431. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Peruvian Elections

PARTICIPANTS

  • Fernando Berckemeyer, Ambassador of Peru
  • The Secretary
  • Richard A. Poole, Officer in Charge of Peruvian Affairs, WST/ARA
[Page 884]

Ambassador Berckemeyer called on the Secretary pursuant to the latter’s suggestion, during their conversation of May 10, that he call after returning from his visit to Peru. (See memorandum of conversation of May 10.)2

Ambassador Berckemeyer explained that he had returned from Peru on May 27, following a visit of a little more than two weeks, having gone to Peru with an International Finance Corporation mission in his capacity as a Governor of the IFC. He said he had found the economic situation in Peru to be very healthy, attributable in considerable measure to the marked upswing in sugar prices, the continuing increase in fish meal production and export, and a strengthening in prices of lead, zinc and other metals.

Turning to the political situation, the Ambassador said he had had the opportunity of talking to many people, both in and out of government, about the outlook for the elections. One obvious thing that struck him was the complete freedom of political activity, campaigning and press. He was also impressed by the fact that the candidates showed a general respect for the rights of their rivals to campaign freely and that the candidates and their audiences showed a maturity that had resulted in a relative absence of political incidents and clashes, only a few minor incidents of violence having occurred.

The Ambassador stated that he personally was confident that elections would be held and the results respected regardless of the winner. He had conversations with General Lindley (senior co-President of the Junta), whom he hadn’t seen in many years, and developed a high opinion of him, of his integrity and of his determination to hold and respect the elections. He felt certain most of the Junta was equally determined to do so, mentioning the Ministers of Agriculture, Development and Health as particular examples, but he could not say this of all of the members of the Junta, particularly two members whom he did not name. (In a later conversation with Department officers, the Ambassador mentioned specifically Foreign Minister (Admiral) Llosa, who avoids stating his position forthrightly, but who does not convey an impression of confidence as to his feelings about respecting the elections regardless of the results.) The Ambassador added that the overwhelming sentiment he got from talking to a wide cross section of private citizens, business leaders, etc., including staunch anti-Apristas, was that the Junta must live up to its promise even if Haya wins in order that the country might return to constitutional, civilian government.

The Ambassador thought that the elections would be very close, but his impression was that Odría was in the lead, due to several factors: [Page 885] Odría3 had made a very good impression with his offer to form a national union with the other parties, even though the offer had not been accepted; the relative prosperity in the country was working in his favor, as it diminished his rivals’ appeal to discontented elements; whereas last year Odría had made very few appearances outside of Lima, he this year had been stumping the country with surprisingly good crowds; his wife continues to be a major asset, Belaúnde being divorced and Haya and Samame being bachelors; while ex-President Prado’s party had last year joined forces with the Apristas, most Pradistas this year, who while not numerous were in many cases persons of considerable influence, had joined forces with Odría. APRA, Berckemeyer said, is a strong party and well organized, but there had been some discord among its leaders that had weakened it somewhat. Belaúnde, he felt, was falling behind. The Ambassador was convinced that Belaúnde was not pro-communist although he was not rejecting communist support.

The Ambassador said that some Americans—and he mentioned a priest whose name he could not recall—were claiming that the U.S. Embassy favored APRA. He himself was convinced that this was not so. He had been delighted to find that Ambassador Jones was very well thought of by all the Peruvians he had seen and that he had done a great deal to create an atmosphere of confidence between the Embassy and the Peruvians.

When the Secretary asked how the Castro-communist problem was affecting Peru, Ambassador Berckemeyer mentioned the fact that a group of young Peruvians, mostly university students, had been apprehended entering Peru from Bolivia with arms and subversive plans. The group had proceeded from Cuba, where they had received guerrilla and subversive training. Mr. Poole mentioned that the Department was very interested in this clear-cut case of Castro-communist training, infiltration and subversion and had asked our Embassy to talk to the Peruvian Government about the possibility of greater public use being made of the incident through the Lavalle Committee4 of the OAS, perhaps with the cooperation of the SCCS,5 of which General Doig of Peru is a member.

The Secretary expressed his appreciation to the Ambassador for giving his observations on his trip. He said he was glad to hear the Ambassador’s expression of confidence.

Footnote: In an immediately subsequent conversation with Department officers Ambassador Berckemeyer mentioned that, at a private social function in the evening of May 28,6 he had had occasion to talk to [Page 886] the President at some length about the Peruvian situation and had expressed his confidence that the elections would be held and respected. He said he did not know how the press learned of the fact that he had talked to the President, but that when he was asked by the press whether the political situation in Peru had been discussed, he had replied that this would be only natural and that he had expressed his feeling of confidence. It had then been reported in the press that the Junta was said to have assured the United States and other friendly governments that elections would be held and respected and that these assurances had been given in person to President Kennedy by him (Berckemeyer). (The UPI correspondent who wrote the story on May 29 had already told a Department officer of this, adding that Berckemeyer had authorized him to use the story without attribution as to source. Comment: In stating this assurance came from the Junta, he must have been trying to interpret the Ambassador’s remarks.) The Ambassador mentioned to the Department officers that Foreign Minister Llosa had then issued a statement to the effect that the Junta had given him (Berckemeyer) no message to give to the President and that the Junta’s promises had been made to the Peruvian people and not to any foreign government. The Ambassador stated to the Department officers that he felt it perfectly proper for him as Ambassador, after talking to General Lindley, to express his personal confidence to the President and the Secretary.

The Ambassador was confronted by the press when he emerged from his meeting with the Secretary, and in answer to a direct question said he had conveyed no message from the Junta but had reiterated his confidence that the elections would be held and respected; he was careful to add that the Junta had given its promise to the Peruvian people.7

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 PERU. Confidential. Drafted by Poole and approved in S on June 5.
  2. See Document 430.
  3. Reference is to Presidential candidate Manuel Odria.
  4. See footnote 2, Document 168.
  5. Reference is to the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the OAS.
  6. Reference is presumably to a reception at the house of Hugh Auchincloss in Washington described in the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
  7. Fernando Belaúnde Terry was elected President on June 9 and was inaugurated on July 28.