138. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)0
Dear Paul : On the basis of previous discussions, I understand that you have been asked by Mr. McNamara to follow up on the Department of Defense proposals relating to the withdrawal of certain U.S. forces now in Europe. These proposals are presumably the ones contained in the attachment to the memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President, dated April 23,1 which identify force adjustments designed to alleviate U.S. balance of payment problems while at the same time correcting certain force mal-deployments, particularly in non-combat units. In recognition of the serious implications of the payments deficit it is our desire to cooperate in this effort in every possible way. However, whatever action is decided upon must be carefully arranged to avoid what could be very adverse political and psychological repercussions. At this juncture in our Berlin negotiations we would not wish to risk conveying an incorrect impression to the Soviets or our Allies as to the firmness of the U.S. intention to insist on our vital interests in Berlin, even at the expense of employment of force if the situation so demanded. Our build-up actions of last Fall had this as a principal objective and this objective is no less valid today.
Consistent with the foregoing, we have worked out a series of political criteria which we desire to see applied to proposals for withdrawing any major numbers of U.S. military personnel from Europe. These are attached. As can be seen from the list of criteria, our objective is to handle any withdrawal of forces which may be militarily justified in a manner least likely to create political problems. In this connection, we wonder whether the Department of Defense would not find it feasible to consider converting a portion of the support forces currently being proposed for withdrawal into a combat unit, for example, an additional division, for retention in Europe. General Norstad has suggested such an approach and we gather that the Ailes Committee considered a similar proposal to be feasible. If the Department of Defense determined that a portion of the forces identified as surplus in their current capacities could, with military advantage, be transformed into a combat element, this would have an immense positive political benefit. Under these circumstances the return to the U.S. of significant numbers of military personnel [Page 395] could be more easily portrayed as a hardening of U.S. combat posture rather than as a retrenchment or wavering in our commitment to European security. Moreover, the provision of an additional division, even if coupled with still sizeable force withdrawals, could serve as a valuable negotiating lever with our Allies to secure a further force commitment from them to the forward strategy concept advanced by General Norstad. We might make our additional division contingent upon added European contributions toward the forward strategy goals.
We are prepared to work with the Department of Defense to facilitate as rapid a redeployment of excess forces from Europe as is feasible. I suggest that after you have had an opportunity to consider the attached criteria we might then meet for the purpose of jointly considering specific force adjustment proposals.
Sincerely,