Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

69. Brief of Special National Intelligence Estimate⁰

Washington, September 8, 1961.

SNIE 11-11-61: IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING

This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 7 September 1961. Significant judgments of the Estimate are as follows:

Motivations for Testing

The Soviets have had increasing technical motivations for further nuclear weapons tests related to development of antimissile defenses; tests of high-yield and of low-yield devices; tests directed toward economy of fissionable materials and improving yield-to-weight ratio; and perhaps tests in new areas of development. Of these, the one relating to antimissile defenses has probably been the most urgent.

Technical and military requirements, which Khrushchev has said were factors being pressed by the Soviet military leaders were thus a major factor of increasing weight on the side of resumption. In July or August it appeared that the US had not decided upon early resumption of tests, and the Soviets had to decide whether to proceed themselves without the benefit of prior US resumption.

At the same time, developments in the world political situation, and particularly manifestations of firmness in the Western stand on Berlin, almost certainly played a major role in this decision at this time. When pressing military incentives to test came to be supplemented by important political ones, the decision was reached—probably in late July—to proceed with the tests for which contingent test site preparations had been underway for many months.

General Implications of the Soviet Announcement

The resumption of nuclear testing at this time was clearly intended to raise the level of fear and anxiety in the world in general, and to create a powerful impression of the strength and ruthlessness with which the Soviets intend to pursue their objectives. We believe the timing of the move reflects and dramatizes the turn by the Soviets to an openly militant and increasingly risky phase of tactics in relations with the West. Renewed testing accords with other recent demonstrations of Soviet military strength and of the Soviet determination to increase it.

By announcing resumption of tests two days prior to the convening of the Belgrade Conference, the Soviets probably believed that the desired effect on neutralist opinion—anxiety and clamor for East-West negotiations—would be enhanced by the use of shock tactics on an assembly of major neutralist leaders, and that much of the negative effect could be counter-acted by lobbying at the conference.

The Chinese Communists, who almost certainly pressed the Soviets not to conclude a test ban will welcome the Soviet test resumption as a manifestation of aggressiveness in the struggle with capitalism. Although this should increase their demands for Soviet nuclear assistance, we do not believe that the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing indicates any increase in Moscow’s willingness to assist the Chinese nuclear program.

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 350.09. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Major General Richard Collins, Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff, to McNamara. The full text of SNIE 11-11-61 is in the Supplement.