51. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Report of Panel on Nuclear Testing
In response to Dr. Wiesner’s request I have reviewed the report of the Panel on Nuclear Testing and have given consideration to the course of action which the United States should now pursue in the light of the conclusion of the Panel that any decisions in the near future concerning the resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by non-technical considerations.
[Page 132]On the basis of this assessment it would appear that the dominant factors to be considered in determining US policy on this question in the immediate future are those relating to the over-all posture of the United States as regards our allies, world opinion, and the USSR, particularly in the light of our general approach to the problem of Berlin. Our policy on the resumption of nuclear testing should likewise take into account the effects of any present moves both on prospects of realistic negotiation on disarmament, and on the longer-range military security considerations to which the Panel has referred.
On the basis of these factors it would appear to me that the most advantageous course would be to defer any announcement of test resumption until at least the end of the year, to reaffirm, in response to questions, US freedom to test upon prior announcement, and to proceed with such preparations as are necessary to achieve technical readiness for weapons tests of highest priority early in 1962. The announcement in each case would be only a few days before the actual test.
If on the basis of the Panel’s assessment it is concluded that an early test resumption would not contribute significantly to our immediate preparations for a potential crisis in Berlin, I believe that a deferral of this step would serve to increase support and cooperation in those measures of preparedness we deem most essential. I believe, too, that deferral of such an announcement would enhance our position in the forthcoming General Assembly, increase support for our position in the Geneva test ban negotiations, and afford the most favorable circumstances for the US initiatives contemplated in the field of disarmament.
In the longer range, it seems to me, considering the possible risks to the security of the country, testing for military weapons purposes should be resumed if a safeguarded treaty ban cannot be agreed, although the final determination should be made in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. Accordingly, I would urge that while deferring an announcement of test resumption pending at least the achievement of a state of technical readiness which would permit the conduct of a significant test series, preparations toward that end should proceed forthwith. The achievement of such a state of readiness would, I believe, contribute to the flexibility we will need in timing any announcement of test resumption, since I am convinced we should be prepared to follow any such announcement quite promptly with an actual test.
Mr. McCloy concurs in these recommendations.