Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ⁰

Washington, July 22, 1963, 10:27 p.m.

277. Re Embtel 269 July 22 9:00 p.m.¹ Your draft for article I-1-B contained in paragraph 3 Reftel approved.

We cannot accept U.K. communiqué language (Embtel 248)² since that in effect constitutes non-aggression declaration by the three principals and would create resentment on part of Germans and French since it would prejudice their position in any further negotiations and would point the finger at them for failure to enter into a non-aggression pact. You should therefore hold firmly to the sense of our proposed communiqué language on NAP contained in Deptel 237.³ President is sending letter to Prime Minister explaining our position on this question.⁴ This letter is being repeated to you.⁵

Believe essential that you try as soon as possible to reach agreement with Gromyko regarding arrangements for signing along lines Deptel 237 as modified in the letter of explanation the President is sending the Prime Minister and which is being repeated to you. You will note that this contemplates your initialing treaty before leaving Moscow.

The President is tonight forwarding letter to de Gaulle for transmission by Bohlen when we give him word that treaty will definitely be initialed. Final version of letter, seen by you in draft, being repeated to you in separate telegram.⁶ As you will note final version is largely informative and offer of assistance to de Gaulle is carefully and rather vaguely phrased.

FYI. Indications are that the French are mounting a covert propaganda campaign against the test ban and that de Gaulle in his press conference on July 29 may openly attack and attempt to discredit the treaty. Under these circumstances I think it essential that you carefully prepare Soviets against this possibility. You might say to Gromyko that our indications are that de Gaulle will probably refuse to sign and may even make a public statement against the treaty. This is something out of our control and, while we deplore it, we cannot believe that de Gaulle will have much influence on the other nations of the world. In fact we are persuaded that most nations are looking forward to this treaty and that most nations are prepared to sign, with the probable exceptions of the French and Chinese. You might at this point indicate that the Chinese have already made clear that they will not sign.

Neither side should lose sight, however, of the significant distinction between words and deeds. The important thing is not what the French or Chinese say but what they do. And you would hope that world public opinion mobilized behind the test ban treaty would have a compelling effect on both nations. In any event, so far as the United States is concerned, we are prepared to concentrate on actions rather than words. We will not be deterred by what the Chinese say, although certainly a Chinese nuclear explosion will create a situation which we will have to examine carefully. End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Ball; cleared by the President, S, and Foster in substance and by Bromley Smith in draft; and approved by Read.
1. Document 339.
2. See footnote 9, Document 339.
3. Document 332.
4. See footnotes 12 and 14, Document 340.
5. In telegram 279 to Moscow, July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
6. Telegram 433 to Paris, July 22, repeated to Moscow as telegram 278. (Ibid.)