164. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 0
Polto Circular 27. Department pass information SACLANT for POLAD. Attention Kitchen. Department Circular telegram 1192.1 Under Secretary began presentation to NAC January 11 with brief review of US/UK decisions on Skybolt and Hound Dog at Nassau, and UK proposal on Polaris. Consideration of this latter British proposal, Ball said, had given whole new dimension to Nassau discussions, for Polaris unlike [Page 472] Skybolt and Hound Dog had probable effective life through decade of 70s; consequently any decision make Polaris available would necessarily influence structure Western defense well into future.
Ball said both governments had recognized this fact and had felt grave responsibility to take no steps re Polaris which would be prejudicial to ability of whole alliance mobilize full potential for nuclear defense.
Certain basic principles and goals emerged from consideration these problems, Ball said. First was that nuclear defense of West is by nature interdependent and indivisible. Ball said US had become convinced in years since 1945 that security of US meaningless if it divorced from defense of Europe. He said that other nations, as they studied this question thoroughly, would be led to same conclusion.
Therefore it had seemed imperative at Nassau to make nuclear defense arrangements in such way as enable alliance as a whole to evolve common nuclear defense policy. Such common policy would not only ensure most rational use Western resources but would also discourage proliferation and make progress toward arms control manageable. Consequently goal should be arrangement permitting increasingly cohesive effort in nuclear defense by European countries which effort would be intimately associated with US strategic forces.
Ball said these considerations had led two governments at Nassau to agree to work for creation of a multilateral nuclear force in which any interested NATO member whether or not a nuclear power could play important role in manning, equipping and controlling a force devoted entirely to alliance purposes. In developing these proposals we could not of course ignore fact that some members of alliance are nuclear powers; our offer of Polaris to UK and similar offer to France reflected this fact. But design of nuclear force was task for all interested NATO members, and speed with which it developed would depend on initiative of NAC governments. US for its part was prepared participate fully in what can be great common enterprise.
Under Secretary then outlined some of implications of Nassau agreement with respect composition, command and control of nuclear force. Concerning composition of force he said: 1) Elements from US strategic nuclear forces and UK bomber command, together with selected tactical nuclear forces in Europe (i.e., pre-targeted weapons, not battlefield weapons at present), might be immediately assigned to proposed NATO nuclear force; 2) UK Polaris force will be assigned as it becomes available, together with equal US force; 3) two governments would also cooperate with other NATO countries in developing multilateral force, which US assumes would be based on principle of mixed manning, to which all interested NATO members could contribute.
[Page 473]Concerning command Ball said US believed NATO nuclear forces should be under SACEUR. In any event, it seemed essential to US both nationally assigned units and mixed-manned forces be responsible to same commander. However, we would not rule out establishment of strategic force at same level as present Supreme Commanders.
Concerning control, Ball noted there were critical problems. Said Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Finletter and other spokesmen of US administration have stated US views these problems and have made clear US prepared consider any proposals desired by consensus of alliance. He wished make only these comments:
1) Nuclear force, both with respect nationally assigned forces and mixed-manned components, should be governed in its use by guidelines agreed at Athens; 2) Alliance must face possibility of East-West confrontations outside NATO area which would involve use of such force. To meet this contingency alliance must develop as quickly as possible same kind of political consensus on world basis as now exists for example re Berlin. In this connection Ball said it is hope of US Government that over months and years ahead NATO political consultations will develop to point where Nassau agreement provision for withdrawal of national components of nuclear force would never arise as a real question. In light of this US hope US is anxious to explore all possible means to strengthen political consultation and will elaborate its views on this question at appropriate time.
Re mixed-manned component of nuclear force US believes more strongly than ever that this component is essential. In addition its military values, mixed-manned force provides opportunity for non-nuclear powers to play important role in nuclear defense. Moreover we look on this force as ultimate embodiment of integrated NATO effort in area of security vital to all. To support these views US prepared make substantial financial, technological and equipment contributions to this force.
Concerning targeting of force Ball said this was subject for continuing exchanges within alliance. US felt there exists greater common agreement than is generally realized on how such force should be used. It will of course be essential to coordinate targeting as between NATO forces and massive external forces in hands of US.
Ball pointed [out] that two governments at Nassau had stressed need for flexible balanced defense which could not be achieved by nuclear capability alone. Would be highly imprudent to concentrate on nuclear force at expense of adequate conventional strength.
Ball then made some observations concerning procedure for further NATO consideration these questions. Said he realized that the proposals would require most careful study and consultation. Within near future US and UK hoped to make recommendations re size and composition [Page 474] of certain immediate elements of proposed nuclear force, and also intended develop series of questions to which other countries would wish to add. In near future various working groups might be set up to refine questions for study and recommend procedures to advance NATO consideration. US hoped alliance would be in position soon, perhaps by Ottawa Ministerial meeting, to develop steps and proposals looking [toward] establishment of nuclear force, including multilateral component, which force represents step along road to long-term organization NATO’s nuclear power.
In summing up Ball reemphasized it was fundamental US policy that security of Western Europe is a basic national interest of US. Problem before NATO was how to fit technology of nuclear arms into larger objectives of our partnership. In US view Nassau agreement moved nuclear question much farther toward alliance solution.
Problems were not easy ones. Scientific progress had been much more rapid than changes in political institutions. This was a pioneering enterprise requiring all energy and imagination alliance can command.
Full text pouched.2 Addressees may use its substance in discussions with Foreign Offices. US/UK texts not distributed here but will be made available to NAC in due course by IS. Separate telegram3 summarizes UK statement and Council discussion.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/1–1163. Secret; Niact. Also sent to EUCOM, SHAPE, SACLANT, and USAREUR.↩
- Circular telegram 1192, January 8, asked for a telegraphic summary of Ball’s address to the North Atlantic Council on January 11. (Ibid., 375/1–863)↩
- A copy of the full text is ibid., 375/1–1163. Polto 775, January 11, reported on the atmosphere of the meeting, which was described as “highly successful,” noting that the “general atmosphere of meeting was to welcome strongly Nassau agreement as providing opportunity for a most important step forward.” (Ibid.)↩
- Polto Circular 26, January 11. (Ibid.)↩