Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

184. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Secretary of State Rusk ¹

Washington, April 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Recommendations for Regularizing Official Relations with Argentina

Discussion

I. The following considerations favor regularizing official relations with the Guido Government without substantial further delay.

1. It has effective control of the machinery of government in accordance with the Argentine Constitution.

Upon Frondizi’s arrest and removal by the military, Guido as President of the Senate assumed office of President as next in line under Argentine Constitution. He was sworn in before the Supreme Court with members of Congress present, and the Supreme Court later reaffirmed the constitutionality of the succession. Frondizi also approved his succession after-the-fact. Guido has constituted a cabinet of civilians (except three armed forces secretaries) who are of conservative-bent but generally respected. He has convened a special session of Congress to meet between April 12 and 25 to reform the law of succession to provide for the calling within 180 days (rather than 30 days) of a new presidential election at a future date deemed advisable under the circumstances.

2. It is in office with general acquiescence if not support.

All political groups except the Peronistas and Communists support or acquiesce in government, although differing on the desirability of honoring recent congressional elections and other major policy questions. UCRI (Frondizi’s party) deputies and provincial governors demanding the return of Frondizi do so largely for the record, as political maneuvering with eye toward future electoral prospects, in our Embassy’s opinion. Indications are that the Peronistas would prefer civilian government to military dictatorship though of course outlawing this party or too reactionary economic measures might force them into more active opposition. Moderate military leaders who are in majority in armed forces accept and support government.

3. Any considerable further delay by U.S. Government in regularizing relations would increase substantially the risk of a military dictatorship.

The moderate military leaders now appear to be in the ascendancy in the armed forces. Extreme military leaders who were influential in bringing about Frondizi’s removal distrust the civilian government and would prefer a military dictatorship. The danger of a further military coup increases if through delayed U.S. action the Guido government should lose public confidence and support.

4. Clarification of major policy issues involving elections, Congress and Peronists is not likely in near future.

The special session of Congress called for some time between April 12-25 is limited to considering reform of the constitutional succession (see above). It is probable new presidential elections will be held in 1963 at the earliest. To avoid having to choose between seating the elected Peronist Congressmen (which the military would resist) or nullifying the recent election (which major democratic parties oppose) the government will probably not convene Congress on May 1 or soon thereafter. It will not likely soon terminate the intervention of the five important provinces which elected Peronist governors, in particular Buenos Aires province. It may seek to work out a compromise acceptable to the Peronists and the military for some limited participation by the Peronists in electoral matters in lieu of the proscription of the neo-Peronist parties, e.g. accession to provincial governships not intervened, and right to vote in new presidential election.

5. The Guido government provides the best and the only present possibility for gradual return of Argentina to democratic processes.

Guido is ostensibly a constitutional president. Frondizi’s return is not a real possibility; the military would not accept him, and he has lost the confidence of important civilian elements of the nation. The only alternative appears to be a military dictatorship possibly accompanied by disorders and even civil war. The best hope for return to democratic constitutionality is through action of the present government, supported by moderates, taking a center course between extremes, and seeking by negotiation to extract concessions from both the Peronists and the military.

6. Argentina is facing an incipient financial crisis, which a new political crisis would precipitate and worsen.

7. Other western governments, including some in Latin America, have moved to continue relations, and others are considering doing so.

The following governments are among those which have continued relations: Colombia, Haiti, Honduras and El Salvador from Latin America; and UK, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and China.

8. The Guido government has indicated it intends to pursue the economic stabilization program of the Frondizi government, a program which had our support. It is now negotiating a new stabilization agreement with IMF, is prepared by new import surcharges and freeing of the peso to reduce the balance of payments deficit, and by increased taxes to reduce the budget deficit.

II. The following considerations indicate caution and favor further delay.

1. The future support of or opposition to the government will be affected by its policy on certain difficult and unresolved political issues of which the most important appear to be the following:

a) whether Congress will be convened or the government will rule by decree.

b) whether Congressional elections will be honored or nullified in law, or in fact by not convening the Congress.

c) whether the provincial interventions will be maintained and other provinces intervened where Peronists won governorships.

d) whether the Peronist parties will be proscribed.

e) whether the labor law will be amended to terminate the monopoly of national labor confederation which Peronists effectively control, in labor representation.

