Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

92. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, February 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

• National Security Action Memorandum No. 118—Participation of U.S. and Latin American Armed Forces in the Attainment of Common Objectives in Latin America²

This report is in response to NSAM 118. It was prepared in collaboration with the Department of Defense and has the concurrence of that department.

I. Policy

The implementation of our Latin American policy is taking place within a framework of rapid evolutionary change. Throughout Latin America social tensions are mounting. The reforms generated by the Alliance for Progress are likely to weaken, rather than strengthen, the fabric of society in most Latin American countries by increasing these tensions during the period before the long term programs of the Alliance become effective. We must expect the Communists and other extreme left-wing political factions to try to exploit this situation to their own advantage.

A key element in preserving the internal stability of Latin American countries during this critical period will be the position and attitudes of the Latin American military. Historically, the military in Latin America has played a major role in local political life. In only a few countries is there any tradition of civilian control. Frequently, the armed forces have exercised degrees of open control varying from outright military dictatorship to situations where they influence the political balance of power, either by dictating the limits within which a civilian government is permitted to operate or by swinging their support from one faction to another.

In the past there was a strong tendency on the part of Latin American military establishments to support conservative political institutions. Even though the officer corps in Latin America is predominately of middle and even lower-class origin, it has usually identified its interests with those of the upper-class landowning and commercial oligarchy that has dominated the political scene in Latin America since the wars of independence. Today, however, the same factors which are revolutionizing the civilian environment are affecting the military establishments of Latin America. In nearly every country the rising generation of younger officers is sympathetic to social and economic reform. In a few cases, their social and economic tendencies are beginning to introduce a new and unpredictable element into already unstable local political situations.

From the standpoint of military policy, our current strategy calls for the United States to assume primary responsibility for defense of the Western Hemisphere against external attack. Our policy objectives, therefore, require military establishments in Latin America which are capable of contributing to the defense of the hemisphere by maintaining internal security against the threat of Castro or communist-inspired insurgency. We also want military establishments that will evolve in a way that contributes to the political stability and economic development of their respective countries. In this connection, it should be noted that most Latin American armed forces are capable of maintaining internal security in urban areas only; they are not generally capable of coping with uprisings or guerrilla actions in rural areas.

In order to align Latin American military establishments with United States military policy, and to train and equip them for their contribution to the defense of the hemisphere, the United States must be the paramount foreign military influence in Latin America. A favorable political orientation on the part of the Latin American officer corps is vital to our interests. This calls for continuous effort in solidifying the bonds between our military forces and those of Latin America.

In achieving the foregoing objectives, we must recognize, however, that some kinds of action to strengthen Latin American military forces are fraught with hazardous political consequences. In nearly every Latin American country the political balance is a delicate one, with the armed forces capable of tipping the scales. Most governments are carefully nurturing the principle of civilian control. We cannot afford to be identified with any step backward either to repressive dictatorship or military intervention in political life.

Accordingly, every move we make to strengthen our ties with the Latin American military must be done on a selective basis with careful attention to the sensitivities of the country concerned and their effect on the political balance in that county. With this qualification, we are implementing the proposals made in JCSM 832-61, along the following lines.

II. Implementation

Nearly all the proposals in JCSM 832-61 have been under way for some time. Nevertheless, we have reviewed the entire list carefully to determine which proposals should be continued at their present level, which should receive increased emphasis, and which should be rejected as not feasible or undesirable.

Our review disclosed that of the twenty-four specific proposals that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to cover their original twenty-seven recommendations, nineteen are already in operation. We believe that eleven of these should continue at present levels and nine should receive increased emphasis. The report being prepared in connection with NSAM 119 (on civic action)³ will include recommendations on the degree of emphasis for these nine. Four of the twenty-four proposals (Nos. 1, 9, 12 and 24) have been carefully reviewed and found to be either unfeasible or of such questionable value that they are being returned for further study. The Enclosure⁴ lists the twenty-four proposals with the current status and degree of emphasis recommended for each.

The civic action recommendations of JCSM 832-61 deserve special mention. Action is now being taken pursuant to NSAM 119 to expand civic action programs in underdeveloped countries throughout the world, including Latin America. The Department of Defense has reviewed the FY 1962 military assistance equipment program with a view to expediting certain projects for selected military forces in Latin America which can contribute substantially to economic and social development, and to determine whether other purely military projects can be deferred without significantly lowering the military effectiveness of Latin American forces. $2.9 million in the FY 1962 Military Assistance Program is being authorized for these projects, and another $5.0 million may also be allotted for the same purpose.

To determine what funds can be obligated for civic action type projects in FY 1962, and to program other such projects in FY 1963, a DOD-AID team will soon visit selected Latin American countries. The specific programs resulting from this visit will be listed in the report on NSAM 119, due on March 31.⁵ We therefore recommend that with this memorandum action on NSAM 118 be considered completed.

William H. Brubeck⁶

1. Source: Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316. Secret. Drafted by Maechling and Brigadier General W.A. Enemark, USA, Regional Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, with concurrences by Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William Bundy, and in the Agency for International Development.
2. NSAM 118, from McGeorge Bundy to Rusk and McNamara, dated December 5, stated that the President was “favorably impressed” with the general approach and content of the proposals in JCSM 832-61 (Document 89) and desired their further refinement and development into specific programs for action. It further stated that the President had assigned primary responsibility for formulating a policy guidance paper on this subject to the Department of State and responsibility for developing general and specific programs for implementation to the Department of Defense and that he requested a brief consolidated report on February 1 outlining actions that were underway. (Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316)
3. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, Document 65.
4. Not printed and titled “Specific Projects Submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Cover the Recommendations Contained in Their Paper No. JCSM-832-61, with Comment on the Current Status, Desirability, and Degree of Emphasis Required for Each” undated.
5. Dated March 30.
6. Printed from a copy that indicates Brubeck signed the original above Battle’s typed signature.