Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

131. Letter From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, April 3, 1962.

Dear Mr. President: As you know, I have just completed a two weeks’ visit to Europe¹ which included stops at several NATO capitals and discussions with numerous officials, both US and foreign (Inclosure 1).² While the purpose of my trip was personal orientation, I should like to report to you my impressions on some of the political-military problems which particularly struck me after an absence of nearly three years from Europe. I have listed them under three heads:

a. The depressed state of US relations with France, resulting largely from our opposition to the French atomic program.

b. The problem of keeping West Germany a contented non-nuclear power.

c. The acceptance by NATO of the “new” US strategy.

To avoid an unduly long letter, I have attached short supporting papers covering each of these three topics. Here I will state only the principal conclusions which I believe these papers to support. The first is that the US, after consultation with Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer, should open negotiations with President de Gaulle directed at changing our policy toward aid to the French atomic program in exchange for loyal French cooperation within NATO, for French participation in a multilateral NATO force, and for an overall normalization of Franco-American relations.

The second is that we should strengthen German ties with NATO by supporting the forward strategy recommended by General Norstad, by giving Germany a voice in controlling the use of any multilateral NATO atomic force and by adopting a statement of principles on the use of atomic weapons similar to the guidelines which Secretary General Stikker is proposing.

Third and last, in the NATO forum we should advance our strategic ideas in a low key without giving the appearance of lecture or exhortation, preferably by way of a NATO comprehensive review of the military requirements for implementing a forward strategy capable of offering some degree of protection to the exposed population centers of West Germany.

My reasons for arriving at these conclusions are set forth in the attached inclosures.

Maxwell D. Taylor³

Enclosure 2⁴

THE STRAIN ON RELATIONS WITH FRANCE RESULTING FROM US OPPOSITION TO THE FRENCH ATOMIC PROGRAM

It is impossible to go to Paris today and meet with representatives of the de Gaulle Government without becoming deeply impressed with their bitterness toward the US Government. Their hostility results from our refusal to aid the French atomic program and the extension of this non-cooperation to their missile and nuclear submarine programs and then to remotely related projects in a way which strains the imagination to find justification in the requirements of the McMahon Act.

I found no European officials, US or European, who do not believe that de Gaulle is going to carry out his program to obtain national atomic weapons for France in spite of the cost and in spite of American resistance. Most of them apparently believe that even if de Gaulle disappeared from the scene, a successor government would not be likely to cancel the program. In case the French encounter technical difficulties beyond their capability to resolve, it is probable that the French would turn to the Germans for aid, a contingency which the latter do not like to contemplate.

The US can either stand pat in refusing to help the French in all fields however remotely related to the atomic weapons program, can modify its position to one of non-cooperation in the atomic weapons field alone, or can open negotiations with France with a view to trading technical aid in atomic matters for important concessions such as:

a. A French return to cooperation in NATO;

b. Commitment of a significant part of French atomic weapons, when available, to a multilateral NATO atomic force; and

c. An overall normalization of French-American relations.

After exchanging views with Adenauer and Macmillan, I would be inclined to try the latter course, i.e., negotiate with the French, and fall back to the middle course if the negotiations proved fruitless. This suggestion is advanced under no illusion as to the likelihood of de Gaulle becoming a grateful, cooperative partner or a true convert to integration of effort within NATO, but he may be induced to withhold his monkey wrench. Also, I appreciate the argument that the existence of a French national force will whet the appetite of the Germans for one of their own; however I would try to meet this contingency through a multilateral NATO atomic force in the use of which the Germans would have a vote. This possibility is discussed in the following paper.

Enclosure 3⁵

STRENGTHENING WEST GERMAN TIES TO NATO

West Germany is in the geographical front rank of NATO facing (the Germans would say) 92 hostile divisions. Several of their principal cities, notably Hamburg and Munich, lie forward of the main NATO battle position, and the German leaders know it. They hear talk of a forward strategy to defend these centers but do not see the conventional forces to execute it. At the same time, they hear of a “new” American strategy which calls for imposing a pause on these hostile divisions by conventional means without the use of nuclear weapons. In combination, the lack of conventional forces to implement a true forward strategy and the alleged reluctance on the part of the US to use atomic weapons at the outset of an attack are matters which give pause to many German leaders concerned with the long-term security of their country.

If West Germany is to continue to be a contented non-nuclear member of NATO, particularly after France obtains national nuclear weapons, these problems need to be faced before a critical situation arises in the heart of the Alliance. Several courses of action suggest themselves and deserve serious consideration.

The first is to develop the concept and then plan for a multilateral NATO nuclear force which will include Germany among a restricted group of nations controlling the use of this force. The composition of the force should be designed to meet the requirement of giving the Europeans—and particularly the West Germans—a feeling of participating more directly in determining the use of atomic weapons in NATO. The weapons in such a force should be counted against SACEUR’s military requirements to strike targets of primary interest to the Alliance and be subject to his control as are his other atomic weapons, but the justification for the force would be primarily political-psychological. It should be set up in business without delay by allocations of existing weapons by the US and UK (and eventually by France); the subsequent modernization of these weapons by the introduction of a new MRBM should be planned as a part of the overall modernization program for all of SACEUR’s atomic forces.

