269. Message From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan 0
Dear Prime Minister, I should like to think that through action by our two governments we could move the Soviet Union promptly to accept a reasonable quota of on-site inspections and an adequate system for making these inspections meaningful. I studied your suggestions carefully with this in mind.1
It seems to me that we have to consider the chances of our successfully engaging the Soviet Union in serious negotiations against the background of what is now evidently going on in Moscow. Khrushchev appears to be maneuvering either to realign the policies of Communist China and the Soviet Union or to place the blame on Peiping if Soviet-Chinese relations cannot be repaired. At the same time, Khrushchev has had to confront the Soviet people with the prospect of no improvement in their material well-being because of continuing heavy expenditures resulting from military requirements. In addition, there seems to be another internal bureaucratic reorganization in process.
Khrushchev probably has too many problems on his hands right now to give the test ban the attention it deserves. In any case, it seems likely that Khrushchev is not yet ready to make the definite move towards the West which a further Soviet concession on the test ban would represent. Given this situation, I am inclined to think that an abrupt Western initiative concerning the quota number might only serve to precipitate a Soviet decision unfavorable to our interests. I suspect that Khrushchev will have to bide his time before he can make a further move.
This does not mean we should drop all conversations with the Soviets on the test ban question. The recent discussions between American and British scientists and Soviet scientists in London produced some suggestions of possible interest.2 I tend to regard the Soviet side of the conversation as a scouting expedition designed to give the Soviet Government a basis for deciding whether any further movement by Moscow would be worthwhile. I think it is fair to say that the Soviet Government [Page 660] must have a reasonably good idea that the United States is ready to negotiate and that the last word on our position has not been said.
Your idea of making a test ban more appealing to the Soviet Government by a parallel agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is one which I would like to think more about. As a general principle, I dislike the thought of tying one difficult problem to another, lest neither one be solved. I am inclined to think that a test ban treaty must stand or fall on its own merits.
You are familiar with our hopes, after Dean Rusk’s very informal conversation with Gromyko, that we might get somewhere on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons.3 You and we see that question in the same way. The Germans are a bit nervous but would probably come along but the French have thus far been unwilling to become involved or to give us a clear answer as to their position.4 The Soviet attitude towards the multilateral force has stiffened to the point now where the Soviet Union gives evidence of unwillingness to adhere to a non-dissemination declaration of the type which we have been proposing. This attitude may very well be dictated by tactical considerations but I think we need to have further discussions with the Soviet Union before we can assume that a non-dissemination agreement is negotiable. You will be hearing from David Bruce if you have not already done so about our thought of inviting the French to join in Four Power talks with the Soviet Union on a possible non-dissemination agreement. If they decline, I would think that we ought to explore further with the Russians the possibility of a practicable agreement aimed at national nuclear capability, in connection with which I think we could satisfy them on the realities of the multilateral arrangements we have in mind.
On the question of a meeting with Chairman Khrushchev, I do not think that we should seek such a meeting simply to settle the on-site inspection quota number and I take it you also see difficulties in this. I would find it quite awkward to agree on a number in a meeting with Khrushchev before I had any idea as to whether the other issues related to a test ban verification system could be satisfactorily settled. If, on the other hand, there was reason to believe that all the issues but the quota number could be satisfactorily resolved and if a discussion of other important issues could be usefully discussed with Khrushchev, then I would be prepared to consider such a meeting. Perhaps we should now consider sending a joint letter to Khrushchev, at a suitable time, to see what the prospects are for real progress in the immediate future. I should like to know what you think about the enclosed draft.5
[Page 661]You mentioned the idea of departing from the annual quota concept in favor of a more flexible plan for using on-site inspections. I think this is a good idea and is an area where early negotiation might be possible. I could accept either a quota covering a period of several years or an annual quota from which inspections could be “borrowed” for application in succeeding years. As you know, the eight new delegations in the disarmament talks have advanced an idea along these lines and apparently intend to submit this proposal formally to the Conference. Unfortunately, there has also been talk of a range of numbers which would be included in the Eight-Nation proposal. As you are aware, your people and ours have been attempting to persuade the Eight to refrain from including numbers in their plan. My thought has been that we should wait until the Eight have submitted their proposal before accepting or proposing a variation in the quota idea. We could then accept at least that part of their plan. If the Eight have not submitted their proposal by the time of the Easter recess, however, I believe we should then consider putting the idea to the Soviet Government officially.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan Correspondence, Vol. II. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the message was sent by the White House channel. A draft of this message, identical to the source text, is attached to a March 27 memorandum from Foster to McGeorge Bundy, which indicates that the draft was approved by Secretary Rusk after review by Thompson and Tyler. (Ibid.)↩
- Reference is to Macmillan’s March 16 letter; see Document 267.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 268.↩
- Reference presumably is to Secretary Rusk’s dinner conversation with Gromyko in Geneva on July 22, 1962; see footnote 3, Document 198 and footnote 6, Document 201.↩
- See Document 265.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Kennedy’s signature appears in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original.↩