307. Memorandum From the Cuban Task Force of the
National Security Council to the President’s Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Washington,
May 15,
1961.
SUBJECT
- The Current Situation in and Contingency Plans for the Dominican
Republic
The Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic is in
the most serious trouble of its 30-year history. It has been condemned
and isolated by the action of the 6th Meeting of Foreign Ministers at
San Jose in August 1960. The economic position of the country has
weakened seriously. Opposition to the regime is expanding and becoming
more determined, and recent reports indicate
Trujillo’s removal may be imminent.
The paramount interest of the U.S. is to prevent Castro-Communist or
other unfriendly elements from taking control and to insure that
Trujillo is succeeded by a friendly, democratic
government. These objectives can best be achieved by cooperation with
and encouragement of those elements in the Dominican Republic and
elsewhere who share them and oppose Trujillo.
Opposition to Trujillo is divided into two main
groupings: (a) the exile movements centered in the U.S., Venezuela and
Cuba, and (b) the internal dissident movements. The facts that the
various exile groups have little unity or cohesion, to some extent have
been infiltrated by Communists and Castroites, and are generally not
acceptable to the Dominican people make them a poor risk for the U.S. to
support.
During the past year a moderate group of internal dissidents who appear
to meet U.S. requirements has been identified and encouraged in its
efforts by the U.S.
While it is highly desirable in the present Dominican situation for the
U.S. to be identified with and to support democratic elements seeking to
overthrow Trujillo, we necessarily run some risks
in doing so. If Trujillo is overthrown with U.S.
support, we may well be criticized by world opinion for subverting an
existing government, albeit a highly
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unpopular one. A miscalculation of the
capabilities of the moderate group could mean that U.S. support for an
unsuccessful attempt against the Trujillo regime
would be exposed, and following on the recent Cuban experience U.S.
prestige would plummet. If we were to misread the intentions of the
moderates or they were deliberately concealed from us, we might find
ourselves in the position of having created a Dominican Castro. An additional factor for
consideration in deciding the amount and timing of further U.S. support
to the moderate anti-Trujillo group is the
possibility that our support may prompt this group to take action before
it or we are ready.
There is attached a paper dealing with various contingencies that may
arise in the near future in the Dominican Republic and setting out
various recommendations for the President’s approval.
In this connection it may be mentioned that Castro-Communist control of
the Dominican Republic would almost certainly lead to a similar takeover
in Haiti.
Attachment
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC—CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
I. Trujillo
Removed and Succeeded by Friendly Internal Elements.
Recent reports indicate that the internal Dominican dissidents are
becoming increasingly determined to oust
Trujillo by any means, and their plans in
this regard are well advanced. This group is believed to have
support among the various sectors of the population and their
leadership includes members of the Dominican military, although the
degree of support they can command in the armed forces is
uncertain.
Once Trujillo is overthrown this moderate group
plans to establish a provisional junta and to begin to create a
democratic government and society in the Dominican Republic. It
appears to have the best chance of establishing a stable government
oriented toward the US. No other group which combines an effective
organization with an acceptable political philosophy has been
identified. The pro-Trujillo elements do not hold any promise of
being able to establish a post-Trujillo government which would be
acceptable to the US. Over the past year our Consulate at Ciudad
Trujillo has been in touch with the leaders
of the moderate group and encouraged them to look toward the US both
as a
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model and for support
in their efforts. If it is successful in ousting Trujillo, it will
merit prompt United States recognition and support.
In addition to recognition and moral support, a provisional
government format by this moderate group will probably urgently need
outside military force to assist it in maintaining internal order
and resisting internal and external attempts at subversion.
Subversive initiative could be expected to come from Cuba and/or
from the Dominican exile groups. Approved plans for the employment
of US military forces in the Dominican Republic have been prepared
and are sufficiently flexible to permit various degrees of force to
be applied under Presidential authority. An amphibious force, with
Marines embarked, normally operates in the Caribbean area and other
forces in the continental US are available on relatively short
notice if required. From the point of view of US posture in Latin
America and the world, military intervention in the Dominican
Republic should to the extent possible be taken through the OAS or at the request of a provisional
government in conjunction with selected Latin American countries
rather than by the US alone. In any event, the OAS should be notified of the action
taken.
Recommendations:
- 1.
- That the US Consul General at Ciudad
Trujillo when so author-ized inform
the moderate group of pro-US dissidents that if they succeed
at their own initiative and on their own responsibility in
forming an acceptable provisional government they can be
assured that any reasonable requests for assistance from the
US will be promptly and favorably answered.
- 2.
- That in the event Trujillo is
overthrown and an acceptable provisional government is
established:
- a)
- The US swiftly recognize such a government.
- b)
- Upon receipt of a request from this government for
military assistance against a real or anticipated
external threat, we dispatch such aid, up to and
including the landing of US forces, recognizing at
the same time that a concomitant objective will be
the stabilization of an internal situation
acceptable to the US.
