326. Telegram From the Consulate General in the Domincan Republic to the Department of State 1
964. Presented plan (Deptel 601)2 to President Balaguer at his residence at 7:15 a.m. this morning. He thoroughly agreed with concept and every point as only way out and undertook do his best to convince Trujillos to comply.
He had strong doubts, however, that Hector and Arismendi would leave. He had tried all day yesterday persuade Trujillo family this only thing to do, but they just as determined to remain as Ramfis is determined to leave. They were reconciled that sanctions would remain in force and that DR would not receive additional sugar quota but thought they could maintain friendly regime in power.
President said Ramfis ostensibly trying assist him persuade uncles to go [10 lines of source text not declassified].
President urged maximum US pressure be brought on Hector and Arismendi to leave, including imposition additional sanctions and threat to use armed force, if his efforts today did not succeed. I authorized him say US Government’s firm position and demand was that they leave according to plan I presented; that sanctions would not be lifted if they here and that, at best, normal sugar quota would probably be smaller; that we doubted any government could survive these conditions; that in case of threat of Fidelismo or situation such as breakdown or disorders leading to same, US would act preserve its essential interests. I offered to tell anyone, including uncles, directly of our position if it would help. President thanked me, urged that permanence of uncles’ departure not be stressed to them, as this only made them more determined to stay, but leave open possibility their eventual return. I replied evident that after transitional period, whether they could return depends on government here, and they should be told best way assure any future was to cooperate now by leaving.
In light foregoing, stressed military leaders should be acceptable but I did not mention names specific officers who might be suitable chiefs services and/or council so as not imperil them. Am reserving this aspect for time, if ever, that there is clear agreement on plan.
Discussed with President possibility his resigning or threatening resign as additional pressure on uncles if current efforts fail, making [Page 678] clear, however, that as matters now stood, we strongly wished him to stay. His mind now inclining in direction staying in office, letting Ramfis leave, and then bringing maximum pressure on uncles. Said he would have think through consequences any action he took.
Believe our course during day should be arm me with additional specific pressures which can bring to bear to re-enforce President. Can I say we will propose additional sanctions and, if so, specifically in what categories? Have we any influence which would curtail Dominican sugar sales to Europe and world market and/or future reduce Dominican income from US market? Can I threaten use every means our disposal expose to Dominican Armed Forces and people that they would be sacrificing selves and honor for Trujillo family interests and would have support hemisphere if they rid themselves of Trujillos? Can US military show of force be prepared for use if we judge would be useful? Believe we should act as quickly and decisively for inherent danger in situation is that installation of regime under influence Hector will drive opposition into radical and uncontrollable channels which can only favor development of Castro-like movement sooner rather than later.
FYI: Reason Rodriguez Echavarria placed ahead Rodriguez Mendez and Montas ahead Hermida in our 9553 is that all indications are first named have enough toughness to maintain discipline and latter considered possibly too easygoing. End FYI.