116. Memorandum of Conversation1
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE SIXTEENTH SESSION
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1961
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- The Secretary
- Mr. Achilles
- Mr. Woodward
- Mr. Braddock
- Brazil
- Amb. Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco
- Minister Geraldo de Carvalho Silos
SUBJECT
- Situation in Brazil and Brazilian Attitude toward Cuban Problem
The Secretary opened the conversation by asking how Brazil was adjusting to the change in its Constitution and its Government. Ambassador Arinos launched into a lengthy discussion of Brazil’s constitutional form. He said that Brazil followed more the Greek concept of the state than the Anglo-Saxon and that whereas in the latter the idea was to defend the citizen against the government, in the former it was to integrate him with the state. He said that in Brazil the President is not elected by political parties or institutions (there being twelve political parties) but rather by a plebescite of the people. The President, therefore, feels [Page 260] responsibility to the mass rather than to any institutional groups. Congress, on the other hand, is made up of representatives chosen by parties or other specific organizations. Congress, therefore, tends to be more moderate in its views than does the President.
With this as a background, Ambassador Arinos said that Brazil was experiencing little difficulty in adapting itself to the sudden constitutional and governmental change. He mentioned that Goulart drew much of his strength from his home state of Rio Grande do Sul and from the labor unions, of which he was a national official.
The Secretary asked whether in Brazil, which had great problems and great potentialities, the government did not concentrate more on internal matters than on external. The Ambassador thought this was generally true and stated that the President, and now also the Prime Minister, were so involved with domestic problems and administration that they left the conduct of foreign affairs largely to the Foreign Minister. He said that Brazil did work closely with some of its smaller, weaker neighbors, particularly Paraguay and Bolivia, to help them toward greater economic and political stability. Brazil exercised with them a role, he said, not too unlike that which the United States exercised toward Latin American countries, including Brazil.
The Secretary asked whether it was not difficult to conduct foreign affairs from Rio with the President located in Brasilia. Ambassador Arinos answered in the affirmative. He said that the Foreign Office had forty members of its staff in Brasilia and five hundred in Rio, and that all of the archives and files were in Rio. He thought that coordination with the President’s office might be improved by the recent creation of a new position of Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Brasilia, which is filled by a member of Congress.
The Secretary brought the conversation gradually around to the subject of Cuba and sought to find out how Brazil viewed the Cuban problem. Ambassador Arinos said that Cuba under Castro was pro-Communist and against the Church, whereas Brazil was anti-Communist and very Catholic. He said that Brazil had some Communists but that thus far they had not gained any ascendancy in the drive to relieve human misery in Brazil, notwithstanding the influence of Castro and the Cuban revolution. The Secretary observed that the modern history of the United States was proof that democratic institutions could meet the need for social and economic change and that we did not concede any superiority to the Communists on this point.
Ambassador Arinos stated that Brazil was opposed to intervention and felt that the attitude that should be taken toward Cuba was to try to bring it back as a full member of the American system rather than to put it outside. Asked by the Secretary whether he thought Cuba could be brought back, the Ambassador said that there was a remote chance that it [Page 261] could, provided Cuba were permitted to retain the positive accomplishments of its revolution and were given assurances of assistance with its economic and social problems. The deterioration of the Cuban economy would work in favor of this course, he said.
The Secretary asked what the Ambassador thought of the proposals made by President Lleras with regard to Cuba. The Ambassador said that inasmuch as these proposals were aimed at trying to bring Cuba back into the family, they were fairly close to the thinking of the Brazilian government. He gave no other indication as to whether the Brazilian government would endorse or support the Colombian initiative, or whether he believed that this course was worth pursuing. When asked by the Secretary what he thought about the possible convocation of a meeting of Foreign Ministers, he seemed surprised and asked for what purpose the meeting would be called. The Secretary answered that a meeting if called would be in connection with the Colombian initiative. The Ambassador appeared somewhat relieved but not entirely reassured.
The Secretary said that Cuba represented not just one problem for us but several. There was the problem of Cuba itself. There was the problem of Cuban-U.S. relations. There was the problem of Cuba’s efforts to undermine other governments. There was the problem of Cuba as a member of the Organization of American States. And there was the effect of the Cuban problem on American public opinion. Unless the Organization of American States could find a way to deal with the problem, it was to be feared that the American public would lose faith in the Organization. The Secretary explained that in saying this he was thinking not of particular sanctions by the OAS but of recognition by the OAS of the existence and seriousness of the Cuban problem and of a serious effort to deal with it.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1957. Confidential. Drafted by Braddock, cleared in draft with Achilles, and approved in S on September 27. The conversation was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.↩