81. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy 1
The Cuban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31. Present were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself.
The following decisions were made:
1. We would proceed immediately to discuss with other Caribbean governments the possibility of organizing a Caribbean Security Force. This could be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework of existing treaty arrangements, as a series of new bilateral treaties, or a formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization would depend on the judgment of other Caribbean countries as to how they could accomplish the objective of establishing the force without running serious internal political risks. The United States, for its part, would prefer the formal multilateral arrangement. Such a Caribbean Security Force would have at least four major aspects:
- (1)
- Advance commitment to come to the aid of other signatories threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation of specific units for participation in necessary multilateral actions.
- (2)
- The establishment of a pool of intelligence information concerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of such information.
- (3)
- The establishment of a Caribbean air and sea patrol to watch for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents.
- (4)
- A training program in combatting subversive tactics, police organization and procedure, etc.
It was conceded that the substantive aspects of this arrangement could, if necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seek a more formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basis of internal political considerations in the United States.
[Here follows discussion of other aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume X, Document 258.]