As background information for the meeting with the President on Haiti,
which is scheduled for Thursday, August 9,2 the enclosed
memorandum on the current situation in that country has been prepared by
the Department and concurred in by the Central Intelligence Agency.3
Enclosure
THE SITUATION IN HAITI
In a country that has had many autocratic, corrupt and incompetent
governments, the Duvalier
regime ranks among the worst. It maintains itself in power primarily
by terrorism, by graft and venality, by the constant removal and
rotation of officials who attain any independent stature, and by the
President’s highly developed ability to ferret out intrigue and play
off one group against another. It has consistently demonstrated
duplicity in its lip service to constitutional practices, democratic
principles and human rights. It frequently indulges in excesses,
including harassment, capricious arrest, brutal treatment or summary
expulsion of persons thought to oppose it, whether they be church
offcials, foreigners or Haitian citizens. It has shown no capacity
for or interest in improving the lot of the Haitian people.
Since the regime assumed power five years ago, the political
situation has deteriorated steadily and the chronically stagnant
economy has been further depressed. A partisan civil militia has
been developed from among the poorest, and in some cases, worst
elements of the population. This militia, which is highly
susceptible to political manipulation, may eventually become
powerful enough to neutralize the US-trained and oriented regular
armed forces, a circumstance which would open the way to a takeover
by unscrupulous activists and extremists, including Communist or
pro-Communist elements. A small group of ultra-nationalistic and
racist advisers, all opportunistic and some receptive to strong
Marxist if not Communist influence and some with Communist
backgrounds, has gradually consolidated its position within the
regime and is exercising a dangerously increasing influence. This
group is believed to be trying to expand its authority within the
Government and militia, in the hope of taking over when Duvalier goes.
While it is estimated that the strength of the Communist Party has
not yet reached dangerous proportions, there can be no doubt but
that the continuance in power of Duvalier’s brutal, corrupt regime, which despite its
propaganda is indifferent to the social and economic welfare of the
people and either unaware of or indifferent to the possibility of
ultimate Communist rule, is highly conducive to the growth of
Communist strength and potential.
On the basis of our experience to date in dealing with the regime, we
are convinced that it is hopeless, so long as Duvalier remains in power, to make
any further attempt to establish a practical basis of cooperation
with it or to carry out successfully the type of aid programs
essential to the development of the country and of more enlightened
and responsible government.
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Accordingly, our present policy is: (a) to look toward the
replacement of Duvalier by a
more efficient, enlightened and friendly government, but (b) to
avoid a premature showdown which might result in failure,
elimination or neutralization of the political opposition or the
assumption of power by elements no less, or perhaps more, inimical
to United States interests than he. Although Duvalier is attempting through
unconstitutional means to perpetuate himself in office at least
until May 15, 1967, the term for which he was constitutionally
elected expires May 15, 1963. The latter date offers special
opportunities for pressure and maneuver on our part and is
considered a target date for Duvalier’s departure.
Since, in our opinion, Duvalier
cannot remain in power for any extended period without United States
economic and military assistance, these two levers are being used to
bring carefully measured pressure to bear on the regime and to
influence internal political developments in furtherance of
objectives (a) and (b) above.
The decision has been made to phase out quietly two important United
States financed regional development projects, which have not
succeeded primarily because of the lack of Haitian cooperation, and
to reduce over the next several months the range and cost of all
other AID activities to about half
their present level. It has also been decided to proceed with one
rather than both of two pending loans in order to avoid either
strengthening Duvalier unduly
or provoking him to intemperate action. We are going ahead with a
loan to construct a jet-capable airport which will meet a United
States military requirement, but not a highway construction loan,
approval of which would make it difficult, if not impossible, for us
to continue opposing two pending IBRD loans.
On the military side, our Missions are exercising a useful influence
on the United States-oriented regular armed forces, but this
influence is being offset by Duvalier’s deliberate and successful efforts to
undermine the armed forces in favor of the potentially dangerous
civil militia. At the moment Duvalier appears still to need our Missions and
military assistance program as proof of United States support of his
regime, but the continued buildup of the militia as the principal
instrument for the support of his regime progressively reduces the
possibility of using our military assistance to arrest or preferably
reverse this unfavorable trend. Consequently, MAP shipments have been temporarily
suspended while we still have this leverage, in an effort to elicit
improved cooperation from the regime in implementing the Missions’
recommendations which are designed to prevent the power balance from
changing in favor of the militia.
There are definite indications that awareness on the part of Haitian
officials and the public that Duvalier apparently no longer enjoys unqualified
United States support has weakened the regime and has helped to
stimulate dissident civilian elements, military officers and
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even former Duvalierists
to plot against Duvalier more
actively than heretofore. An increasing volume of reports on plots
against Duvalier has been
received, but the plotting appears to be based largely on wishful
thinking and to be vague and uncoordinated. Approaches have been
made to us recently by one dissident civilian element for assistance
and by a military group (with perhaps some civilian associates) for
assurances that the United States would not interpose itself against
a military coup directed against Duvalier. A spokesman for a pro-American group of
former and current Haitian military and civilian officials told our
Ambassador as recently as August 1 that they were plotting to
overthrow Duvalier not later
than October of this year.5
While the latter group, which apparently includes some reputable
individuals such as the Army Chief of Staff, represents possibly a
cohesive and potentially effective challenge to Duvalier, the various currents of
opposition activity generally have not yet made any efficacious
attempt to organize or agree on future programs or a candidate, and
are floundering in little groups out of fear, self-interest and
uncertainty. On the basis of present evidence, it appears that the
mistrust, treachery and opportunism which are chronic in Haiti make
the prospects of Duvalier’s
overthrow in the near future problematical at best. A cool public
posture and occasional mild acts of hostility toward Duvalier by the United States will
maintain and probably increase current ferment, but effective
opposition action will, in our opinion, probably require at a
minimum firm assurances of United States support. Opposition
elements at all levels invariably stress that only the United States
can come to their relief.
