184. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State0

Disto 414. In course of continuing consideration of possible future policies on nuclear test ban question believe Dept should bear in mind effect of current situation in test ban discussions here, both on any new policy decisions and on method of their presentation.

For four weeks now since presentation 8-power memo1USDel has addressed all statements on test ban in plenary and subcommittee primarily to that memo. We have of course been careful neither to abandon any portion of present US position on test ban nor to give appearance acceptance any suggestions in 8-power memo inconsistent with that position.

To do this we have carefully hedged all discussions of memo by putting them in guise of mere tentative explorations thereof. Nevertheless, we have drawn up long list of factors involved in test ban negotiations on which we have sought exchange of views as to how they would be handled under 8-nation plan.

By this tactic, we have been enabled meet Soviet move of claiming to accept memo as basis of negotiations, by creating impression that we too are seriously exploring its potentialities. We have taken line that Soviet acceptance is illusory because USSR only accepts its interpretation of memo and that this interpretation is almost same as Soviet position of Nov 28, 1961. Thus, we have made it appear that real issue is one of whose interpretation of terms of memo is correct, and co-sponsors have been deterred from involving themselves in this direct East-West quarrel by offering definitive interpretation of their own document.

This approach will continue to work as long as SovDel maintains current rigidity and insists that US commit itself to idea of “invitational inspection” (which we say is incorrect interpretation of memo) before SovDel will talk about working out any other details of treaty following 8-nation plan (such as inventory of national stations, composition of international scientific commission, etc.). However, if SovDel should begin to move from this, and, particularly, if SovDel should produce draft treaty allegedly implementing joint memo, we would be in difficult position which would require further instructions.

It would seem desirable to have foregoing tactical situation in mind in consideration of any new US moves. Whatever we may do, it should [Page 456] be, we believe, at least superficially, related to 8-nation proposals and related to recent conference discussions of test ban issue. Would also be useful for some official statements from Washington in near future to refer to joint memo, as indication of serious consideration which it is getting within US Govt.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1662. Confidential.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 175.