260. Memorandum for the File0
Memorandum of discussion with William Foster on Wednesday, February 6, 1963.
Mr. Foster came at the direction of the President to discuss his program for further discussions in Geneva on a nuclear test ban.
After summarizing his present appraisal of the number of earthquakes expected in the Soviet Union in a year, the improvements in seismology and the ability to analyze seismic readings as a result of project Vela, Foster concluded that we could expect in the order of 40 or 50 unidentified and suspect events per year. I made no attempt to evaluate this conclusion from a technical standpoint.
Foster then indicated that a certain percentage, perhaps as many as half of these unidentified events, could be eliminated by information developed from United States intelligence resources.
He then explained that the Soviet’s position was about as follows: They would see their 70 national stations (in universities and elsewhere) for detection and monitoring purposes and would turn the “tapes” over to an international team of analysts and this process would be on a current basis.
In addition the tapes from the three “black boxes” would be handled by an international team and analyzed periodically by the international analysts.
The United States would use its national stations (universities, the five Vela stations, and others) under the same procedure, transmitting [Page 638] the tapes to the international analysts. The same procedure would be followed for the AEDS stations. However, the surfacing of these stations might involve complications and hence duplicate stations might be required in various locations throughout the world. This is because the presence and purpose of AEDS stations in many countries is not known publicly.
It was proposed by the Soviets that these arrangements, coupled with an agreement for two or three on-site inspections annually, would provide a satisfactory detection system for underground testing.
Foster indicated that the U.S. position called for 10 black boxes, this had not been agreed to by the Soviets, and no reduction in this figure had been established by U.S. policy makers.
The present U.S. policy calls for ten on-site inspections annually, Foster indicated to Kuznetsov an indication of willingness to compromise this figure, and that in his, Foster’s, opinion six inspections annually would be an acceptable figure.
The agreement would provide for the immediate suspension of all testing in all environments. Foster and his staff are advocating the pursuit of a treaty on these modified lines although they have no indication of the Soviet’s intention to increase their proposed number of black boxes or annual on-site inspections.
I then asked Foster what in his opinion was the threshold of the system which he proposed, and by that meaning the size of underground explosion which could be conducted in the Soviet Union without reasonable prospect of detection. Foster replied that the threshold was one kiloton in granite, two kilotons in limestone and ten to twenty kilotons in tuff. With respect to the latter Foster stated that our experience in Nevada had proven a test of such size at 1000 feet would cause a sinking of the surface which would give a surface indication which might be picked up by aerial surveillance.
With respect to the intelligence contribution to the system Foster was depending very largely on communications intelligence and I pointed out that the construction of land lines would eliminate this entirely.
We then discussed the fusion bomb. Livermore believe they have proven this to be feasible; they now have a device of limited effectiveness, that six or eight tests would be required to develop it as a weapon of limited effectiveness but that a substantial program would be required for improvements and further developments. In response to my question, Foster said that further testing of this device would be prohibited under the agreement.
With respect to China and France, Foster recognized that neither country was “manageable” at present but that any signator to the treaty [Page 639] could abrogate it unilaterally if other countries in the world pursued testing.
With respect to “cheating” Foster felt it was the opinion of his staff that the Soviets could probably cheat under the threshold for a single test or maybe a few tests but that a meaningful series of tests would be subject to discovery.
No means are provided for the inspection of laboratories, testing areas, etc., to expose new clandestinely planned development work in anticipation of a future test series.
I have reviewed the AEC letter to the Joint Committee of February 4th,1 and it is apparent there are a number of areas of development which if we are to pursue them will require both underground and atmospheric testing.
It appears to me that the treaty would stop nuclear weapon improvement in this country without guarantee that the Soviets would likewise stop (in spite of their promise) and would not control the “proliferation problem” as both the French and the Chinese Communists and others that they might work with, such as the Israelis or the Indians, would be outside of the treaty restrictions. Against this must be balanced the advantages of a “step forward” in the field of disarmament and the attendant lessening of tensions between the two world powers.