Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

155. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, September 30, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Latin American Attitudes re Informal MFM

As a result of your meetings with the Latin American Foreign Ministers and additional conversations with them during the last few days, the following is our appraisal of their positions at present:

1. The Central American and Caribbean countries (except Mexico and Haiti whose views are unknown) are interested in taking some joint action among themselves to strengthen their defenses. Some of them are toying with a separate declaration, but due to their dispersion and lack of leadership, this has not jelled. All are receptive to the idea of a later Caribbean meeting of the Ministers of Defense and Interior to establish joint air and sea patrols for coastal surveillance and to set up some system for exchanging information. The major points in our proposed communique are all acceptable to them.

In addition, one or more have suggested the following steps, none of which is generally acceptable to all (nor to us):

a. Creation of a government in exile. (Guatemala will push this.)

b. Convocation of a formal MFM under the Rio Treaty to take binding decisions on severance of diplomatic and economic relations.

c. In addition, there have been press reports that some countries favor the creation of a Caribbean NATO-type military alliance. However, they have not proposed this in discussions with us.

2. Venezuela likes the points contained in our proposed communique but insists on adding a reference to the importance of strengthening representative democracy. Colombia is sympathetic and cooperative, but somewhat concerned that any separate action by the Caribbean group would appear as a division within the OAS.

3. Brazil’s position is encouraging. They agree to the desirability of firmer action to control the flow of funds, propaganda, agents and trainees; agree to the right of the Caribbean countries to take special measures; agree that some public declaration is desirable and Arinos did not object to any of the basic points contained in our proposed draft.

4. Bolivia will probably follow Brazil. The Bolivian and Chilean Foreign Ministers have engaged in informal conversations regarding the Lauca controversy. They will keep this subject out of the MFM.

5. Argentina’s position is uncertain due to the lack of a Foreign Minister, but we believe they will be generally helpful. Mexico’s views are unknown.

6. Chile poses a serious problem. The Foreign Minister feels strongly there should be no communique at all. His position is based on the Chilean domestic situation and on his alleged promise to the legislature in return for permission to participate in the meeting, that there would be no agreement or declaration emerging from the meeting. If, however, we have the support of Brazil and Argentina, the Chileans can be isolated and perhaps brought along.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/9-3062. Confidential. Drafted by Allen. The source text bears Rusk’s initials indicating that he read it.