Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

189. Plan of Action for Argentina¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Argentina—Plan of Action Over Period From Present to April 1964

A. Objectives

1. Maintenance of the present civilian regime to the end of its declared tenure: April 30, 1964 at the latest.

2. Strengthening of the prospects for continued democratic civilian government through early elections held without undue military pressure or dictation.

3. The election and installation in office of an administration that

a. holds promise of a social outlook and program sufficient in scope and appeal to permit a gradual weaning of the Peronists and other dissidents from adherence to extremist solutions to national problems.

b. is basically committed to wise use of foreign or domestic economic resources for national development, the maintenance and expansion of a favorable environment for private enterprise and friendly cooperation with the U.S.

4. Seek to assist the Argentine Government in its efforts to reverse the trend and mitigate the consequences of the presently adverse economic situation.

C. [sic] Plan of Action

I. Intelligence

1. Strengthening [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] intelligence collection on activities of the far left.

a. Determine the extent of Communist involvement with Peronism and its reaction to the movement by Peronist leaders to the left.

b. Clarify importance in Peronist movement of leaders John Cooke (in Cuba) and Americo Barrios (in Montevideo) and their links with Peron despite his reported disavowal of them.

c. Determine if Castro followers have increased activities since March, 1962 … and to what immediate ends.

d. Provide additional information concerning Peron’s quasi-Communist stance and whether he is promoting a coalition for elections or for an attempt on the government.

e. Follow activities of Frigerio group and especially watch for possibility of its organization of a combination with civilian and military elements of extreme left.

2. Increase capacity and efforts of service attaches [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to gather intelligence on political activities of the military as their highest priority task.

a. Identify leaders of hard line military group.

b. Determine the specific issues between Guido Government and this group and particularly those measures against the Peronists and Communists it would have the government take.

3. Evaluate the support, program and intentions of the National Social Front. Specifically seek to ascertain

a. judgment of suitable Church authorities on likelihood of participation by members of the hierarchy.

b. whether Christian and anti-Communist tendencies and present divisions in the Peronist parties may have induced Peronists like Framini to adhere to the National Social Front.

c. if any “62 Bloc” Peronist union leaders look with favor on the National Social Front idea or are more likely to adhere to a Peronist-left popular front.

d. if National Social Front has support of so-called “Nasserite” army group.

e. whether the National Social Front has produced a program indicating the extent to which its objectives coincide or conflict with those of the U.S.

f. whether the front would be permitted to operate as a political party for the coming elections.

II. Political and Military

1. Cooperate with and support the Guido Government in all feasible ways in order to strengthen it vis-à-vis the military.

a. Continue quietly but firmly to indicate to key personalities in and behind the Guido Government that the U.S. would find it extremely difficult to cooperate with any government installed as the result of a new military coup.

b. Communicate the foregoing sentiment … very discreetly … to Peronist leadership to forestall any extremist Peronist link with military “Nasserites.”

2. Avoid any association with policies or action by the government, military or political parties which might in the popular mind identify us with anti-popular elements. Our deep interest in and commitment to assuaging social discontent should be promoted on every feasible occasion through personal diplomacy, our public statements and our aid program.

3. Explore quietly and judiciously with non-extremist political groups the possibility of the formation of the middle groups in Argentina into a broad if loosely organized political movement or voting coalition and the manner in which Proportional Representation might benefit or adversely affect electoral prospects for such an amalgamation.

a. Seek out those factions of the UCRI and the UCRP most closely identified in the past with doctrines generally sympathetic to U.S. objectives and most disposed to carry their party name and/or followers into a “Center Front.” These leaders or factions are most likely to be acceptable to the government and the military and without them prospects for a broad center alignment would founder.

b. Identify moderate political groups not conspicuously linked to Old Line Parties which might be persuaded to take the initiative in forging a center coalition.

c. Urge upon the target party leaders a search for an Argentine of large stature as a presidential candidate, possibly a man of letters or an educator of the mold (if not the substance) of a Sarmiento not previously identified firmly with a given party or partisan faction.

d. Analyze relations between Peronist voters and leaders and identify issues on which working class might be brought into center or center-left grouping.

4. Explore the advantages and disadvantages as they bear on our policy objectives, of the early release of former President Frondizi bearing in mind his possible return to politics in Argentina; communicate our conclusions to the Guido Government should we conclude a greater degree of freedom … including residence abroad … for Frondizi is desirable.

5. Refrain from supporting or promoting the candidacy during the foreseeable future of any of the incipient presidential candidates now on the scene (i.e., Alsogaray, Aramburu, del Carril, Alende, etc.). Wait for younger leaders to emerge.

6. Determine whether the Guido Government or its moderate military backers will seek to shape and control a political movement or party and the names of those individuals it would in those circumstances support as Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates.

7. Maintain a “correct” attitude in our relations with the military and do nothing which is likely to accentuate the deep divisions among them. Insure when possible that our actions, whether in the field of military cooperation or in our desired contacts in the political-labor arena, will not contribute to further divisions among the military or a hardening of the resolve of any of its factions to overthrow the civilian government.

8. Encourage within the possibilities of the Argentine situation civic action by the Argentine military forces.

9. Examine the wisdom, should threat of a military coup prove imminent, of covert and pointed indication to hard line military leaders of U.S. concern with a view to forestalling the adventure and fortifying the resolve of the moderate military to prevent it.

