218. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy in Europe; U.S.-Soviet Relations
PARTICIPANTS
- Jens Otto Krag, Prime Minister of Denmark1
- Count K. Knuth-Winterfeldt, Ambassador of Denmark
- The Secretary
- Eric V. Youngquist, Officer in Charge Danish-Norwegian Affairs
The Secretary assured the Prime Minister: 1) that while President Johnson was still Vice President, he supported President Kennedy’s foreign policy not merely because he felt that he was called upon to do so, but from a sense of conviction; and 2) that there would be no reduction in the sense of U.S. commitment and involvement in Europe. In fact, he said, we are prepared to go farther in a partnership with Europe than Europe itself is.
[Page 628]The Secretary said that most of the questions that seemed to be trans-Atlantic in character turned on issues which could be settled only by Europe itself. The most important of these is the question of what structural and formal developments will take place in Europe. The differences in conception as to the future structure of Europe have caused us difficulties. For example, he said, we could have had a love affair with France had we been willing to accept the idea of a directoire, with the UK, France and the United States sitting as co-equal heads. This concept was rejected by both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Until there is some settlement of this question of form or structure trans-Atlantic relations will remain unsettled.
The Prime Minister, referring to talk of dissension and disunity within NATO, suggested that a meeting be held, on a higher level than the forthcoming NATO meeting, where the allies could talk about the things on which they are agreed rather than on those which divide them. Such a meeting would solve no problems, but could have an important psychological effect. The Secretary replied that the idea was rather persuasive, particularly since major changes had recently taken place in the leadership of four of the NATO partners, and added that we would give it serious thought.
Continuing on the subject of NATO unity, the Secretary said that it was almost a tragedy that, at a time when the Communist world has been racked by uncertainty about its own structural arrangement and when important changes were taking place within the Communist Bloc, there had not been sufficient unanimity in the West. Had there been this unanimity, then the contrast between the free world and the Communist world would have been dramatic.
The Prime Minister observed that France was both a loyal and a difficult ally, to which the Secretary replied that both words were very true. The Prime Minister concluded by suggesting that it might be possible to adopt deGaulle’s own recipe in dealing with deGaulle himself, that is, try to live with the problems rather than solve them. Specifically, why not leave the question of atomic defense and control of atomic weapons where it stands?
Regarding the French attitude toward MLF, the Secretary observed that deGaulle’s ideas on nuclear defense were not really in conflict with the idea of the MLF. DeGaulle has not rejected MLF; he has merely said that he has other things to do. To the Prime Minister’s query whether deGaulle regards the MLF as useless, the Secretary mentioned that this could hardly be the case, since it would be some time before deGaulle had two hundred missiles, whereas MLF would have that striking power immediately.
To Ambassador Knuth-Winterfeldt’s observation that deGaulle appeared to object to the MLF because he felt that it would only be an extension [Page 629] of U.S. control, the Secretary replied that the U.S. would only be one member of the force. The Secretary said that the U.S. of course wants to participate in any decision, regardless of who makes it. This in itself can hardly be called a monopoly. The only way Europe could have a force without U.S. involvement would be to have Europe completely independent of the U.S., because it would be impossible for a decision to be taken involving us where we would not insist on some participation.
The Prime Minister then said that Europe could not be defended in any other way than through participation by the U.S. To this, the Secretary demurred, saying that Europe could defend itself without the U.S., but that it did not have to do so. We would, of course, not object if the countries of Europe were to decide to create their own defenses, and devote an additional 25% of their budgets to defense, but we would regard it as wasteful. We consider the defense of Europe equivalent to the defense of the U.S., said the Secretary. It is as simple as that.
Reverting to the subject of NATO unity, the Secretary said that the U.S. realized that developments of recent years make necessary some reorganization of the NATO framework. All we ask, he said, is that, pending this reorganization, the members of NATO give NATO their full support. Without a pledge of such support, then uncertainty and difficulties naturally will arise.
To the Prime Minister’s statement that Denmark regarded presence of U.S. troops in Europe essential, the Secretary noted that there were domestic political problems in a situation where the U.S. was the only member of NATO which had met its force goals completely. Given the U.S. balance-of-payments situation, there might be congressional pressures for some reduction in U.S. military presence in Europe. In reality, however, there will be no problem, said the Secretary, because of the basically strong general support for NATO which exists among the general public in this country.
[Here follow 4 paragraphs on U.S.-Soviet relations, civil aviation, and shipping.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol 1 Eur-US. Secret. Drafted by Youngquist and approved in S on December 9.↩
- Krag was in the United States to attend the funeral of President Kennedy who was assassinated on November 22 in Dallas. A 2-page memorandum of his conversation with President Johnson later that day is ibid., NATO 3.↩