141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations0
Topol 1922. Eyes only for Ambassador Finletter. To Ambassador Finletter from the President. I have just approved the long cable of instruction1 to you on MRBMs but I would like to give you this short additional statement of my own views for your guidance.
- First, you should make it very plain that the military need for this force is not proven. Seen from the center rather than from a theater command post, the Western military need for this force in undemonstrated.
- Second, the cost of this undertaking is great, and the main burden must necessarily fall on European members. No advocates of this force should neglect or underrate this problem of cost.
- Third, the United States would strongly oppose the substitution of this force for needed efforts to strengthen conventional forces. Our support for a multilateral MRBM force will be contingent upon adequate efforts in the conventional field, and so our allies should understand that the cost of this force would be an addition and not merely a substitution in relation to existing programs.
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Fourth, my estimate is that in the light of these factors, the probability of final affirmative action on this MRBM force is low at present. Nevertheless, [Page 408] I strongly support discussion and examination in NATO, for its educational effect and as a basis for any action our allies may, in fact, wish to take. As I see it, your job is to communicate our central position while keeping it clear that if Europeans do want this force, we will firmly support it and pay our proportionate share.
John F. Kennedy
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF-Instructions to Finletter. Top Secret; Niact; No Other Distribution. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and cleared with Kohler.↩
- See Document 142.↩