83. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward)1

Dear Mr. Woodward : At a meeting on 5 May 1961, the National Security Council agreed, inter alia, that the United States should at once initiate negotiations to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral, and OAS arrangements against Castro. Listed among the possible measures were:

a.
Creation of a Caribbean Security Force; and
b.
Initiation of a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean.

The Department of Defense recognizes that there are desirable political benefits in establishing a Caribbean Naval Patrol (CNP) and a Caribbean Security Force (CSF). However, so that the Department of State is fully informed of all aspects of the matter, I wish to convey the following comments made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which I concur.

Briefly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold the opinion that, militarily, the advantages in establishing a CSF and a CNP would not be significant. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in support of the NSC decision, have furnished guidelines for use in creating a CNP and a CSF. Those guidelines are attached herewith.2

Military opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff follow:

Comment on a proposed Caribbean Naval Patrol (CNP): The U.S. Atlantic Fleet is fully capable of conducting necessary naval patrols in the Caribbean. In the past, the U.S. Navy has operated with combined Latin American Naval forces in the Caribbean for other purposes. From a U.S. military point of view, there are no apparent military problems incapable of solution which would be generated by the establishment of a multi-national naval patrol to prevent a Cuban-sponsored invasion of other Caribbean states. The stopping of clandestine shipment of arms and men is complicated by the restrictions of international law against boarding and searching ships on the high seas. The CNP could stop, board and search suspicious ships in the territorial and/or customs waters of those Caribbean countries which are willing to grant such authority to CNP [Page 184] forces. With such authority the CNP could intercept some clandestine shipments of areas and men destined for Caribbean countries.

Comment on a proposed Caribbean Security Force (CSF): Latin American military contributions to such a force, would, of necessity, be small. Hence the U.S. contribution should be sufficiently great to ensure successful military action. However, from a U.S. military point of view there would be no apparent military problems incapable of solution which would be generated by the establishment of a multi-national CSF.

Castro Threat: Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a meaningful military invasion against any Latin American country with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti, the capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or small boats.

Castro possesses the capability to export the Cuban revolution through support and provision of “volunteers” and/or arms to indigenous revolutionary groups in other countries and is more likely to choose this alternative than military ventures which could be identified as being instigated by the government of Cuba.

General Comment: Before a political decision is reached for the establishment of a CNP and CSF, consideration should be given to the possible legal effects on the treaty with Cuba for use of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo3 lest Castro gain grounds for legal termination of the treaty. Following a political decision to create a Caribbean Security Arrangement and prior to initiation of operations thereunder, international agreements providing for combined operations, rights of entry of forces, and overflight authority will be required.

If arrangements go forward for a CSF and a CNP then supplemental funding arrangements will have to be provided in appropriate programs.

Sincerely,

Haydn Williams 4
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 381 Caribbean. Secret.
  2. Two memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, both dated August 18, are attached to the source text. JCSM-560-61 concerns a possible Caribbean Security Force; JCSM-561-61 concerns a possible Caribbean Naval Patrol. Each has an attached appendix setting forth guidelines.
  3. Signed at Havana February 16, 1903, and at Washington February 23, 1903; for text, see 6 Bevans 1113.
  4. Printed from a copy that indicates Williams signed the original.