- c)
- The US encourage the provisional government also
to request the assistance or the presence of other
friendly democratic nations, such as Venezuela and
Colombia, with notification to the Organization of
American States of the action taken and a request
that the measures adopted at the Sixth Meeting of
Foreign Ministers be discontinued. (For this purpose
OAS observers
might be invited into the Dominican
Republic.)
- d)
- The US take steps to screen the departure from the
continental US and Puerto Rico of all Dominican
exiles attempting to return to the Dominican
Republic for as long a period as may be desirable
and feasible, and request the Venezuelan Government
to take similar action.
- 3.
- That the US send immediately to Caracas a special emissary
to:
- a)
- Obtain from President Betancourt a commitment to immediately
earmark specific forces which would be prepared to
act jointly with US forces and to commit such forces
to joint operations in the event actions envisaged
in this paper are ordered.
- b)
- Request President Betancourt to approach President
Lleras of Colombia with a view toward a similar
commitment for participation of Colombian
forces.
- c)
- Explore with President Betancourt, and ask him to discuss
with President Lleras, the possibility of a prompt,
affirmative response to an appeal from an acceptable
provisional government, which might include a joint
declaration by the three heads of state disclaiming
political or territorial ambitions in the Dominican
Republic and expressing readiness to lend moral and
material support for the specific purpose of
assuring to the Dominican people opportunity to
carry through necessary reforms and establish
democratic institutions and practices free from the
threat of externally supported invasion or
subversion.
This emissary should speak only with President Betancourt and emphasize secrecy,
urge the same treatment by Lleras, and make clear that the US is
only planning against a possible contingency.
II. Trujillo
Removed and Unfriendly Elements Take Over.
It is possible that the plans of the moderate group of dissidents may
be frustrated. Unfriendly elements, either
Trujillo supporters or possibly Castro-Communists, may remove
Trujillo themselves and seize power. Or,
once Trujillo had been removed by the
moderates, these unfriendly elements might grab control in the
resulting confusion. In any of these situations the group supported
by the U.S. may be unable to establish themselves. It is also
possible that the removal of Trujillo would
result in a total breakdown of the power structure, leaving the
country in a chaotic state of anarchy with no group or individual
able to stabilize the situation.
Recommendations:
- 1)
- That the US Consul General when so authorized discuss with
leaders of the acceptable dissident group the advisability of
having in his possession a pre-signed request for US, Venezuelan
and OAS help in the event of a
quiet takeover by unfriendly elements or of a situation in which
friendly leaders would be unable to expose or establish
themselves. If they agree, such pre-signed request should be
obtained.
- 2)
- The US Consul General should have stand-by instructions to
urge the moderate pro-US group to declare themselves to be the
provisional government and to request help from the US and the
OAS.
- 3)
- Upon notification by the US Consul General that
Trujillo has been removed from power,
or that his removal seems reasonably certain the
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appropriate US military forces be
immediately positioned to be able to reach Dominican territory
with a minimum of delay.
- 4)
- Upon receipt of a request for military assistance from an
acceptable group which has declared itself and taken any
reasonable or plausible steps to constitute itself a provisional
government, or upon notification by the US Consul General that
he has received such a request, US forces should move into the
Dominican Republic immediately.
III. Trujillo
Remains in Power.
Despite the difficulties he faces Trujillo may
manage to maintain himself in power for an indefinite period. During
this time it would be in the interests of the US to continue to give
encouragement to the internal dissidents in order to buttress their
position in the anti-Trujillo movement and hold their loyalty.
Our attitude toward Trujillo is a continuing
foreign policy test before Latin American and world opinion of US
support for democracy and social reform. In view of the criticism
that has been leveled at the US in the past for its alleged support
of Trujillo, it is imperative that the US
public posture be unequivocally in favor of the return of the
Dominican Republic to the inter-American community under a
government committed to democratic principles. It is important,
therefore, that the US avoid any action that would imply support or
toleration for Trujillo and that we continue to
express publicly our distaste for the oppressive undemocratic nature
and policies of his regime.
Recommendations:
- 1.
- The Voice of America, and all other media, should carry
more information highlighting the anti-US, pro-Communist,
anti-OAS, anti-Catholic
Church line of the Trujillo press, and editorial comment
condemning Trujillo’s constant
violations of human rights and his interventions in the
affairs of other nations.
- 2.
- High ranking US public officials should make appropriate
and timely statements critical of the excesses and
undemocratic practices of the Trujillo
regime.
- 3.
- The US should present to the appropriate committees of the
OAS information
reflecting Trujillo’s violations of
OAS principles.
- 4.
- The US should expose through public media attempts which
Trujillo is now preparing to
hoodwink the American community into believing that he is
preparing to hold free elections.
- 5.
- In pursuing actions along the above lines, the US should
maintain flexibility of application in terms of current
developments.