Action by the government or even its failure to take action on these issues will create internal conflicts.

2. The extent of the support by the democratic political parties might be more clearly indicated at the special session of Congress to be convened between April 12 and 25.

3. Depending on the policies of the government and the reaction of the Peronists, the latter may incite disorders in which the Communists would join and other labor elements might participate. Although the military forces are disposed to maintain order and could probably do so, it would be at the expense of democratic liberties and return to democratic processes would be retarded.

4. The government though civilian in form will be subject to strong military influence, which could become dominant depending upon how the situation develops.

5. The government is conservative and in the economic field tends to be orthodox. There is no indication it will give adequate attention to social reform and immediate improvement of the economic and social conditions of the lower classes. It will probably be less inclined than the previous government to reach an accommodation with the Peronists and to seek to integrate them into the democratic framework, especially because Frondizi’s unsuccessful attempt to do this brought about his deposition by the military. Yet the Peronists cast 35% of the total vote in the recent Congressional elections.

6. Of the Latin American governments which have not continued relations with the Argentine government, most are following our policy of watchful waiting and would follow our lead if we should decide to continue relations. Brazil, however, is inclined to withhold action until it is able to ascertain what action GOA will take on seating Peronist governors-elect, and what Argentine public reaction will be. Venezuela, while sympathetic to action by U.S. Government to continue relations, intends to adhere firmly to its policy not to recognize a government resulting from overthrow by military of constitutionally elected regime.

III. On balance it is believed in United States interest to take action to confirm continuance of relations with the Argentine government without any considerable further delay.

Recommendations²

A. That the United States Government continue official relations with Argentina on the basis that the Argentine government has effective control in accordance with the Argentine Constitution of the machinery of government and Argentine territory with general acquiescence of the Argentine people, provided important Latin American countries (i.e. Brazil, Chile, Uruguay) also decide to do so simultaneously or in coordination with us. (Failure of any such important Latin American countries to agree to this would not preclude a subsequent U.S. decision to continue official relations if the U.S. so desired.)

B. That following this action, with view to helping the situation in those Latin American countries where civilian democratically elected governments may feel weakened by the example of military intervention in Argentina, an official U.S. spokesman make a statement to the press, preferably in reply to a press question, along lines of expressing regret at the interruption of the democratic processes in Argentina and encouragement to the Argentine people and government to maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in order that Argentina may resume and intensify the social and economic programs called for by the Alliance for Progress.

C. That with reference to the special situation of Venezuela, a letter be sent to President Betancourt by the President in reply to the former’s letter, along the lines suggested and approved by our Ambassador in Caracas. A proposed form of letter is attached.³

D. That following announcement of continuance of relations, the United States upon request from Argentina for the economic assistance it will continue to need, announce its willingness to provide aid under the $150 million aid package of March 1962, subject to (1) Argentina’s carrying out the self-help and reform measures (railway reforms, financial stabilization and national development planning) accepted at that time by the Argentine government, which would be publicized, and (2) increasing attention by the Argentine government to the aspirations of the average man in Argentina for social justice, social reform and improved living standards.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.35/4-1362. Secret. Drafted by Well-man on April 12 and cleared by Whiteman.
2. Rusk approved recommendations A-D on April 14 on the condition that the press statement in recommendation B would be softened.
3. Attached to this memorandum, but not printed, are a proposed reply from President Kennedy to President Betancourt’s March 29 message on the ramifications of the change of government in Argentina, a memorandum of a conversation between Martin and Foreign Minister Dantas of Brazil on the same issue, and an advance copy of telegram 2063 from Buenos Aires, April 13, in which McClintock argued that the only way to keep Argentina from outright military dictatorship was to recognize the Guido government, the “least objectionable of alternatives in the limited choice we have.”