131. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State1
1570. 1. Goodwin and I met Thursday with Bernardes and Valle, and Saturday with Foreign Minister Dantas, Bernardes, and Renato Archer to discuss GOB views forthcoming MFM. (Deputy Archer is new Undersecretary in Foreign Office under terms Parliamentary amendment.)
2. Dantas states as basic premises (A) need to secure maximum unity and strengthening inter-American system in face Cuban problem and (B) need to avoid sharp conflict and division with Brazilian public opinion. Immediate or slightly deferred but automatic diplomatic or economic sanctions continue to be outside framework Brazilian thinking, although we made clear these possibilities under increasingly active discussion in Washington and warmly supported by smaller countries closer to Cuba.
3. With respect condemnation Cuban past and present, Dantas continues prefer idea of resolution confronting Cuban official statements and actions with restatement of principles of inter-American system, drawing conclusion that such statements and acts are clearly incompatible with system. Against this background, Brazilians would introduce new idea that declared Marxist-Leninist state can coexist peacefully with rest of hemisphere only if it accepts a form of “neutralization”, which would include arms limitation, avoidance types military actions set forth Colombian drafts, foreswearing of subversive radio broadcasts to other LA countries, and refraining from subversive infiltration by other means. MFM would appoint a special committee to define terms of neutralization in detail and discuss with Cubans, and to report results to COAS within definite time period. If no positive results, Cuba then would clearly be engaged in acts under Article 6 Rio Treaty and could be subjected to sanctions under Article 8. To our surprise Dantas said such sanctions might include if necessary even armed force.
4. This idea appears to have a double origin (A) Bernardes belief after long talks with Olivares that if assured that US will not invade, Cuba would in fact accept rigorous limitation, and (B) Dantas conviction that no juridical definition is feasible of “breaking ties with Soviet bloc”, whereas neutralization is an accepted juridical status which could be defined unequivocally.
5. Dantas also considering some means coupling above plan with MFM declaration that Cuban actions and statements warrant determination [Page 286] by rest of OAS that Cuba has taken itself out of system and is no longer entitled to its rights and privileges. This might be immediate or automatic within fixed time period unless Cuba radically altered her posture and policy. Further discussion tentatively arranged for Sunday, although not firm date.
6. We regard Bernardes idea paragraph four (A) above as pipedream, but see some real merit in idea reading Cuba out of system, possibly losing OAS membership thereby, as MFM action result, immediate or deferred, rather than formal sanctions which we do not believe Brazil can accept at this time. Neutralization concept, if defined with enough rigor, may come to much same thing as breaking military ties Soviet bloc and refraining any form subversion other LA countries. Discussions are making Dantas aware that US also faces major problem public opinion which he and other southern country Foreign Ministers must weigh. We believe position should be kept sufficiently flexible to accommodate at least part Brazilian approach if it develops in concrete manner.
7. Dantas still troubled recent chest operation but believes may be able to come Washington by mid-week, e.g. January 10 or 11.
8. Goodwin will be back Monday and will discuss further.
9. Goodwin concurred in draft.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/1-762. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, and Bogota.↩