29. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State0
New York, May 26, 1961,
9 p.m.
3200. Nuclear testing. Department telegram 2306.1
- 1.
- We believe that political groundwork has not yet been established which would permit us to resume nuclear tests without suffering severely damaging political reaction throughout world. We are not in position to judge defense requirements which may favor early resumption of testing but we question whether these requirements are sufficiently compelling and immediate to warrant resumption testing without further political preparation and clear demonstration in and to UN that US has exhausted every reasonable possibility of negotiation.
- 2.
- We believe one key to estimating public reaction lies in demonstrated ability Soviets to stimulate public condemnation on such issue through leftist groups and public media over which they have influence; if Soviets choose exercise this influence, which we confident they will, reaction will be severe. For past decade Soviets have attempted with considerable success to mold public opinion against nuclear explosions whatever their purpose. While UN resolutions have always been carefully restricted to nuclear “weapons” tests, resumption of any kind of testing would be viewed with alarm by many UN members because of fear it only first step to resumption weapons tests, either by US or by USSR. In our view resumption US underground tests now, whether for weapons or for seismic research or peaceful purposes, could provide pretext to Soviets both for effective worldwide anti-US campaign and for resumption of weapons [tests] on their part if they wish, while leaving blame on US. If we resumed peaceful explosions only (seismic tests to improve inspection capabilities would perhaps be distinguishable), and if we included appropriate international supervision of devices and tests we could probably prevent resolution but would nevertheless anticipate great difficulties in debate and that US would be in defensive position, especially if Soviets used this as pretext free selves from their restraint on weapons testing. As replies from field have shown, public opinion reaction in most countries would not distinguish between weapons and non-weapons tests and we think this public reaction would be heavily reflected here. Should atmosphere testing be resumed, fear of radiation, whether rational or not, would further magnify reaction. In short we do not see any advantages from resumption any type nuclear testing at this time which would offset undoubted adverse political reactions.
- 3.
- We assume that greater lead time would be required for weapons test than for other types of underground shots. If this is case, and if decision is taken that we must resume weapons testing in absence change Soviet position, we believe intervening time should be used to prepare political groundwork in hope of minimizing damaging reaction when testing actually takes place.
- 4.
- Chief requirement in preparation for resumption of tests is public belief that US has made and continues to make sincere reasonable efforts to reach agreement with Soviets at Geneva test talks with parallel appreciation of obstacles which Soviets have placed before such an agreement. This requires far greater dissemination and understanding of key issues at Geneva than is case to date. Pressure “neutral” opinion might, for example, be used in our interests in this case; Presidential letters to chief neutrals such as Nehru, Nkrumah and Tito might warn them in advance that we feel testing talks about to break down because of failure Soviets to agree on reasonable inspection. And, since so many governments are properly fearful of leftist-organized public demonstrations and since public opinion so widely opposed to nuclear tests, this understanding must reach level of man on street. It follows that a major propaganda effort would have to be launched well in advance of any testing. Even break in negotiations without immediate resumption testing would require much more public opinion preparation both through Washington and elsewhere than has yet been made if we are not to suffer political reactions.
- 5.
- Presumably nuclear test talks in Geneva would be broken off sometime after decision reached to resume tests, yet well ahead of actual tests. To bolster our posture of reasonableness and of desiring make every conceivable effort to reach satisfactory agreement with Soviets, we should, simultaneously with breakoff at Geneva, bring matter on our initiative to UN. (It would be highly important to beat Russians to the punch.) Forum would depend somewhat on time of year; if break comes during fall we could introduce item in GA, if it comes in summer we could put it either in DC or SC, or we could put it on GA agenda for fall while pursuing other means in summer, e.g., in disarmament talks or bilaterally. Our purpose in referring matter to UN would be to build support for our contention that Soviet negotiating position has prevented an agreement by which weapons tests could be stopped with any real assurance of compliance by all parties. We believe it is only by taking political offensive in this manner that we could prevent Soviets from getting resolution passed against resumption of tests which would further extend present uncontrolled moratorium or increase political cost for us if it then went ahead with tests. And it is only in this manner—i.e., after having exhausted world’s top political forum in effort to produce agreement—that [Page 83] we can build maximum political atmosphere which would put blame for failure negotiations and resumption of tests on USSR.
- 6.
- Although we recognize that initiative along these lines is not without risk, we believe Soviet positions, such as tripartite administrative council, limited number of on-site inspections, staffing and criteria proposals, could not successfully be defended under spotlight of world attention.
- 7.
- With these views in mind, and believing that we must make every effort to gain world public support on an issue of this magnitude and gravity, we believe decision to resume tests before political groundwork had been laid would critically isolate us with serious repercussions to our foreign policy objectives.
Stevenson