146. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State0
Secto 81. Followed based on uncleared memcon.1 Secretary and Lord Home discussed on June 25 MRBMs and related nuclear questions. Discussions continued subsequently by Kohler with Shuckburgh and Ramsbotham. Below is summary.
Home said British felt military need for MRBMs should be discussed first in NATO and this discussion might take some time. British feel ultimate form multilateral force might take, whether NATO or European, should be left open for moment. Main point is to wait to see developments growing out of UK entry into Common Market.
Secretary said he essentially agreed British views on timing MRBM discussion. Felt we should proceed “with all deliberate speed”. Stressed US did not want to seem to be holding up. Alliance consideration MRBMs. We had earlier remained silent on subject, which had been interpreted by some, as US holding up NATO action. Secretary also stressed we have no intention presenting “US plan”. In Ambassador Finletter’s June 15 statement to NAC,2 our sole purpose had been to raise certain questions which we felt required meaningful consideration MRBM question. Definitely not our purpose, as some appear to have thought, to veto MRBMs entirely.
Home said British felt Athens package of guidelines, assurances, and information had gone long way take care of German concerns. In recent discussions with Germans, British had impression they were quite satisfied, at least for present.
Secretary said he believed this was true, adding that recent Washington talks with Strauss3 had further useful effect on Germans, but fact that Germans are satisfied for present is not by any means whole story. Secretary said his recent talks with Adenauer4 left him with strong impression that future German pressures for nuclear role bound to be very strong. Secretary gained clear impression Germans want to reserve their position on nuclear question for future. Their strong opposition to any [Page 424] nuclear non-dissemination provision in Berlin package further evidence of this.
In subsequent discussion, Kohler reiterated Secretary’s point re German position, stressing that multilateral solution must be found if German pressures for national solution are to be headed off. Kohler also stressed that Germans had made strong point of non-discrimination. Any ultimate solution found must avoid discriminatory treatment of Germany in nuclear matters. Kohler also pointed out that French had spoken of German interest in nuclear matters as “obsession”. Furthermore, Germans themselves in Bonn had been careful say there were no pressures for national program “as of now”. Also significant was Chancellor’s statement that original WEU declaration by Germany based upon rebus sic stantibus. As result, US convinced that pressures for national program inevitable in Germany if alternative not found. Kohler also pointed out Germans made quite clear they do not propose to add in any way to their existing undertaking in the unilateral WEU declaration.
Ramsbotham said, based on their talks with Balken and other Germans, they have feeling additional reason in German mind for avoiding further undertaking on non-dissemination is that Germans want to avoid giving Russians right of interference in future.
Ramsbotham said UK at earlier stage multilateral MRBM force discussions had understood we had no idea diluting unilateral US control. More recently British had heard from Stikker and others that US position on this was not so categoric.
Kohler said that we do in fact want to leave impression conveyed by Stikker and others that we have open mind on control question. We believe would be politically very unwise for us to make flat statement at outset that we insist on unilateral US control. We of course have no present intention change existing system and, indeed, do not have any legal authority to do so but we do not want to rule out possibility considering situation if it develops our Allies wish to see some change. Key to control problem is really targeting. We want to bring about realization by all that nuclear war is in fact indivisible and to demonstrate that control must be based on really integrated targeting and strategy.
Ramsbotham asked for confirmation that, if MRBMs are provided for NATO, they would be provided only to multilateral force. Kohler confirmed that this is case.
On MRBM requirement, Kohler explained importance of full sharing targeting info in NATO. Only in this way, in our view, can we reach understanding of MRBM requirement. Information on targeting will demonstrate that many of targets for which MRBMs said to be needed are already taken care of. Result may be that only 200 or so will remain [Page 425] for coverage by Polaris and another 200 plus battlefield targets and the like could be dealt with by other means, one of which might be missile “X”, another V/STOL aircraft, etc.
Ramsbotham said he believed UK generally agrees with US views on military requirement, although they also feel something is to be said for having MRBMs for deterrent effect. There is place for some MRBMs to fill in complete spectrum of nuclear weapons from small tactical to major strategic. Nevertheless, UK agrees with US view that inconceivable that MRBMs will be used except in general war situation.5 Ramsbotham said this type of question which UK wants Standing Group to look into.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–RU/6–2662. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Rome.↩
- SET/MC/36, June 25. (Ibid., 110.11–RU/6–2562)↩
- See footnote 1, Document 142.↩
- See Document 140.↩
- See Document 145.↩
- Kranich underlined this sentence in the source text and wrote beneath it: “Why do we keep raising this straw man?”↩