354. Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy in Dominican Republic
The year 1962 was a critical one in Dominican history and for our policy in that country. This is a recap on 1962 and a look ahead at 1963—at what lessons we can derive from past crises, at what future problems may arise. (It is written without knowledge of what happened when Mr. Bosch went to Washington. I assume the Department will wish to assess his visit and may want to put this local piece into the assessment pot.)
Results: 1962
We started the year with three basic objectives—to keep the provisional government in power, to hold free elections, and to install the winner in the Palace.
We have accomplished the first two. As of now, the prospects for the third are good.
We can take some satisfaction in these results, considering that they were constantly imperiled by the Castro-communist left and the Trujillista right, that they had to be undertaken in the enormous vacuum created by the crashing fall of Trujillo, that there was almost nothing but wreckage and rubble to build on—a stagnant economy a looted treasury, vast unemployment, no free voluntary institutions, no democratic tradition, few experienced people in government, an ignorant submerged populace, and a miasmatic fear which prevailed everywhere, for Trujillo had destroyed people’s confidence in each other and in themselves.
[Here follow sections entitled “The Council of State,” “Crises and Lessons,” “Successes and Failures,” “The Election’s Meaning,” “Bosch’s Opportunity,” and “The Opposition.”]
Our Role—and Our Dangers
We have a whole new ballgame. We may have as many problems now as under the provisional government—but they will be different problems. (Of one thing we can be sure: we can never really predict what our problems will be. Who would have thought that the only bloodshed of this year would have been the Palma Sola massacre? Incidentally, I do not think we have heard the last of that sect.)
[Page 727]The perils from left and right that plagued the Council are likely to subside for a time in the face of Bosch’s mandate—unless he stumbles badly and loses popular support. Then look out.
This seems unlikely to happen soon, perhaps not this year. Therefore, our real problem is the PRD and Bosch himself. We do not know nearly enough about them—especially about the party directorate, the provincial leaders, the candidates, the Senators, the Deputies, and the local leaders of the PRD. We do not know whether Bosch has commitments to the extreme left.
It seems to me that Bosch presents us with several possible dangers. I am aware that our agencies have been checking on Bosch and Miolán2 for many years. But after Castro, nobody can ever be really sure of anything. So I would list all these as possible dangers:
- 1.
- That Bosch has been a deep-cover communist for many years.
- 2.
- Ditto Miolán.
- 3.
- That Bosch and Miolán might lose control of the PRD to the Castro-communists. (But Miolán is a pro, thank God.)
- 4.
- That for unforseeable reasons Bosch might turn toward support of Castro.
- 5.
- That Bosch’s campaign demagogy might turn into presidential charlatanism, transforming him ultimately into a personal homegrown nationalistic extremist who, though neutral and not tied to Havana or Moscow, would almost surely be anti-American as well as ruinous to the Republic. (I can easily envisage his using us as a whipping boy if things go wrong. He must maintain the underdog role to hold the masses. And having smashed the oligarchs, and being afraid to whip the military, he can only turn on us.)
- 6.
- That Bosch, a plunger, might miscalculate, lose a fight, and resign.
How do we defend against these possibilities? I think we do several things. We hang onto the military. We save Imbert and Amiama as an ace in the hole. And of course we do all the nice things to build for the future and strengthen democratic institutions—Peace Corps, CARE, CARITAS, schools, university, voluntary institutions, all by way of going over the head of the government to the people themselves, to align ourselves with them. We should, of course, support Bosch until he goes wrong. We should help him lead, should never impede, his advance into his own revolutionary new frontier. We should hope he goes straight, and takes the people with him, and us too.
But if he ever goes wrong—and I mean if his basic loyalties ever belong to another country than his own—we had better have the military [Page 728] on our side and, if it happens soon, Imbert and Amiama as well. That might pit us against the people, and the results would not be pretty to contemplate. But we can have no new Castro in the Caribbean.
Let me say at once I do not believe this will happen. But I think we would be foolish to ignore the possibility.
Meanwhile, we should tie him so closely to us that he cannot wriggle loose. At the same time, however, we should try to avoid tying ourselves too tightly to him—should not build him up too much, should not bet on him too heavily, should not propagate the idea that the Alliance is sure to succeed here if anywhere. The prospects here seem dazzling—but we must not be bedazzled, for the inherent difficulties are still enormous. Let us not, and let us hope the Dominican people will not, repeat the mistake of a year ago. All the Republic’s problems were not solved because Trujillo fell. Nor are they solved because Bosch won. In every province, in every town, in every village, in the Dominican character itself, you can see the ruin Trujillo wrought. You do not repair in one year, nor perhaps in five, the ravages of 31 years. And we do not yet really know whether Bosch is up to the task at all.
We rejoice, with the people, at the victory of the people’s hero. We are grateful for his strengthening the democratic left in Latin America. We can work with him, and we will. But we must not forget what we know about him—[5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. He won—but he is still the same man. As a candidate, he was an enigma. As a president, he is an unknown quantity.
All this means, I suggest, that we avoid in the American press over-optimistic statements about the prospects here. It means that in the Dominican press we express our confidence in the future of Dominican democracy and our support for Bosch in his efforts to build a better life for his people.
Moreover, it means we really do support him here. I consider that during the months ahead the emphasis of our work will shift from the political to the economic. Alongside Bosch, the Alianza should do better than alongside the Council of State—the Council was a semi-caretaker, and its oligarchs shrank from some Alianza goals. Tactically, however, I believe we must guard against smothering Bosch with advice and help. We should offer him everything—and not press too much on him. He reacts badly to pressure—though he will take it if forced to in a real crisis. At least at the outset, he will not operate as the Council did, seeking our help at every turn. A prima donna, he will try to do it himself, suffering us to assist. We should accept this role gracefully. And when he makes mistakes and comes to us for advice, we should give it in a spirit of magnanimity.
[Page 729]None of this will be easy. But if we can help him pull it off, we can create a better life for the Dominican people and a modest triumph for ourselves in the Caribbean.