III. Labor

1. Urge upon Guido Government that it take on sweeping action against Peronist unions or leaders which would penalize pro-democratic unions and leaders or drive the latter into full cooperation with militant Peronists.

2. Consult discreetly with democratic labor leaders to obtain their judgment regarding formation of a democratic labor party which might in present circumstances attract softcore Peronist support.

a. Approach Church authorities to find if there might be Church interest in supporting creation of a democratic labor party.

b. Assess the likelihood of such a party’s participation in a center coalition.

3. Give priority to greatly increasing our contacts with labor but not without assessing the possibility of adverse military or government reaction.²

a. Improve and enlarge our labor exchange programs, seminars, round-tables and informational activities.

b. Enlist support of Department of Labor and U.S. trade unions to enlarge measurably the scope and depth of the latter’s contacts with Argentine labor including its Peronist elements. Specifically seek to encourage expansion of leader exchange, attention to worker education and provision of technical assistance in union administrative activities.

IV. Informational and Youth

1. Augment our efforts to work with and influence youthful members and potential leaders in the Peronist formations.

2. Increase efforts of U.S.I.S. and the Embassy’s political and economic sections to extend contacts with student and youth organizations.

3. Greater participation by political and economic officers in the selection of information and exchange program target groups and of exchange candidates.

4. Insure greater attention as target groups to professional organizations receiving large numbers of university graduates.

5. Rapid action in the book translation and publication program.

6. Promote with the Guido Government the rapid creation of an Argentine Peace Corps for domestic purposes, to focus the energy and social consciousness of youth into constructive channels, providing them a sense of participation in the solution of the country’s pressing needs. Our Peace Corps might provide administrative assistance.

7. Expand assistance to Argentine educational institutions and encourage similar assistance by private U.S. educational and philanthropic organizations.

V. Economic—(The following general statements complement the AID/LAPC paper.)³

1. Express to Guido Government our general satisfaction with self-help measures it has undertaken but continue to press upon it that more remains to be done.⁴

2. Press for arrangement for private professional U.S. assistance to National Development Council and to continue USG efforts through A.I.D. to assist with special studies, statistical services and other appropriate technical aid.

3. Recognize the possibility that the GOA may not find it possible to remain within the credit expansion ceilings established by the June, 1962 IMF Standby Agreement. Be prepared to provide sympathetic consideration to requests for revision by the Guido Government and a parallel extension of the U.S. Treasury Agreement.

4. Impress upon Minister of Economy Alsogaray the rapid need for undertaking negotiations with the Europeans to reschedule short-term financial obligations.

5. Seek to secure a cut-back in Argentine military expenditures, and discourage particularly expenditures for large items.

6. Encourage the Guido regime to consult with labor groups before undertaking specific wage-price decisions of national import.

7. Devote highest priority to plans for low-cost housing in Argentina by both U.S. Government and international lending agencies.⁵

a. Accelerate our investigations (A.I.D.) of the methods by which assistance may be provided labor union and other cooperative organizations for the financing of low-cost housing without direct Argentine Government participation.

8. Explore with the Export-Import Bank the manner in which its $50 million segment of the $150 million February, 1962 loan package should be used, particularly whether any portion might be devoted to infra-structure or impact project purposes.

9. Establish a government-wide consensus regarding the extent to which the U.S. wishes to encourage increases in both production and productivity of Argentine agriculture given its largely competitive role with U.S. plant and animal products.

a. Arrive at this decision with particular reference to the meat import problem.

10. Reach policy conclusion regarding the timing and scope of personnel reforms of the Argentine national railways, bearing in mind the severe repercussions ill-advised or rash action might have on the stability of the regime.

11. Explore the possibility of A.I.D. providing technical assistance in the field of labor-management relations.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Argentina, General, 7/62. Secret. Transmitted by Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a July 4 memorandum which indicated that it was for his approval. According to Brubeck the plan was based on the decisions of the Latin American Policy Committee at its June 21 meeting. Bundy wrote the following note on the covering memorandum: “Ralph: I doubt if we want to ‘approve’ anything as detailed as this. We might simply note it & leave responsibility in Dept.—unless you want to disapprove. McGB.” Bundy sent Brubeck a memorandum on July 17, noting that he had reviewed the plan, that it did not require Presidential approval, and that the NSC staff should not undertake to give formal approval or disapproval to Department of State documents. He also noted that Dungan had comments on some of the points and would communicate directly with relevant officers at the Department; see footnotes 1, 3, and 4 below. (Ibid.)
2. In a July 12 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Dungan commented on this recommendation: “I do not believe we should be inhibited in making contact with labor groups in Argentina or elsewhere by excessive anxiety about disturbing the government’s power or elements within it. If it is important for us to maintain substantial and good contacts with labor or any other group we should go ahead and do it even if it has to be done on a covert basis.” (Ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. In the July 17 memorandum to Bundy, Dungan commented that “we should direct State-AID to conduct as quickly as possible an examination of the Argentine budget, analyze its present monetary policies and come up with a specific list of so-called self-help measures which we think to be in their interest and consistent with our objectives under the Alliance. Unless we have this basic analysis we have no way of knowing whether it is prudent for us to advance dollars to create local currency for public works or other types of projects or whether it is possible to fund some of the local currency costs themselves.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Argentina, General, 7/62)
5. In the July 17 memorandum to Bundy, Dungan queried, “On what basis have we decided to place our highest priority on low-cost housing in Argentina?” (Ibid.)