Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

48. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-517-61

Washington, August 2, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (U)

1. Reference is made to:

a. Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President, dated 28 July 1961, subject as above.¹

b. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 4 March 1961, subject: Fisk Panel Report.²

c. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 17 May 1961, subject: Department of Defense Policy on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U).³

d. Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 22 June 1961, subject: Proposed Letter to the President on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Testing.⁴

e. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 July 1961, subject: review of Nuclear Test Plans (U).⁵

2. By reference a, the Special Assistant to the President forwarded the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (Panofsky Panel) with the request that comments of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff be available for the President not later than 4 August 1961.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Panofsky Report and agree with the panel that the report is essentially an updated Fisk Panel Report. In this connection, the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference b remain valid in relation to the Fisk Report. Of particular significance is the nonconcurrence of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy⁶ on the Fisk Report which contained views which were generally agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following comments on the subject report:

a. There are many points in the report which are considered to be inaccurate or which express opinions and military judgments with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree.

b. The report is based on unconfirmed intelligence estimates and therefore its conclusions with respect to Soviet capabilities are conjectural and subject to gross error. In this connection, the following are pertinent:

(1) United States intelligence sources cannot identify nor can they give specific information on a single stockpiled Soviet nuclear weapon.

(2) United States estimates of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile are based entirely on analysis of Soviet nuclear tests with no confirmation from defectors or from other sources.

(3) Estimates of the Soviet nuclear material availability are better than estimates of the weapons stockpile; however, a margin of error of plus or minus 50% is assigned the 1963 materials estimate. No margins of error can be assigned subsequent estimates because of their dependence upon actual production which, in turn, is dependent upon Soviet plans, policies, and intentions.

c. From b, above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious reservations as to the validity of the conclusions concerning Soviet capabilities in development and production of nuclear weapons relative to capabilities of the United States. In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile is essentially unknown both qualitatively and quantitatively.

d. The final conclusion loses a considerable amount of its validity when the report states that the possibility of new surprises in developments exists in the area of tactical nuclear weapons. The conclusion also overlooked phenomena in weapons effects of various kinds, and failed to evaluate the potential value of such break-throughs based on the erroneous conclusion that there is no established doctrine for the use of tactical weapons.

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot concur with the Panel’s conclusion that from the military viewpoint there is little urgency connected with the US resumption of nuclear testing, and that decisions in the near future on resumption of nuclear testing can be governed primarily by non-technical considerations. Earlier Panel statements that the possibility exists of important surprises in overlooked weapons effects and tactical weapon developments invalidates this conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that discoveries in these areas are potentially of sufficient importance that their unilateral achievement by the Soviets could result in a decisive Soviet military advantage. The fact that the US has refrained from pursuing these important discoveries by not testing since October 1958, while we have no assurance that the Soviets have likewise refrained from testing, makes the US resumption of testing a matter of great urgency. In the interest of national security the US cannot afford the risk of unilateral Soviet discovery of these important new achievements in nuclear technology.

5. An important element in the decision to resume nuclear testing is the psychological aspect associated with world-wide fallout. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to emphasize the conclusions of the Chief, Defense Atomic Support Agency,⁷ which are contained in reference e:

“The Chief of DASA desires to emphasize that world-wide fallout from past tests has not produced a biologic hazard. While contrary to some widely publicized statements, the above conclusion is based on a careful study of the problem. For many years DASA has conducted an extensive stratospheric sampling program. Data from this program coupled with extensive surveys of levels of radiation in soil, foods and directly in people have shown conclusively that the levels of radiation exposure to important areas of the body which have been created from past tests (including the radiation effects of ingested Sr 90, Cs 137 and C 14) are only a few percent (2 to 3%) of the natural radiation background. These are even smaller than the fluctuations in the background exposure as one moves from place to place on the earth. In light of these facts, it is believed that the testing philosophy of the United States should allow tests to be conducted in any environment for which information is required, including if necessary, all environments that have been employed in the past. As far as fallout is concerned, care should be taken, as can easily be done, to insure that local fallout does not descend into inhabited areas. The conduct of the above-ground tests, which are proposed, would increase the background radiation by less than 1/10 of 1%; consequently, any biological effects from world-wide fallout would be insignificant.”

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views on the necessity for the resumption of nuclear testing which are summarized in reference c. It is requested that the views contained herein and those in reference c be brought to the attention of the President. It is further recommended that reference d be updated and forwarded to the President.⁸

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Jun-Nov 61). Top Secret; Restricted Data.
1. See Document 42 and the source note thereto.
2. See footnote 2, Document 5, and Document 4.
3. In this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their approval of the position set forth in the enclosure to Document 22. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 8 Apr 61 (Apr-May 61))
4. In this draft letter, McNamara set forth a position similar to that in Document 47. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 4613 (22 Jun 61)) McNamara’s letter may have gone to the President on June 27 but was returned at Kennedy’s request. See Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, p. 69.
5. Not found but see numbered paragraph 5.
6. Major General Herbert B. Loper (Ret.).
7. Major General Robert H. Booth.
8. A memorandum from the President to General Taylor, August 7, reads: “The Joint Chiefs took a very strong position against the Panofsky report on testing. I wonder who prepared their analysis. Was it done by one, two, or three men? Was it done outside of the Defense Department by a group of scientists, or what? This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the Chairman of the AEC seems to find himself ‘in general agreement [with] the findings and conclusions of the report.’” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Panofsky Panel Report 7/21/61) Kennedy’s quote is from Seaborg’s August 4 letter to Wiesner, in which Seaborg emphasized maintaining a readiness to test “quite apart from the political decision whether or not to resume testing” and recommended increasing the limit on laboratory explosions to 1 ton. (Ibid., Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Nuclear Test Ban, 7/2/61-8/7/61)