Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

40. Highlights of Discussion at the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Committee Meeting¹

Washington, February 13, 1962, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Three INR Papers on Aspects of Political Change in Latin America

PRESENT

• S—the Secretary
• AID—Mr. Chenery
• AID—Mr. Coerr
• USIA—Mr. Murrow
• B—Mr. McGhee
• G—Mr. Johnson
• S/R—Mr. Thomson
• S/P—Mr. Morgan
• S/P—Mr. Ramsey
• S/P—Mr. Fried
• S/P—Mr. Wriggins
• INR—Mr. Hilsman
• P—Mr. Rowan
• CU—Mr. Coombs
• AF—Mr. Herz
• ARA—Mr. Goodwin
• EUR—Mr. Elting
• FE—Mr. Usher
• NEA—Mr. Cottam

The INR papers were found to be provocative and stimulating.² There was some question whether the examples chosen in RAR-6 in fact represented examples of the useful hypothesis of the paper. It was explained that these were all preliminary papers intended as suggestive for those concerned with the Alliance and background for a larger, long-term study of “political development” now under external contract.

The Alliance for Progress, it was pointed out, was primarily political in nature, ultimately designed to encourage the growth of reasonably stable governments capable of absorbing reform and change, secure from both the extreme Left and the extreme Right. In Latin America we seek more than we seek in Asia, i.e., neutral countries capable of maintaining their own stability. Rather, we hope the Alliance for Progress will increase the strength of the free world alliance as these countries industrialize and develop over the next twenty years. The danger is that many Latin American countries may fall not merely into neutralism but all the way into the Communist orbit. Bolivia, Ecuador and one or two others could well become Cubas.

Alliance for Progress reforms may work primarily to reduce political and social tensions or they may contribute to improving output by accumulating more resources and directing them into more productive channels. The former should buy us more time to assist governments and political systems to make the difficult adjustments necessary as they move to greater productivity and ultimately to political viability.

There are four main difficulties. Firstly, the entrenched oligarchies in many countries are resistant to change and refuse to face the facts of political life. In some countries, the Alliance is very likely to fail because of the inflexible attitudes of the oligarchic leaders. Secondly, a stable and responsible middle class is not yet developed. Thirdly, there is danger that in our efforts to ease the way for reforms and changes which we consider to be inevitable, we will so arouse mass impatience that we will release forces we cannot control. Che Guevara believes this will be the outcome of the Alliance. The fourth difficulty concerns the lack of qualified people in the U.S. and Latin America, capable of economic planning and possessing the necessary political skills to manage political and economic transitions. At the moment, no single sound development project is lacking funds. The real shortage is lack of planned projects.

It is difficult to determine how much self-help and reform we can insist upon in relation to the political limitations facing a recipient government. S/P is heading up a study on this problem.³ At present, there is no correlation between per capita assistance received by countries and their performance in terms of self-help and reform criteria. Indeed, the most irresponsible countries, those which get into balance-of-payments or other major financial difficulties, are the ones which have received most assistance. We thus reward the irresponsible and discriminate against the responsible.

While some stressed the importance of concentrating on the oligarchy and finding ways of persuading it to change its ways, others emphasized the importance of doing what we could now to multiply production and increase the opportunity and achievement of the masses. Well thought-out technical assistance programs focusing on crucial sectors, such as improved seeds and agricultural methods, are one way to do this. Undue preoccupation with the oligarchies will lead to a flight of capital and political disruption which the Communists and other extremists can use to their advantage. We should draw on our experience and recall that not by leveling down have we progressed in the United States, but by leveling up. We should, therefore, attempt to combine indigenous and foreign resources to find the quickest means of progress, which can be experienced by ordinary people, as in agricultural production, eliminating debilitating diseases and in education. Seed corn projects in Mexico, the Puerto Rican rural health service, and the U.S. Extension Service were examples. We must, it was held, concentrate on what we can do now to work with the people on the bottom and help them to get on with their own development.

It was also felt that the problem posed to us by the oligarchies was not so much to limit their high privilege, but to induce them, with our assistance, to encourage greater participation of the middle and lower social strata in national life. The symbolic importance for us of not being too closely identified with the oligarchies was stressed. We should not forget the very important role played by intellectuals, teachers, students and journalists in the formation of opinions for the future. We seek to induce them to overcome their alienation and to play a more constructive role in society. Mr. Achilles is conducting a study in this connection, in Communist tactics toward youth and education and how we can deal with these problems more energetically.

Prior to the Alliance, we allowed the Communists to hold the monopoly of sympathy toward change. Only lately—and with the Alliance—have we begun to demonstrate our interest in change.

We must persuade the home offices of U.S. business to encourage their field staffs to get behind the Alliance. For those interested in the mass Latin American market, there is no difficulty but extractive industries need more attention on our part. The good work already undertaken through Advisory Councils and the like, to explain in the long-run U.S. interest in the success of the Alliance, should be stepped up.

Latin Americans are fighters, and they will fight two things: dictatorship and intervention. We must be wary not to become tarred with the brush of “intervention” even as we attempt to induce governments to follow our aid criteria. A broadening of U.S. contacts with the area will improve our chances of encouraging a fight on dictatorship through reforms and of avoiding the charge of governmental intervention.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Wriggins.
2. RAR-6, RAR-11, and INR-35; see Document 38 and footnote 1 thereto and Document 39.
3. Not found.