Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

427. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Acting Secretary of State Ball¹

Washington, October 3, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Military Assistance to Peru

Our policy determination to limit the level of military assistance to Peru at this time is based on a number of factors:

1. Last March, in accordance with authorization given him by the President, Ambassador Loeb told top Peruvian military leaders that we would find it very difficult to recognize a government installed by military coup and next to impossible to continue assistance programs, and in doing so he referred to his conversation with the President. The position we took is now public knowledge.

2. When we announced suspension of diplomatic relations and assistance programs we declared publicly that the coup d’etat represented a grave setback to the principles agreed to under the Alliance for Progress.

3. In taking this public position we hoped to demonstrate to the hemisphere our firm support of democratic, constitutional process and to provide a deterrent to potential military coups against democratic, constitutional regimes elsewhere in the hemisphere.

4. In Peru itself it was hoped that witholding full resumption of assistance might serve as an additional inducement toward a rapid return to constitutional government.

We have carefully explained to the Junta our position on limited resumption of military assistance to commence this month, our assurance that, in any case, full assistance would be resumed when the situation returns to “normal” next year, and our disposition to review the situation at some intermediate time, perhaps early next year. (We were prepared to commence limited assistance a month ago, but the White House requested this be deferred until the Congress acts on the 1963 program.) As you know, the Junta has been exercising heavy pressure to induce us to resume full assistance now, accusing us publicly of violating our agreements, threatening to dispense with our military missions, threatening to withdraw from Peru’s hemispheric defense mission and generally choosing to confront this issue headlong as a matter of political prestige rather than agree to a gradual approach.²

In actuality the grant assistance we have contemplated resuming this month (certain maintenance, spares and training) is not inconsiderable: $6.1 million out of $9 million undelivered in FY ‘62 and previous programs (i.e. 67%) and $1.5 million out of the $13.8 million FY ‘63 program, if approved (i.e. 12%), totaling $7.6 million.

I believe the following factors militate against reverting to full military assistance at this time:

1. The deterrent factor in our position against military coups elsewhere in the hemisphere would be impaired, including our credibility should we wish to convey a similar warning.

2. Our posture in the hemisphere and in Peru itself in favor of constitutional process would be weakened by a speedy return to business as usual in military assistance. (The position we took at the time of the coup was generally applauded in the press of the hemisphere and our present position is not out of step in the hemisphere as a whole, where several countries—Colombia, Venezuela, Uruguay, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Honduras—have not yet even recognized the Junta.)

3. We would permit the Junta to have the satisfaction of seeing us capitulate before threats and pressure from a position carefully arrived at and approved at the highest level. In all probability this would strengthen the extremists in the Junta who have been advocating a hard line and further weaken our already limited influence. (See Lima telegrams 416 and 418 at Tabs A and B.)³ Disquieting questions have been raised as to the real intentions of the extremists.

4. Congress might well question our tactics in holding the line until adjournment and then suddenly returning to full assistance.

5. Full assistance would be illegal in the absence of a Presidential determination on internal security and the negotiation of an amendment to our mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Peru. The proposed FY ‘63 program contains a large internal security component which can be delivered only after those actions. I believe it would be inadvisable to seek to negotiate an amendment of our agreement at this time.

Recommendation⁴

For these reasons I recommend that you speak to the President again in order to secure his agreement that, rather than resuming full military assistance immediately,⁵ we modify our position in the following manner, the first three steps to be effective after congressional action (expected shortly) and pending step four:

1. That we permit military purchases on a normal basis rather than the present basis (maintenance and spares only, with certain other items on a “case by case” basis), as sales do not constitute assistance and therefore should not affect our public posture in this regard.

2. That we expand the categories of grant assistance to be provided (now restricted to certain maintenance, spares and training) to include additional training and certain types of non-sensitive end items, e.g. certain civic action items, support items, uniform material, etc. not involving internal security.

3. That we consider other grant assistance only on a case by case basis, using the criterion of urgent necessity.

4. That we plan full resumption in mid-November—four months after the military coup—and inform the Junta this month that we shall make our promised review at that time instead of early next year.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.5-MSP/10-362. Secret. Drafted by Poole and Thompson of ARA/WST.
2. See, for example, the memorandum of conversation between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Llosa at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on September 28. (Ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
3. Not printed; dated September 30 and October 1, respectively. (Ibid., Central Files, 723.5811/9-3062 and 10-162)
4. Ball approved all four recommendations.
5. A handwritten notation here reads: “This refers to President’s decision, made during conversation with Secretary, that full mil. assistance should be resumed immediately.”
6. A limited resumption of military assistance to Peru began on October 8 according to a joint State-Defense message transmitted in telegram 281 to Lima, October 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 723.5-MSP/10-862) Telegram 313 to Lima, October 23, reads: “In view need solidarity in face Cuban-Soviet threat to hemisphere security, remaining special restrictions on MAP for Peru (Deptel 281) are removed effective immediately.” (Ibid., 723.5/10-2362)