Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

76. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, May 19, 1961.

U.S. POLICY FOR THE SECURITY OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE SIXTIES

Part I—Introduction

Latin America is militarily important to the security of the United States. It is an area on which we are dependent for bases and strategic resources in peace and war. The Cuban experience makes it plain that the fall of additional Latin American nations to the Sino-Soviet Bloc would jeopardize the entire Inter-American system; and that the establishment of a military foothold in Latin America by Bloc powers would pose a direct threat to the security of the U.S. itself.

The purpose of this paper is to review current U.S. military policies and programs concerned with the security of Latin America and project them in the light of the threat, the resources available to meet it, and the adjustments which may be necessary during the 1960’s. The focus will be on the strategic concepts, collective security arrangements, military assistance and other military programs, and arms control policies applicable to the security of the Western Hemisphere during the decade.

Parts II-IV of the paper will discuss three principal security problems: (1) the problem of extra-continental aggression; (2) the problem of aggression by one State against another; and (3) the problem of indirect aggression and subversion. Examined under each will be the nature of the threat; existing strategies and policies; and existing capabilities to cope with the threat. Part V of the paper proposes strategy and policy for the future. The last two sections of the paper set forth conclusions and recommendations in the military field for furthering the goals of our “Alianza para Progreso” and meeting successfully the challenge we face in the decade of the 1960’s.

The long-range goals of hemispheric security are dependent not only on military capabilities but also on a carefully phased approach to such complementary needs as political stability, social and economic development, and the encouragement of the people of Latin America toward what the President has called “an historic decade of democratic progress” and a “hemisphere where all men can hope for the same high standard of living”. Where directly relevant to the military requirements and resources, other factors—economic, political, and psychological—will be discussed. Basically, however, this paper is limited to an analysis of the military aspects of hemispheric security.

[Here follow Parts II through V.]

Part VI—Conclusions

1. Latin American nations collectively are essential to the security of the U.S., and certain Latin American countries, individually, are important to its security. The fall of individual Latin American countries to the Soviet Bloc will jeopardize the security of the United States.

2. The Western Hemisphere has a sound strategy and sufficient capacity at this time to guard against the least likely threat to its security, an armed external attack, and an ineffective strategy and insufficient capability to guard against the most likely threat—the threat to internal security.

3. Existing military policies and programs for the security of Latin America will have to be modified to meet the shifting nature of the security problem, giving priority to the internal security threat and new emphasis to military programs contributing to economic development and the strengthening of representative government, while at the same time, maintaining an effective strategy to secure the Western Hemisphere against external attack.

4. Modifications in existing programs will have to be brought about gradually, taking into account the sensibilities of the Latin Americans on these matters. The goal should be to give Latin American states a sense of more vital and more dignified partnership with the U.S. in the overall defense of the hemisphere from attacks from without and within.

Part VII—Recommendations

1. Encourage acceptance of the concept that the U.S. has primary responsibility for the defense of Latin America against external attack, that the role of the Latin American nations in this mission is to be de-emphasized, and that the internal security mission of Latin American nations is to be accorded increased emphasis.

2. As further means of coping with indirect communist penetration of the hemisphere, the U.S. should:

a. Seek to create increased awareness on the part of Latin American countries of the danger to hemispheric security posed by Castroism and communism in general and of the need to take prompt multilateral action, when necessary, to eliminate this danger.

b. Negotiate, or renegotiate, as may be required, bilateral agreements designed to provide assistance to countries requesting help in defending themselves against indirect aggression and subversion directed and sustained by communists from within or without the hemisphere.

3. Explore the establishment of an Inter-American Security Force, and, as an initial step, promote the establishment of a Caribbean Security Arrangement, by means of which Caribbean countries would cooperate with the U.S. and one another in maintaining the security of any Caribbean country, at its request, against bona-fide communist-directed aggression or subversion.

4. Make efforts to strengthen the IADB through such means as: (1) closer relationship with the COAS, (2) increased joint defense planning, (3) greater responsibility for planning and advising on internal security matters (including a system of surveillance in the Caribbean to identify and frustrate armed assistance from Cuba to subversive movements in other countries).

5. Promote the establishment of the proposed Inter-American Defense College at an early date.

6. In our military assistance programs, give first priority to meas-ures designed to meet the threat to internal security and seek to eliminate missions which may no longer be valid. In this connection seek the repeal of the Morse Amendment.

7. Increase and strengthen the training of Latin American military personnel in anti-subversion, anti-guerrilla, and riot control techniques.

8. In accordance with the President’s Special Message on Foreign Aid, place new emphasis on military assistance programs which contribute to the civic improvement and economic development of the countries of the area, and at the same time to the development of improved social responsibility and better public acceptance of the local military.

9. In order to give additional emphasis to the internal security and civic action missions of Latin American forces, seek a modest increase in the level of U.S. military assistance programs.

10. Encourage and support Latin American initiatives toward regional arms limitation agreements.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/6-2861. Secret. The source text incorporates revisions after May 19 and is filed with a covering memorandum of June 28 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Haydn Williams to Berle. Williams recommended sending the draft to the National Security Council for consideration, but other attached memoranda indicate that it was not sent.