Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

379. Haitian Situation Report¹

Washington, May 8, 1963.

1. Reinforced Dominican forces deployed along Haitian-Dominican border during past 48 hours to a total of perhaps 1,200 men.²

2. Bosch has assured Ambassador Martin and Ambassador Facio of OAS that he will not take any unprovoked aggressive action outside OAS context.

3. Bosch has informed Ambassador Martin privately of his recognition that Dominican armed forces lack capability to invade Haiti and stated that he is maintaining them along border principally to pressure rapid OAS action.

4. Haiti has been noticeably quieter during the past 48 hours, with a strict 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. curfew still in effect.

5. The only organized opposition activity is under direction of Clement Barbot, organizer of the TTMs, who has since broken with Duvalier and who claims credit for killing three Palace escorts in recent unsuccessful attempt to kidnap President Duvalier’s children. His force is quite small but we have information it probably inflicted around 30 casualties in a clash with TTMs on April 30.

6. 100 U.S. dependents departed for Miami by plane at 11:00 a.m. Another group of about the same size will be evacuated tomorrow, May 9, and a third planeload of private citizens is expected to leave on Saturday, May 11.

7. Haiti agreed to our evacuation and have assured Ambassador Thurston that the Haitian Government has every intention of continuing to guarantee protection of foreigners.

8. This morning the OAS adopted a resolution returning its special investigation committee to Haiti and broadening considerably the terms of reference governing its operation.³

9. The UN Security Council will meet at 3:00 p.m. to hear the Haitian protest Dominican aggression.⁴ We will try to avoid formal UN action on the basis OAS is currently seized of the problem and dealing with it adequately.

10. The prospective flight of an official Haitian aircraft to Curacao was cancelled at Haitian initiative after authorization for it to land had been given by Dutch authorities. We do not know what the intended purpose of this unusual flight might have been nor the reasons why it was cancelled.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HAI. Secret. Sent to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, May 8. The report of the situation was as of 2 p.m., May 8. It was in response to a request from Dungan.
2. On May 6 Bosch told U.S. correspondents that he would invade Haiti at 4:30 a.m. on May 7. Ambassador Martin was not convinced that Bosch would invade, neither was he sure that he would not. Martin recommended giving Bosch a firm commitment to help him subvert Duvalier, a flat “no” from the United States implying that the U.S. was withdrawing its support, or some combination of the two alternatives. (Telegram 1364 from Santo Domingo, May 6; ibid., POL DOM REP-HAI)
3. OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1062. The committee made several trips to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The OAS Council adopted various resolutions in an attempt too facilitate the situation without much success during the remainder of 1963.
4. That effort was successful. At the end of the discussion of the crisis by the Security Council, May 8-10, the Secretary General ruled that it was a consensus of the majority of the members that the OAS should be given the chance to bring about an amicable solution. (Memorandum from Cleveland to Ball, May 10; Department of State, Central Files, POL DOM REP-HAI)