23. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 0

SUBJECT

  • Future U.S. Policy Regarding Negotiations with the Soviets on the Test Ban

Mr. McCloy is contemplating a meeting of the Committee of Principals on Monday, 22 May,1 to discuss a memorandum which he has prepared on the above subject.2 The memorandum has not yet been transmitted formally to the Principals.

A briefing paper and an advance copy of Mr. McCloy’s memorandum are attached for your use at the proposed meeting.

William P. Bundy 3

Enclosure

BRIEFING PAPER

FUTURE UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE TEST BAN

Mr. McCloy has forwarded a memorandum on this subject (copy at Tab A) for discussion at an early meeting of the Committee of Principals, which he has proposed for Monday, 22 May. This memorandum, with more emphasis on the political aspects, covers the same ground as Dr. Harold Brown’s memorandum to you of 13 May 1961, Subject: Department of Defense Policy on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

Mr. McCloy’s memorandum sets forth accurately the current situation at Geneva, and states it is clear that the intent of the Soviet negotiators [Page 68] is to avoid a prompt conclusion of a test ban agreement. He poses two questions to be decided:

A.
Should the U.S. sometime in June or July of 1961 indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear tests?
B.
Should the U.S. actually detonate a nuclear device prior to July 31, 1961, and, if so, what sort of a nuclear device should be detonated?

The memorandum then covers objectively the arguments for and against the resumption of nuclear testing. Mr. McCloy concludes that if, after a final approach to Mr. Khrushchev by the President and Mr. Macmillan, there is no significant change in the Soviet approach, the United States, acting in concert with the United Kingdom, should indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear weapons tests, at the same time indicating the U.S. does not propose to test on the surface of the earth, in the ocean or in the sensible atmosphere. (This answers Question A.)

The memorandum then explores arguments for and against the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other device before July 31, 1961, and implies that a test of a nuclear weapon before that date would not be in our best interests. A nuclear detonation in the seismic research program (Vela Uniform) is indicated to be preferable. (This states an implied answer to Question B.)

Mr. McCloy then makes seven detailed recommendations (Section V, pages 22-24). These appear generally consistent with the recommended Defense position on resumption of nuclear weapon testing which was submitted by DDR&E on 13 May 1961 for the Secretary’s approval, and can be supported by Defense subject to the following comments:

a.
Recommendations 1 and 2 state in substance that if, after a high level approach to Mr. Khrushchev, no significant change ensues in the Soviet attitude, the U.S. should decide to resume nuclear weapons testing. Although not stated in the recommendations, the text of the memorandum (top of Page 11) states that “the U.S., acting in concert with the U.K., should indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear weapons tests.” In view of the past reluctance of the U.K. in this matter, the U.S. should be prepared to proceed unilaterally if necessary.
b.
Recommendation 4 states that the announcement would indicate that the U.S. “considers itself free to resume weapons testing and that it plans to do so as soon as this will afford it an advance in weapons development of major military significance.” Perhaps the U.S. in a public announcement should not be this specific, but should state the testing is essential to U.S. national security.
c.
The last sentence of Recommendation 4 states that it should be indicated the U.S. has no plans to test on the surface of the earth or in the sensible atmosphere, while the text of the memorandum (second paragraph, Page 11) also includes “in the ocean.” Defense would prefer the less restrictive language in the recommendation, and preferably some more general language regarding “tests which will produce relatively insignificant radiation effects.”

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 97 USP Nuclear Test Suspension/Geneva (1960-1962). Secret; Restricted Data. A copy was sent to Philip J. Farley.
  2. The meeting was held on May 23; see Document 26.
  3. This 24-page memorandum was attached but is not printed.
  4. Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.