Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

233. Policy Guidelines Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

GUIDELINES OF U.S. POLICY AND OPERATIONS

Brazil

I. Basic Approach

A stable, friendly, democratic Brazil is in the U.S. interest. In terms of population, area and economic potential, it stands in the front ranks of the nations of the world and is by far the largest and most populous nation in Latin America, comprising roughly one third of that region. In it are centered all of the political, economic and strategic problems to which the Alliance for Progress is a response.

We wish to see Brazil achieve orderly economic and social progress as a solid foundation for and as a means of strengthening its political democracy. We try to stimulate and support Brazilian efforts to accelerate sound economic development, more equitable distribution of resources, and social advances. We hope thereby to encourage resistance to the undemocratic extremes of both right and left. If U.S. policy fails on Brazil, it will become extremely difficult to achieve success elsewhere in Latin America.

We recognize Brazil’s potential and ambition to achieve world-power status, as well as its position of leadership in Latin America, and we seek to channel Brazil’s activities in world and hemispheric affairs into a constructive role for Free World interests.

[Here follows section II entitled “Background” comprising 23 pages.]

III. Objectives

A. Long Term

1. Assist Brazil to move toward economic and social progress under a democratic system to the end that it may become a strong member of the community of free nations.

2. Preserve Brazil’s traditionally friendly orientation toward the United States and channel its growing “independence” in international affairs into support of U.S. foreign policy objectives and a constructive role for the free world.

3. Assist Brazil in the development, under conditions of financial stability, of a modern, dynamic competitive economy, which will form a solid foundation for democracy in a nation which has the potential of becoming a world power.

4. Assist Brazil in relieving widespread social pressures arising from chronic poverty and economic depression, especially in the potentially explosive Northeast.

5. Guide Brazil’s youth into constructive programs to advance Brazil’s freedom and progress.

6. Seek to maintain a favorable climate in Brazil for the investment of U.S. capital and to secure maximum participation of U.S. private investment in the Alliance for Progress program in Brazil.

7. Protect the right of U.S. enterprise to fair, prompt and adequate compensation in case of expropriation.

8. Increase the export and import trade between the two countries.

9. Encourage Brazil to extend financial, technical and other assist-ance to neighboring, less economically developed countries.

B. Short Term

1. Demonstrate the effectiveness of the Alliance for Progress by concrete accomplishments.

2. Insure continued U.S. access to and use of those facilities and sites in Brazilian territory which are determined to be required in our military and space programs, including the following:

a. airport, dock and communications facilities at Recife needed to support the Atlantic missile range and other operations in the area;

b. continued operation by the United States of Radio Rio (in the Brazilian Navy Ministry) as part of the U.S. naval communications system.

3. Strengthen the determination and capability of the Brazilian armed forces to detect and cope with Communist infiltration and subversion, and other civil disorders.

4. Obtain removal by Brazil of the existing discriminations against foreign, including U.S., shipping.

5. Secure Brazil’s continued respect and application of the principles contained in our Air Transport Agreement with Brazil.

6. Preserve mutually satisfactory trade relations with Brazil under the GATT.

7. Enlist Brazil’s diplomatic assistance (within or without the UN) in influencing the Government of Portugal to institute reforms in her colonial policy in Africa.

[Here follow sections IV and V entitled “Lines of Action,” and “Contingencies” comprising a total of 13 pages.]

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121. Secret. The source text was transmitted by Brubeck to Ford of S/P under cover of a memorandum dated February 7, 1963, which stated that the paper was being disseminated on a need-to-know basis for use within the Executive Branch and at U.S. missions abroad.