West Germans need reassurance not only through the provision of this NATO nuclear force but also through evidence of a determination to use all NATO atomic weapons under certain predetermined conditions which will satisfy German security requirements. For the moment, some declaration of principles governing the use of atomic weapons such as Stikker’s currently proposed guidelines, if approved both by the President of the United States and by the North Atlantic Council, seems the most feasible way to give the needed reassurance to Germany.

Finally, there is need to give reality to a forward strategy which can be executed for the duration of a significant pause without a general employment of atomic weapons. In the eyes of the Germans, means for such a strategy do not exist now. The first step is to agree within NATO upon what these means should be; in short, to embark on the NATO military review which is discussed in the following paper.

The foregoing actions are affirmative suggestions to tie the West Germans more tightly to the West. There are some negative actions which would work strongly against this objective if the Europeans—particularly the Germans—became aware of them. They include any action which might suggest that the multilateral NATO force is a device to remove atomic weapons from Europe or to deflect a general modernization of NATO atomic forces. Another would be to advocate a pseudo-forward strategy based on an obviously fragile defensive shield without the depth, durability, or logistic means to support sustained combat. The Germans know too much about war and the facts of life to be taken in for long.

Enclosure 4⁶

THE “NEW” US STRATEGY

General Norstad feels, and I agree, that the sure way to defeat our purpose of gaining NATO acceptance of our reoriented thinking on military strategy is to present it as something new and extraordinary, made in the USA. He points out that many of the cardinal points, particularly the increased emphasis on conventional weapons and the concept of creating a pause before using atomic weapons, have been a part of NATO thinking for a long time. In his recent Emergency Defense Plan⁷ now disseminated to NATO commanders, there is recognition of the possibility of a conventional conflict in resisting an aggression less than general war.

In listening to the views of General Norstad and the SHAPE staff, I was struck both by their support of the need for a forward strategy to reassure the Germans and by what I view as their reluctance to face up to the need for larger forces to give reality to such a strategy. One thought was advanced that the pause imposed on the Soviets might occur prior to firing a shot, presumably while they contemplated the consequences of an attack on NATO forward positions. This would be accomplished by placing a sufficient number of NATO ground forces far enough forward to oblige the Soviets to mass for a major military thrust thereby exposing their forces at the outset to the possibility of effective use of nuclear weapons. If the attack then came, the NATO forces would be expected to expend themselves on these forward positions, since their numbers would not permit anything like an effective resistance forward and a defense in depth as well. In the background of these views, I detected a fundamental disbelief in the practicability of getting an increased NATO contribution to support a forward strategy with adequate forces.

Returning to the problem of influencing our NATO allies in the direction of our strategic thinking, if direct explanation and exhortation must be avoided, it remains to find a better way. I would recommend a comprehensive NATO review of the requirements for an adequate forward strategy as a vehicle to argue the case for the modified strategy. To do such a job in a professional military way, it would be necessary to give to the Allied planners—and through them their governmental leaders—much of the new information on weapons effects, targeting plans, and enemy capabilities which would be otherwise suspect if suddenly released to support US arguments on NATO strategy. In this NATO forum, we could thrash out the differences in assessing Soviet capabilities which now plague our international discussions.

In passing, I would mention that the assumptions for such a review would, as always, largely control the outcome. I would suggest the inclusion of the following assumptions if the end product is to have the desired value:

a. NATO should defend far enough forward to cover the main population centers of the exposed member nations.

b. NATO forces should be sufficient to prevent without the general use of atomic weapons any serious inroad into NATO territory for at least ______ days (the exact figure to be based on a political estimate of the time requirement).

c. SACEUR should have operational control of all the weapons necessary to strike the principal targets primarily threatening Western Europe, to include the Soviet MRBM deployment.

The establishment of agreed NATO requirements for a forward strategy would have generally good consequences apart from the progress which it might make in educating our Allies. One result would be to require SHAPE to justify the need for NATO MRBM’s both as modernization of existing bomber and cruise missile forces and as a contribution to the NATO nuclear force previously discussed. Another would be to establish the role for very low yield atomic weapons in extending the capability of conventional forces. Such matters could not be considered without getting into questions of NATO organization, command and control. In the full context of Western European defense and in the relatively cool atmosphere of military planning, we might hope for more progress than in high temperature political discussions, where these intricate matters are often considered in isolation.

On the negative side, it is probable that an honest study of requirements would be opposed, possibly frustrated, by national interests desirous of controlling the end result. If this result is a requirement for a greatly increased contribution to NATO, efforts will be made to discredit and bury the review. Nonetheless, even in this case, it would have important collateral benefits and is, I am convinced, worth giving a sincere try. There is not much likelihood that the project will be started—certainly its conclusions will not be adopted and implemented—without vigorous US backing all the way.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, NATO General. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. Taylor visited Europe March 18–31.
2. Not printed. Enclosure 1 was a list of the U.S. and foreign officials seen by Taylor.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
4. Top Secret.
5. Top Secret.
6. Top Secret.
7. Not found.