Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

65. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, October 8, 1963.

SUBJECT

• The Martin Doctrine

I hope very much that at your press conference tomorrow you will be able to clear up some of the fears aroused by the Martin statement in the Herald Tribune Sunday² and the Martin backgrounder as reported in today’s Post. The Venezuelan Ambassador called me this morning and said that the “Martin Doctrine” was causing “consternation,” that it was being interpreted as a “very serious reversal of policy,” that he feared it would “trigger all sorts of bad reactions though the hemisphere,” and that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister had returned to Caracas yesterday “very apprehensive and gloomy.” I assured him that there was no change in policy, that the Martin statement was to be read in the context of our total Latin American policy, that it dealt with only one aspect of that policy, that it did not repeal the Secretary’s statement of Friday, etc. I think, however, that a more authoritative declaration to this effect is required if the Martin statement is not going to begin to cause damage. The points, I think, which should be made are:

a) there has been no change in Administration policy

b) our main reliance in Latin America continues to be on the forces of progressive democracy, and our essential hope lies in the establishment and extension of civilian, democratic regimes

c) the Martin statement does not constitute a “doctrine” it was wrongly and misleadingly headlined by the Herald Tribune as “Official U.S. Policy for Latin America” it is simply a sober and realistic description of certain conditions and problems which the struggle for democracy is bound to encounter along the way.

Since I have had some involvement in Latin American affairs, I hope you will not mind if I add a few words about the Martin statement. I think Ed Martin had done a first-class job in running ARA; and I recognize the need for cooling down those in the press and Congress who suppose that military coups constitute definitive evidence of the failure of the Alliance. I do think, however, that the Martin statement needlessly laid itself open to misinterpretation. The notion that the statement means a reversal of U.S. policy is only partly to be explained by the Herald Tribune headline. It is also to be explained by the way the Martin statement said some things and by the way it omitted other things.

The signal contribution of your Administration to Latin American policy has been to make an implicit alliance with the forces of progressive democracy in Latin America. You have become a rallying-point for these forces, which in past years have been disorganized, dispersed and discouraged. Your coming to Washington has meant a new voice, a new position, a new opportunity. It has altered the relationship of the United States to the rest of the hemisphere by identifying Washington with moral and progressive leadership. The Alliance for Progress is really based on this implicit alliance.

Now obviously we have been disappointed by the weakness of progressive democracy in many countries, but only what Ed Martin calls “impatient idealists” would have expected these forces to triumph overnight. The trouble with the Martin statement is that it gives the impression that, since they have failed to triumph overnight, we have lost interest in them and are now looking to military rule to produce progressive regimes. This impression is conveyed especially by what seems to me a gross exaggeration of the merits of military rule in Latin America and of its “contribution to political freedom and stability in many countries.” Thus the Martin statement says of Ecuador and Guatemala that “military regimes have announced reform programs of substantial importance.” What is the advantage of going on the record in praise of regimes which we know are not much good? Everyone knows that the Guatemalan regime has been quite regressive and repressive, and that the Ecuador regime is falling apart, and our praise must therefore convey to many the implication that, if military regimes “announce” nice programs, they will be forgiven everything else. Similarly the Martin statement says that military government in Argentina has produced “one of the most progressive regimes” that Argentina has ever had—a striking feat of clairvoyance, since the new regime in Argentina has not yet taken office. I see no gain in committing ourselves to so glowing a description of a government which has not even been inaugurated.

Everyone in Latin America accepts the necessity of dealing with military regimes for tactical purposes, so long as there is fundamental faith in our democratic purpose. The Martin statement has alarmed some about the constancy of that purpose by appearing to transform a pragmatic necessity into a new policy departure—or rather into a reversion to old and familiar U.S. policies which for a moment Washington seemed to have abandoned. Because the statement does not reaffirm in any vivid way our preference for the forces of progressive democracy, and because it detects so many notable virtues in military rule, it seemed to be signaling, say, to the Venezuelan military that, if Leone turns out to be weak, it is OK to throw him out so long as the military regime “announces” reform programs and observes the proper etiquette. The Martin statement even calls for “military participation in the formation of some national policies.” A Chilean diplomat says sadly, “We have struggled for years to keep our military out of politics. You are weakening the democratic structure in Chile by inviting them in.”

I don’t want to prolong this memorandum, but I should add that the tone of the statement also seems unduly cold and condescending and to suggest a lack of sympathy with the problems of Latin American democracy and with the dignity of the Latin American people. The suggestion that “the traditional method of transferring political power has been by revolution or coup d’etat” is offensive to countries like Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Costa Rica, Brazil, Argentina, etc., where this has not been the traditional method. The suggestion that the goal of the Alliance is to “strengthen in each society the power of the educated middle class” suggests that we have forgotten all our fine words about helping the campesinos, and the workers and that our basic concern is with the business community. And there is altogether too much flourish of the word “we”—“we must strengthen in each society …” “we cannot aim to reduce them to impotence in the national life …” “our efforts to train the military in their most valuable role …”—all this suggesting to sensitive Latinos an unconscious paternalism and contempt in American policy.

For all these reasons, I think it would be most important for you to strike a note of reassurance in tomorrow’s press conference.³

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.⁴

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Latin America, July-November 1963. Confidential.
2. October 6; see Document 64.
3. At his October 9 press conference, President Kennedy was asked whether he had cleared the Martin article and whether it represented a reversal of U.S. policy in Latin America. He replied that he had not personally cleared the article but was generally aware of its content and that the United States remained opposed to governments in the region imposed by coups d’etat. Assistant Secretary Martin, he said, was “merely attempting to explain some of the problems in Latin America, why coups take place, and what problems they present [the United States] with.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 767-775)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.