304. Airgram From the Consulate General in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1
G-105. This Airgram is on the subjects of “What is the Trujillo Opposition?” and of “The nature of the U.S. Choice in the Dominican Republic today”. It does not contain details since they have already been supplied to the extent that they are available in the Consulate’s previous reporting.
The Trujillo opposition.
There is no well organized unitary opposition to Trujillo. On the other hand, on the basis of the judgment of our best sources 80 to 90 per cent of literate Dominicans are anti-Trujillo and would like to have a representative form of government oriented toward the west, one which would not intervene in the affairs of its neighbors and which would respect basic human rights. The strongest unifying force of the anti-Trujillo Dominicans is their hatred of the dictator.
While most anti-Trujillo Dominicans are not even considering any action against the Generalissimo owing to a combination of the Generalissimo’s highly organized repressive machinery, their long experience of domination through fear, their lack of capability, their lack of courage and their generally recognized docile nature, there are small nuclei of Dominicans who are planning to overthrow him. Their very lack of a large well defined opposition is a defensive condition, since in the past whenever a conspiratorial group became large or well defined, it was caught and ruthlessly suppressed. It was usually exposed by torture and rendered ineffective by assassination of the most courageous elements. These circumstances have led the nuclei of which I speak to view liquidation as the only way to accomplish their ends. Political assassination is ugly and repulsive, but everything must be judged in its own context. The United States used the atom bomb on Hiroshima and that was ugly and repulsive—unless one stops to consider that it was used to save thousands of lives in the long run. One cannot regard those Dominicans who favor the assassination of Trujillo as morally bankrupt, criminals, etc. Some of them are in fact, and this is a sobering thought, the people with whom we ourselves would be identified if we had the misfortune to be Dominicans. The nuclei who are friendly to the U.S. have spurts of courage, they are pro-U.S., they subscribe to the principles of the OAS, and they are the hope of the D.R.
There are probably other nuclei against Trujillo than those of which we are informed.
[Page 622]The Consulate believes the communists have been working here at least since August through the Generalissimo and Radio Caribe in pursuit of the ends of Moscow. The Consulate cannot prove it. Like so many dictators, Trujillo does not see the danger to his own way of life in playing with these elements. He thinks he is using them, but in reality is being used. It is quite possible at this stage he no longer cares as long as they are anti-U.S. and anti-Catholic Church. Whatever communist led nuclei there may be, the Consulate does not believe they are in a position to take over the country. The campesino has not yet been politically awakened. He will be the pawn of whatever element takes over. The people with education, control over economic life, control of the professions (doctors, lawyers, engineers) are mostly in our camp. The military is a question mark despite all our efforts to discern its innermost thoughts. The Consulate suspects we cannot discern their thoughts because they do not have any beyond staying out of trouble and living as well as possible. We are informed some of the military would follow quickly if an anti-Trujillo outbreak began, but we cannot prove this with firsthand testimony. It is probably true, if it becomes evident that a revolution has a chance. The military are used to following a leader and the Consulate believes they will continue to do this. The big question is, “What leader?” If the Jefe disappeared they might go with Balaguer; more likely they would set up a junta but someone would emerge as leader, probably eventually a civilian. It seems reasonable to suspect that under the conditions which prevail here the people with brains and influence would come out on top. Those friendly to us have a near monopoly on those commodities. This is not to say they will do everything our way. There are lots of changes to be made here and there will be no singlemindedness on how to make them. As must be expected, trial and error will be a principal method of progress and not even the U.S. can know all the answers of what is good for the D.R. in its own peculiar circumstances. Patience and understanding will be highly important.
The nature of our choice.
The Consulate doubts there will be chaos after the fall of Trujillo, but this depends somewhat on what one means by chaos. There will probably be some bloodshed and there will be many difficulties of adjustment, both economic and political. How much of this there will be will depend in large part on the Dominicans, but also partly on the U.S. and the OAS. The OAS must be prepared to give help promptly if requested and the U.S. must be prepared immediately to be the agent of the OAS.
Ever since August 1960 Trujillo has, wittingly or not, been softening up the D.R. for leftist extremists. Consulate reporting has pointed this out clearly and repeatedly and it was in large part the basis for our argument for effective sanctions against Trujillo’s exports last August. Our theme has been that the longer Trujillo continues to dominate the D.R. [Page 623] the more susceptible the country is becoming to leftist extremists, and that, therefore, Trujillo’s overthrow in the near future would be in the interest of the U.S. The situation is not as favorable to us as it was last August because of the softening up that has gone on in the meantime. It is, however, more favorable to us than last December, and I believe if Trujillo should be overthrown today we would come out of the situation better than we ever will again. This is because since early January our stock with the dissidents is high. If we were free to choose our alternative, our choice would not be simple. As often occurs in international relations, it would be a choice between two difficult alternatives. If the U.S. should decide that Trujillo is bad but that it should, for the sake of momentary expediency, work with him in a keep-your-distance sort of way, the prestige and influence of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic would disappear with Trujillo, and he cannot last much longer in any event. If, on the other hand, the U.S. is known to be using its influence toward the establishment of a representative government in the Dominican Republic which subscribes to the principles of the OAS, it has a good chance of maintaining a position of influence in the government that succeeds the Generalissimo. Let no one, however, think that the transition from a thirty-one year old dictatorship is going to be accomplished with anything approximating the orderliness of a mere administrative shift in personnel and the type of policy deliberations one would find at a meeting of the National Security Council.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/3-2261. Secret; Limit Distribution.↩