Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina ¹

Washington, February 10, 1962, 4 p.m.

1436. Reference Embassy’s telegram 1350² and Department’s telegram 1391.³ Department shares Embassy’s concern internal political crisis may result in destruction of balance between civil and military forces and subordination of constitutional elected executive to military. We welcome foreign policy changes brought about by internal pressures mainly from military.⁴ We believe however continued and extreme military pressure upon government would be contrary to US interests.

You have taken position with our approval that this is Argentine internal matter in which we are resolved not to intervene but that we would deplore overthrow of constitutional government by military. If consistent with this position you have opportunity in contacts with military to point out advantages of relieving pressure on Government in interest of moderate solution, now that foreign policy changes have been achieved, you are encouraged to do so.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 735.00/2-862. Secret. Drafted by Well-man, cleared by Goodwin, and approved by Rusk.
2. In telegram 1350 from Buenos Aires, February 8, the Embassy reported increasing tension between the Frondizi government and the Argentine military. The Embassy noted fears that either the military would demand the ouster from the government of certain Frondizi supporters, placing him in an inferior political position, or might even overthrow him. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 1391 to Buenos Aires, February 2, the Department noted it “would deplore overthrow by armed forces of constitutional government.” (Ibid., 735.00/2-162)
4. Reference is to the breaking of relations between Cuba and Argentina on February 8.
5. In telegram 1389 from Buenos Aires, February 15, the Embassy reported that it had on several occasions used U.S. officials to inform the Argentine military that overthrowing Frondizi “would indicate a regression in Argentine political affairs and could not but help affect adversely our relations.” (Department of State, Central Files 735.00/2-1562)