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  4. Document 256

256. Memorandum of Conversation0

Washington, January 10, 1963, noon.

SUBJECT

  • Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • The Secretary
    • John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV
  • U.S.S.R.
    • Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister
    • Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
    • Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich, Assistant to Kuznetsov
    • Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, First Secretary of Embassy (Interpreter)

The Secretary said that he wished to report on a matter of general common interest, to wit, the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom and France, he said, have not reacted to discussions which he had in Europe in December on this subject, having had their attention somewhat diverted by the Nassau meeting.1 However, he expected to talk soon with the Ambassadors of these two countries. The Secretary observed that it was almost axiomatic that no nuclear power has any interest in seeing others become nuclear powers. We were no less interested in this subject despite some delay. The Secretary went on to say that disarmament is a problem which should be objectively considered. A man from Mars would regard both the USSR and the United States as crazy for devoting so much to the arms race. Both countries have great unfinished tasks at home and the arms race was a diversion from these tasks. We hope for early headway on the problem of testing, which is a key to unlock some of these larger problems.

Over-simplifying, the Secretary said, we understand the Soviet problem concerning secrecy and espionage. We do not accept the basis for this Soviet attitude but we do understand that this is a serious problem [Page 631] for the Soviets. On our side, he said, you should try to understand the problem of suspicion and ignorance. The USSR occupies a vast area in the Eurasian heartland. The rest of us must have a reasonable assurance of what is going on in your country. This is not so much a problem for the USSR owing to the nature of our society, so that it looks to you as though our insistence on inspection means a unilateral concession to the West. Kuznetsov interjected that the Secretary exaggerated this point. The Secretary continued that the management of the waves of suspicion which would develop in the wake of ignorance constituted a real political problem. On testing, it should be possible to work out arrangements whereby we get the necessary assurances. We are willing to take some risks since after all the arms race itself is a risk. But the Secretary was hopeful that we could get what we want without raising the espionage problem for the Soviets.

Kuznetsov replied that the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament indicated Soviet willingness to permit inspection. According to these proposals, during the first stage of disarmament the Soviets would allow foreigners to visit factories manufacturing nuclear weapons, areas where armaments were being dismantled and armed units were being dis-armed. He said that Ambassador Dean had agreed that the Soviet proposal would open the door to the Soviet Union to a very wide extent. However, Kuznetsov said, the USSR is against control without disarmament. Regarding the cessation of nuclear tests, the Soviet position is that modern technology has given us the means by use of national detection systems to detect and verify seismic events. But wishing to meet the United States objection, we have agreed to on-site inspections in the number of 2, 3 or 4 a year.

The Secretary said that there must have been a misunderstanding regarding the number of on-site inspections required by the United States.

Kuznetsov rejoined that there was no misunderstanding and that the records would show the United States had talked in terms of two to four per annum. The figure of 8 or 10 had come up only in connection with black boxes. In general, he observed, at Geneva the United States Delegation had been extremely vague on the number of inspections they would insist upon, talking usually of “just a few”.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-1063. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Guthrie on January 11 and approved in S on January 16. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. Memoranda of their conversation on U.S.-Soviet relations are printed in vol. V, Documents 171 and 172, and one on Germany and Berlin is printed in vol. XV, pp. 474–475. Foster also met with Kuznetsov and Dobrynin; a memorandum of their conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Secretary of State.↩
  2. Regarding the discussions in Paris, see Document 249. Documentation on the meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in Nassau December 18-21, 1962, is printed in volume XIII.↩