription. If you think it useful you may recall that we agreed to inscription last year of various items directed against us, e.g., U–2, RB–47, Cuba. We have long held that inscription on Security Council agenda does not in itself constitute position on substance of item inscribed, nor can it constitute intervention in internal affairs of member state.

3) In view US worldwide commitments and responsibilities we find it increasingly difficult and disadvantageous to Western interests publicly to support or remain silent on Portuguese African policies and have come to the conclusion that more public clarity on US position on these particular issues of overseas provinces is required. FYI. In general, we are greatly concerned that because of our close association with Portugal, which we value as ally, we shall come under increasing criticism from Afro-Asian countries which will, rightly or wrongly, tend to hold us responsible for Portuguese actions and inaction in connection with overseas provinces which clash with America’s traditional position in regard to colonialism and self-determination. End FYI.

4) US feels that it would be remiss in its duties as fellow NATO member of Portugal if it did not point out its conviction that step by step actions are now imperative for the political, economic and social advancement of all inhabitants Portuguese African provinces towards full self-determination within realistic timetable. Conversely attempt maintain status quo may lead to maximum disadvantage. We would be lacking in candor if we did not express our serious and sober conviction on basis most sympathetic examination Portuguese African policies, that those policies are so totally out of step with political and economic advancement elsewhere in Black Africa that unless Portugal adjusts her policies to African realities, increasingly serious outbreaks in her territories may be expected in future.

5) In accordance above thoughts, we believe it would be very helpful if Portugal were willing announce decision to submit information to UN on overseas territories in accordance with Article 73e of the UN Charter. We feel that such action, coupled with effective steps by Portuguese advancing the inhabitants of Portuguese African provinces towards full self-government with self-determination, would go long way to reducing pressure upon Portugal in UN, and avoidance creation more Congos. More importantly we are convinced that such reforms would in long run constitute best assurance that Portugal could maintain mutually beneficial ties with overseas provinces. FYI. Conceivably if Portugal feels she cannot report to SYG, she could report to certain UN nations such as SC members. End FYI.

6) We are fully aware of economic importance of overseas provinces to Portugal and of great potential cost of their development towards responsible self-government. This process of readjustment may initially be economically costly. Accordingly we are prepared to extend important bilateral assistance to Portugal and to her overseas territories and in addition to explore possibilities unilateral aid program with selected NATO countries in order minimize economic consequences for Portugal. While these territories presently economic assets, continued political deterioration could quickly turn them into liabilities. Furthermore history shows British-Indian type relationship in long run much more profitable economically than where colonial relationship abruptly and bitterly terminated as in Guinea case. FYI. I am fully aware distasteful nature above line to Salazar regime but feel frankly this approach required especially since no real effort along these lines previously made. We have few illusions here that Portuguese Government in the near future will change its policies toward African possessions, especially in light their previous intransigeance. However if as result this démarche, and hopefully similar approach by British, and perhaps Brazilians at some later stage, Portuguese can be brought to accept at least fact that we must “agree to disagree” on their African policies, we will have taken forward step in what will probably be long and difficult road toward necessary changes. Similar developments will occur in UN context. At present time we wish primarily alert Portuguese to problem, and we wish avoid appearance of “take it or leave it” attitude which would only invite Portuguese precipitate counter-action which we do not want in connection with NATO or Azores where we believe retention of base rights very important.

Immediate purpose of your démarche is to make Salazar understand that he cannot reasonably expect us to support Portugal in forthcoming SC debate or in GA on this issue, while in longer term we would hope effect change in their policies which although heretofore rigid in extreme may be open to change among certain elements at least. Meanwhile welcome your comments on what useful further steps we could take in case there is further deterioration in Portuguese territories which would doubtless result in sharply increased pressures in UN. We have also in mind possibility trouble at any time in Portuguese Guinea fomented by Republic of Guinea. In short inaction to us seems likely to lead to catastrophic upheavals of Congo type or worse. End FYI.

Elbrick should coordinate with Rio so that Rio may inform Brazilian Government for its information only either simultaneously or immediately after démarche made.¹

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State Central Files, 753.00/3–461. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McBride; cleared with Chayes, Bowles, Ball, Cleveland, Kohler, McGhee, AF, ARA, the White House, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to London; repeated to Paris, USUN, Rio de Janeiro, Luanda, and Lourenco Marques.
1. In telegram 567, March 7, Elbrick reported that he had met with Salazar for 1-1/2 hours and presented in detail the views set forth in this telegram. Salazar was relaxed and friendly but “deeply concerned over what he considers self-defeating policy of US with regard to Africa.” (Ibid., 753.00/3–761)