416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru 1
Washington,
May
29, 1962, 9:14 p.m.
860. For Ambassador. Department has held further consultations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] USIA concerning additional steps to be taken in effort prevent military intervention in Peruvian elections using as discussion points informal memorandum prepared during your visit here and your comments by official-informal letter.
- 1.
- Agreement reached to proceed immediately with following steps,
which we consider to be in consonance your views:
- a.
- APRA should be encouraged again to urge Prado request OAS observer team (request should be made to SYG rather than Chairman COAS). Have you made or do you plan make further approach to APRA, or would you consider it preferable handle through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (which latter prepared undertake) in order avoid possible leak of your involvement?
- b.
- Department and USIA will encourage US press, radio and TV coverage, including dispatch of correspondents, and off the record will alert key journalists to issues involved in intervention.
- c.
- CAS alerting stations in various LA countries to encourage widespread LA press coverage, including dispatch of correspondents, and will arrange FBIS coverage and playback.
- d.
- USIA will assist in playback but avoid using attributable media.
- e.
- Department will request advance approval of message of congratulations from President to winning candidate to be dispatched immediately if situation warrants.
- 2.
- Agreed not to inspire press query to President on US attitude toward possible military intervention.
- 3.
- Following suggestions being considered and we would appreciate
your views urgently by priority cable:
- a.
- Dispatch of general officer to Peru under suitable pretense (such as inspection trip to include other countries) to serve as additional point of contact and communication with Peruvian military during election [Page 860] period.2 (View Doig’s attitude as revealed Deptel 850,3 we doubt utility your suggestion in Embdes 6224 that Gens White and Doig visit Peru ostensibly on SCCS business.)
- b.
- An approach to third countries (i.e. Colombia and Brazil in addition to Venezuela which you report has already taken some action this regard) to suggest they inform Peruvian military that they could not recognize a military takeover while at same time suggesting all three be prepared align selves with US, should coup take place, on policy of at least temporary nonrecognition. (We will discuss with you separately possible courses of action in event elections postponed or nullified because of alleged fraud, actual military coup, etc.)
- c.
- Dispatch of economic mission following elections and prior to inauguration to discuss assistance programs etc. with winning candidate.
- 3.
- Are there any other steps you believe you or Washington agencies should take aside from above and steps you have already taken under existing authority? We must bear in mind of course widespread belief in Peruvian military and political circles that you, Embassy and Department favor APRA and resultant fact that, despite our protestations to contrary, overt efforts to prevent coup will be interpreted by many as effort assist APRA and hence be discredited. We must also bear in mind strong possibility of Belaúnde victory and desirability erasing his impression we favor APRA and oppose him as pro-Communist.
Rusk
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/5-2962. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Belcher and Poole; cleared by Curtis of INR/DDC, Wellman of ARA/EST, and by S/S; and approved by Goodwin.↩
- Retired U.S. Army Colonel Clyde R. McBride was sent to Peru for this purpose. A memorandum of conversation between Colonel McBride and Peruvian General Alfredo Rodriguez of May 22 is ibid., 723.00/5-2262.↩
- Dated May 24. (Ibid., 723.00/5-2462)↩
- Dated April 23. (Ibid., 723.00/4-2362)↩